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Interest Groups and Social Policy in the United States 
 
American legislators are unlikely champions of the poor.  As reelection-seekers, 
legislators have few incentives to devote their scarce time, labor, and resources to 
constituents who can neither promise electoral rewards nor threaten electoral punishment.  
Yet interest organizations are active in lobbying legislators on behalf of low-income 
populations.  And despite the fact that they have few resources to exchange for favorable 
legislative action, organizational advocates for the poor sometimes emerge from 
legislative battles victorious.  Why does this occur?  How and under what conditions do 
advocates for the poor gain influence in national and state legislative settings?  
In this dissertation, I develop a theory of diverse coalition formation by interest 
groups to explain one way that organizational advocates for the poor achieve influence in 
legislative settings.  Building on literature on lobbying, information, and influence in 
Congress, I theorize that although advocates have limited funding and small membership 
bases, they can gain influence by building diverse coalitions with other interest groups.  
In building diverse coalitions, advocates can provide legislators with different types of 
informational resources – for example, when a group with substantive expertise partners 
with an organization with a large membership base, as well as a wider range of the same 
type of informational resource – for example, when groups with different areas of 
substantive expertise work together.  Because coalition building is costly, it can convince 
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legislators that the information being provided by the interest groups is credible. Diverse 
coalitions can therefore help advocates influence legislative outcomes. 
To test my theory, I analyze interest group advocacy, diverse coalition formation, 
and legislative outcomes at both national and state levels preceding and following the 
enactment of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996.  Popularly known as welfare reform, this act fundamentally 
changed the program of cash benefits to needy families in the United States.  Among 
other changes, the act eliminated the individual entitlement to cash benefits and devolved 
considerable program authority to the state level.   
The PRWORA provides a unique opportunity to test the predictions of my theory. 
At the federal level, the breadth and significance of the proposed changes to the 60-year 
old welfare program activated a large number of organizational advocates for the poor, 
who were for the most part opposed to the federal legislation.  At the state level, the 
federal legislation required each state government to submit plans defining the revised 
programmatic and funding structure of the state‘s welfare program to the federal 
government.  These plans were passed through the state legislature, virtually 
guaranteeing some form of lobbying by anti-poverty advocates in the legislative arena as 
they sought to modify what they perceived to be punitive provisions of the new law.  In 
addition, interest groups in every state had similar incentives to participate as they knew 
that a welfare reform bill with a particular set of provisions would come before the state 
legislature.  Analyzing the behavior of interest groups during this time can provide 
insight into the strategies that anti-poverty advocates use to further the interests of the 
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poor, and the relative impact that these strategies have on legislative outcomes both at the 
national level and across states.    
In this introductory chapter, I provide an overview of my theory of diverse 
coalitions, and outline the methods used to test the theory.  I also present key findings, 
and offer an overview of each chapter.  I begin by introducing the theoretical and 
empirical questions that underlie my dissertation project.   
 
Poverty, Political Participation and Social Policy 
Low-income populations face multiple barriers to political participation.  Formal 
barriers restrict the voting rights of non-naturalized immigrants and institutionalized 
populations, and ex-offenders in some states.  Many low-income people also experience 
informal barriers that interfere with their ability and motivation to participate.  For 
example, poor populations often lack the time, money, and civic skills that enable 
individuals to become involved in political organizations, contribute to political 
candidates and campaigns, and participate in elections.  Many are also isolated from 
networks of political engagement, and are less likely to report belief in their political 
efficacy (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).  As a result, 
the poor are less likely to vote, contact public officials, engage in protests or 
demonstrations, or become involved in political campaigns (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 
and Nie 1993, 305).  
This is relevant for social policymaking in several ways.  First, legislators are held 
accountable for their actions through the electoral system.  Elected officials have strong 
incentives to place greater importance on the preferences of constituents who contribute 
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time, money, and votes in future elections (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Mayhew 1974).
 
 If 
low-income populations do not participate, they are less able to punish or reward 
legislators for addressing their concerns in policy.  It is also true that legislators simply 
have more information on the preferences of politically active constituents because these 
individuals are more likely to make their opinions known through voting, time and 
monetary contributions, and personal communications.   
Second, politically active populations differ from other constituents with respect 
to their individual characteristics as well as their policy preferences (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993; Verba et al.1993, 1995).  This means that the preferences that legislators 
take into account when making social policy differ from the preferences of poor 
populations:  
―Those whose preferences and needs become visible to policymakers through 
their activity are unrepresentative of those who are more quiescent in ways that 
are of great political significance: although similar in their attitudes, they differ in 
their personal circumstances and dependence upon government benefits, in their 
priorities for government action, and in what they say when they get involved‖ 
(Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie 1993: 314).   
 
When the poor do not participate, or when legislators disregard the policy preferences of 
the low-income population, social policy is not likely to reflect their preferences. This is 
important because the poor tend to have different policy preferences than higher-income 
populations.  
 Yet this does not mean that the voices and concerns of the poor are entirely absent 
in the policymaking process.  This is because low-income populations are often 
represented in legislative settings by interest organizations, or groups that seek public or 
private ends through political action (Berry and Arons 2003; Hays 2001; Imig 1996; 
Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  There are many different types of organizations that 
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advocate on behalf of the poor – including public interest law firms, intergovernmental 
organizations and federal agencies, research institutions, citizen groups, and nonprofit 
organizations (Hays 2001; Imig 1997). Most individuals within these organizations are 
not poor but rather share an interest in expanding anti-poverty programs for either 
ideological or professional reasons.   
For the majority of these organizations, the obstacles to legislative representation 
are acute.  Research institutions and government actors lack an active membership and 
thus have fewer electoral resources to exchange for favorable political attention 
(Salisbury 1984).  Nonprofits regularly interact with disadvantaged populations, but most 
do not engage in extensive lobbying for fear of losing their tax-exempt status (Berry and 
Arons 2003).  Social welfare organizations and public interest groups also have fewer 
monetary resources than other types of organizations, relying heavily on individual dues, 
gifts, or donations (Berry 1977; Scholzman and Tierney 1986).   
These characteristics have implications for the lobbying behavior of advocates for 
the poor.  Advocates have strong incentives to pursue strategies of influence that do not 
rely on the monetary or electoral resources of any individual organization, but rather 
utilize advocates‘ extensive informational resources. 
 
A Theory of Diverse Coalitions and Legislative Influence 
I theorize that advocates build diverse coalitions in order to diversify and add 
credibility to the information that they provide to legislators.  Coalitions that are diverse 
with respect to the organizational type, policy domain, or ideology of member 
organizations can provide legislators with a broader range of information.  In addition, 
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diverse collaboration can offer evidence that information being provided is credible.  
Political scientists have argued that when interest groups engage in costly lobbying, they 
offer a signal to legislators that the information that are providing is credible (Ainsworth 
1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1991, 1994; Kollman 1998).  Because diverse coalition 
building is costly in terms of resources, policy positions, reputation, and lost opportunity, 
it provides evidence that the information provided by the coalition is credible.  In 
providing both more information and credible information, diverse coalition building can 
lead to legislative influence.  
This theory produces a set of testable implications.  First, the theory predicts that 
anti-poverty advocates will engage in diverse coalition building as a strategy of 
legislative influence.  Second, the theory predicts that diverse coalitions will result in 
favorable policies for the poor.  To refine the predictions of the theory, I develop a formal 
theoretic model in which two interest groups – an anti-poverty advocacy group and a 
group opposed to generous social welfare programs – complete for a median legislator‘s 
vote.  The model shows that anti-poverty advocates will gain influence when they view 
an issue as salient and when potential partners view an issue as salient.  When these two 
conditions are met, advocates will build diverse coalitions when political conflict is high 
and when opponents of social welfare programs control the legislature. 
 
Research Design 
I pursue a multi-method research design, employing formal-theoretic models, 
statistical models, and case studies, to better understand the research hypotheses. A multi-
method approach allows me to isolate and test mechanisms of influence that would not be 
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identified through a single methodology.  The formal-theoretic model, presented in 
Chapter 4, is used to refine the predictions of my theory.  Research suggests that the costs 
and anticipated benefits of coalition building vary alongside features of the political 
context, such as the strength of opponents, level of political conflict, and partisan control 
of the legislature (Heaney 2004; Hojnacki 1998; Hula 1999). The goal of the model is to 
identify how such contextual features impact collaborative behavior and influence.  This 
is important, in part, because the project uses cross-state comparisons to test the empirical 
predictions of the theory.  If coalition formation is affected by contextual features that 
vary at the state level, such factors are important to take into account. 
In the empirical chapters, I focus on coalition formation and influence at the 
national and state levels preceding and following the passage of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 (i.e. 
welfare reform).  At the national level, I use existing case studies, hearings testimony, 
and media reports to document diverse coalition building by anti-poverty advocates took 
place in the two years preceding the passage of the PWRORA.  The goal in this chapter is 
not to write a new history of the federal welfare reform, as many excellent case studies 
have already been written (Haskins 2004; Heclo 2001; Weaver 2000; Winston 2002).  
Rather, the goal is to use existing primary and secondary sources to focus attention on the 
collaborative behavior of anti-poverty advocates during this period.   
The state-level analysis is divided into two parts: a quantitative analysis of all 
states and a qualitative analysis of 15 states.  For the quantitative analysis, I estimate a 
series of logistic regressions to analyze the relationship between the characteristics of a 
state‘s interest group population and welfare policy adoption, for all states. These tests 
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use data compiled from a wide range of sources, including existing studies of state policy 
decisions following the PRWORA (Blank and Schmidt 2001; Pavetti and Bloom 2001; 
Soss et al. 2001), public databases of state-level policies and characteristics (Urban 
Institute Welfare Rules Database, University of Kentucky Poverty Research Center), and 
a dataset of interest group registrations at the state level (Gray and Lowery 2000).   
For the qualitative analysis, I explore diverse coalition formation at the state level 
by reviewing case studies of state-level welfare policy choices, including Heaney (2004), 
Winston (2002), and the Urban Institute‘s Assessing the New Federalism Case Studies 
(1998), and newspaper articles about advocacy group activity at the state level.  The case 
studies either focused on interest group advocacy at the state level during welfare reform, 
or provided an overview of the political context of state welfare policy making following 
the PRWORA.  Because all authors interviewed the key organizational participants in 
each state, these case studies help me to identify whether diverse coalitions existed and 
were active at the state level prior to, or formed in response to the welfare reform.  To 
provide additional information on the organizational actors involved in welfare reform at 
the state level, I reviewed newspaper articles from each state during the two years 




 The empirical tests provide support for the hypothesis that organizational 
advocates for the poor build diverse coalitions as a strategy of legislative influence.  At 
both national and state levels, advocates built coalitions in an attempt to prevent 
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legislators from adopting policies that would severely restrict or eliminate supports for 
welfare recipients and their children. The vast majority of collaborative efforts were 
informal, and diversified either the types of resources that advocates could bring to the 
policy debate (for example, substantive and electoral resources), or diversified a single 
type of resources (for example, technical information about the likely impact of a policy 
from a variety of perspectives).  Ideological diversity was less prevalent than diversity 
with respect to an organization‘s type or policy domain.   
At the national level, diverse coalitions emerged on a set of policies known as 
―child exclusion‖ policies, which would prevent welfare payments on behalf of children 
born to teen mothers, additional payments to mothers currently receiving welfare, or 
children whose paternity had not been established.  At the state level, collaborative 
efforts were more broadly focused on preventing legislators from enacting the strictest 
policy instruments.  At the very least, diverse coalition building appears to require that 
advocacy groups have experience and centrality in a policy network.  Other features of 
the political context – for example, a high level of political conflict and Republican 
control of the legislature – seem to be sufficient but not necessary conditions for diverse 
coalition formation. 
There is limited evidence that diverse coalition building influenced legislative 
outcomes during welfare reform – at least for anti-poverty advocates.  For example, 
although diverse coalitions formed at the national level on a set of issues known as ―child 
exclusion‖ issues, the current tests do not indicate that such coalitions caused legislators 
to enact more lenient policies (see Chapter 5).  However, diverse coalition building did 
seem to yield influence for intergovernmental groups and socially conservative groups.  
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In addition, particularly at the state level, coalitions that were diverse with respect to 
organizational type, policy domain, and region, but less so with respect to ideology, 
seemed to function more to provide technical information to legislators interested in the 
substantive impact of policies (see Chapter 6).  
 These findings suggest that diverse coalition building is an important strategy for 
organizational advocates that lack monetary and electoral resources.  However, like many 
lobbying strategies, its relationship to legislative influence is ambiguous. Future 
empirical tests are necessary to address measurement issues that may have affected the 
ability of some of these tests to assess actual influence.  
 
Overview of Chapters 
In Chapter 2, I situate this puzzle within the literature on interest group lobbying 
and influence in Congress. I argue that while interest groups are the primary means 
through which politically disadvantaged populations such as the poor find their interests 
represented in government, advocates for the poor are disadvantaged with respect to 
many of the resources that facilitate access and influence in legislative settings – namely, 
money and votes.  Consequently, organizational advocates for the poor utilize strategies 
of influence that do not rely on the monetary or electoral resources of any single 
organization, as well as strategies that make use of organizations‘ extensive informational 
resources.   
In this chapter, I introduce the types of interest groups that are active on poverty-
related policy issues, and explore how interest groups gain access and influence in 
American legislatures, focusing specifically on the way in which interest groups persuade 
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legislators to adopt group-friendly positions through the strategic use of information.  I 
provide an overview of the types of information that interest groups provide, the 
strategies that interest groups use to convey information to legislators, and introduce 
coalition building as a strategy for credibly conveying information to legislators. 
Chapter 3 presents my theory of diverse coalition building and legislative 
influence among organizational advocates for the poor.  In this chapter, I explore how 
coalitions provide legislators with electoral, policy, and political information.  I argue 
that coalitions that are diverse with respect to the organizational type, issue domain, or 
ideology of coalition partners are capable of providing more information to legislators, 
and thus may be more likely to gain influence in legislative settings.  Diverse 
collaboration can offer legislators different types of informational resources– for 
example, when a group with substantive expertise (policy information) collaborates with 
an organization with a large membership base (electoral information).  Diverse 
partnerships can also provide a wider range of the same type of information, for example, 
when organizations with different areas of substantive expertise work together (policy 
information).  Diverse coalitions are costly to build, and consequently will be unlikely to 
form unless all partners view the policy issue as salient.  As a result, diverse coalitions 
indicate that the information being provided by interest groups is credible.  Two 
hypotheses emerge from the theory presented in Chapter 3: advocates for the poor will try 
to build diverse coalitions, and diverse coalitions will yield legislative influence.   
In Chapter 4, I employ formal theoretic modeling to refine these predictions.  I 
model the process of coalition building and influence as a signaling game with three 
players: an anti-poverty advocacy group, an ―opposition‖ group opposed to any 
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additional programs for the poor, and a median legislator.  My model predicts that an 
anti-poverty advocate can gain influence in two ways: by bargaining with opposing 
interest groups, or by building a diverse coalition with other advocates.  An advocacy 
group‘s decision to bargain or build a diverse coalition is affected by the level of political 
conflict and partisan control of the government.  When political conflict is low and 
Democrats are in the majority, the model predicts that advocates will be more likely to 
gain influence through bargaining with opponents of social programs.  When political 
conflict is high and Republicans are in the majority, advocates will be more likely to gain 
influence through building diverse coalitions.   
In chapters five and six, I test the predictions of the theory using the federal 
welfare reform of the mid-1990s as my empirical example.  As mentioned previously, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA), or welfare reform, ended a 60-year guarantee of cash assistance by 
replacing the entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
with the block grant program Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).  TANF 
differed from its predecessor in that benefits were time-limited and made conditional on 
participation in employment-related activities. The policy also contained provisions 
designed to discourage out-of-wedlock childbirth and teen pregnancy.  Many 
programmatic decisions were devolved from the national to state level, and states were 
granted significant discretion over a wide range of issues, including work incentives, 
generosity of benefits, program time limits, and sanctions for non-compliant behavior. 
In the fifth chapter, I analyze interest group activity at the national level to 
provide empirical support for two predictions of the theory: that anti-poverty advocates 
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build coalitions that are diverse with respect to the informational resources of partner 
organizations, and that diverse coalitions help organizational actors influence legislative 
outcomes.  The data show that anti-poverty advocates engaged in diverse coalition 
building as a strategy of legislative influence during welfare reform, and that most 
collaborative efforts were informal rather than formal.  While the evidence is somewhat 
weak for the hypothesis that diverse coalitions lead to more generous outcomes for the 
poor, the data show that organizations that were opposed to generous social policies also 
engaged in diverse collaboration as a strategy of legislative influence, and that these 
collaborative efforts were associated with legislative influence. 
 In the sixth chapter, I test the empirical implications of the theoretical model at 
the state level.  First, to explore the hypothesis that generous policy outcomes are more 
likely in states where strong advocates, or those capable of building diverse coalitions, 
are more likely, I examine whether the presence of advocacy groups and partners was 
associated with the adoption of three types of welfare policies: welfare-to-work policies, 
child exclusion policies, and strict welfare policies. The data provide very little support 
for the hypothesis that the strength of anti-poverty advocates was associated with 
favorable policy outcomes for the poor.  However, it is unclear whether the lack of an 
association is due to a lack of actual influence, or to measurement issues.  Second, using 
a subset of 15 states, I explore how diverse coalition formation at the state level varied 
with features of the state political context, including the professionalism of the state 
legislature, partisan control, and number of anti-poverty advocates.  In these states, 
coalitional behavior was most likely in states with characteristics similar to the federal 
level.  However, the lack of a strong association between features of the political context 
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and coalition formation suggests that organizational, rather than contextual, 
characteristics may be more important determinants of collaborative activity. 
 In the final chapter, I situate my findings within the context of recent research on 
interest group lobbying and influence in the United States.  I propose future lines of 
inquiry based on the formal theoretic model and findings from the project. 
 
Conclusion 
This dissertation contributes to research on interest group advocacy and social 
policymaking.  While social policy scholars have examined differences in policies across 
states, few systematically evaluate the role of interest and advocacy groups in 
contributing to differences in policy adoption across states.  Existing research on state 
variation in social policy tends to emphasize broad associations between the social, 
economic, and political characteristics of a state, and the types of policies adopted. Yet 
research on policy adoption at the national level lends support to the argument that 
special interests are powerful players in policy decisions, and the lack of attention paid to 
the influence of special interests in state policymaking represents a significant gap in the 
social policy literature. 
Additionally, existing theories of legislative decision-making fail to adequately 
explain how and why legislators make decisions on social welfare policy issues.  While it 
is well-established that legislators respond to politically active constituents, they also 
sometimes vote to increase benefits to disadvantaged populations.  By focusing on the 
process through which disadvantaged populations achieve representation, this project can 
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help scholars understand the conditions under which legislators vote in favor of policies 
distributing benefits to individuals who cannot influence their chances of reelection. 
Finally, a key contribution of this theory to the interest group literature is to 
illuminate the ways in which properties other than the size of an interest group coalition 
generate opportunities for political access and influence.  Viewing coalition building 
through the lens of information helps provide a basis for understanding how the diversity 
of a coalition - either in conjunction with, or irrespective of its size - can translate into 
political power in legislative settings.    
 16 
Chapter 2 
Interest Group Advocacy and Influence on Behalf of the Poor 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the fundamental empirical issue that my 
dissertation addresses.  Because the poor are unable or unlikely to vote, they cannot hold 
representatives accountable for failing to address their concerns.  Legislators thus have 
little to gain by voting in favor of programs that benefit the poor, particularly when those 
programs face organized opposition and when the intended recipients are widely viewed 
as undeserving of public benefits (Mayhew 1974).  And yet programs for the poor are 
enacted by legislatures at both national and state levels – sometimes even in the face of 
strong opposition.  Why does this occur? How and under what conditions do the poor 
achieve representation and influence in American legislative settings? 
In this chapter, I situate this puzzle within the literature on interest group lobbying 
and influence in Congress. Interest groups are the primary means through which 
politically disadvantaged populations such as the poor find their interests represented in 
government. And yet interest groups that represent the poor are disadvantaged with 
respect to many of the resources that facilitate access and influence in legislative settings.  
Consequently, organizational advocates for the poor utilize strategies of influence that do 
not rely on the electoral or monetary resources of any single organization, as well as 
 17 
strategies that make use of organizations‘ extensive informational – rather than monetary 
or electoral - resources.   
I begin the chapter by introducing the types of interest groups that are active on 
poverty-related policy issues.  In the second section, I review how interest groups gain 
access and influence in American legislatures, focusing specifically on how interest 
groups attempt to persuade legislators to adopt group-friendly positions through the 
strategic use of information.  In the third section, I provide an overview of the strategies 
that interest groups use to convey information to legislators. The fourth section 
introduces coalition building as a strategy for credibly conveying information to 
legislators, and the fifth section concludes. 
 
Who Represents the Poor? 
The interests of the poor are represented by many different types of interest 
organizations, which are groups that seek public or private ends through political action 
(Berry and Arons 2003; Hays 2001; Imig 1996; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
1
 In 
legislative settings, representation by interest organizations is critical because low-
income populations have few opportunities to signal their interests to their elected 
representatives.  Advocacy on behalf of such populations is also distinct: organizational 
advocates for the poor typically have few monetary or electoral resources at their disposal 
                                                 
1
 Definitions of interest group vary widely.  For some scholars, an interest group is defined by the 
voluntary and unpaid nature of joint activity. For other scholars, an interest group is defined not by the 
characteristics of association, but rather by a shared characteristic among members (for example, a shared 
demographic characteristic or political belief) that has consequences for political behavior.  Most 
definitions in political science require some degree of formal organization, but beyond this requirement 
there are many different definitions. For example, some definitions of interest group refer only to 
organizations whose members include individuals or other organizations (Walker 1991), while others 
incorporate organizations without formal members, such as institutions (Gray and Lowery 1996; Heinz et 
al. 1993; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; see Baumgartner and Leech 1998 (especially pages 25-30) for a 
review). 
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for influencing legislators, and some face real or perceived legal constraints on their 
lobbying behavior (Berry and Arons 2003).  Advocates also make up a relatively small 
percentage of national and state pressure communities, defined as communities of 
organizational actors seeking to influence policymaking.  
Political scientists generally classify interest groups by their membership structure 
or the type of interest they represent.  Some organizations have individuals or groups as 
members (referred to as membership groups and associations, respectively), while others 
have no formal membership structure (referred to as institutional actors).  Interest groups 
are mobilized around a wide range of interests – some related to a shared professional or 
demographic characteristic of group members, others related to broader public concerns.  
Both classifications are useful for thinking about the types of organizations that represent 
the poor, the lobbying strategies that these organizations use to gain influence, and their 
relative success in securing favorable legislative outcomes. 
Advocacy groups are among the most active in lobbying on behalf of the poor. 
Advocacy groups are membership-based organizations that seek selective benefits for 
individuals who are unable to represent their own interests, including the poor, children, 
non-naturalized immigrants, and institutionalized populations (Schlozman and Tierney 
1986).
2
  Most scholars view advocacy groups as a type of citizen group, which is a 
membership group mobilized around an interest other than the vocation or profession of 
its members (Berry 2000; Imig 1999; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
3
  In practice, these 
                                                 
2
 This definition essentially combines Schlozman and Tierney‟s (1986) definitions of advocacy group and 
social welfare organization (45-48). 
3
 Definitions of advocacy groups and citizen groups also vary. Imig (1999) includes institutional actors in 
his definition of advocacy group.  Schlozman and Tierney (1986) define citizen groups as organizations 
that pursue non-material and non-vocational benefits, while Berry (1999) defines citizen groups as 
organizations pursuing material or non-material and non-vocational benefit.  The definition employed here 
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types of groups are often indistinguishable from one another: for example, the National 
Coalition for the Homeless can alternatively be described as an advocacy group for the 
homeless or a citizen group seeking to end the problem of homelessness for society as a 
whole.  Advocacy groups and citizen groups are an extremely small percentage of the 
interest group community, representing less than 7 percent of all interest groups 
registered to lobby in Washington in the 1990s.
4
    
Groups that represent low-income individuals – or anti-poverty advocacy groups 
– are an even smaller percentage of the pressure community.
5
  This fact may seem 
surprising given the size of advocates‘ potential membership base.  For example, while 
over 10 percent of American families were poor in the early 1980s, advocacy groups 
representing the poor constituted less than 1 percent of all Washington interest 
organizations during this time (Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  The under-representation 
of anti-poverty advocacy groups is due in part to the fact that interest group mobilization 
requires resources that many poor populations lack. ―Membership in organizations,‖ 
Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 61-62) note, ―makes specific demands of a material nature 
that many other forms of political participation do not.  These demands might pose a 
                                                                                                                                                 
is most similar to Berry‟s (1999) in that it does not restrict citizen groups to those pursuing non-material 
benefits. 
4
 Because there are so many definitions of advocacy groups and citizen groups, it is difficult to arrive at a 
precise estimate of their presence in national or state pressure communities.  This approximation is based 
on Baumgartner and Leech‟s (2001) tally of the number of „nonprofit and citizen groups‟ present in 
lobbying registration rolls in the late 1990s, and Berry‟s (1999) discussion of the decline of citizen groups 
in the decades following Schlozman and Tierney‟s (1986) survey of interest groups. Baumgartner and 
Leech (2001) find that „nonprofits and citizen groups‟ represented 7 percent of all Washington-based 
interest organizations in 1997, and Berry (1999) argues that the percentage of citizen groups in Washington 
had decreased from Schlozman and Tierney‟s (1986) estimate of 7 percent by the 1990s.   
5
 Although anti-poverty advocacy groups are underrepresented in the pressure community, some research 
suggests that the number of groups mobilized around poverty-related policy issues is increasing. For 
example, Gray and Lowery found that the number of nonprofits registered to lobby at the state level on the 
issue of ―welfare‖ increased by over 200 percent from 1980 to 1997. Yet despite this increase, advocacy 
groups still represent an extremely small percentage of national and state pressure communities.  
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particular barrier to lower-status citizens.‖ In addition, the diversity of low-income 
populations hinders the development of a sense of shared identity, which can facilitate 
political mobilization.  As Imig (1999, 2) argues:  
―The diversity of low-income Americans helps to explain the historical paucity of 
political action by the poor. To act as a group, poor people would need to see 
themselves as undergoing a common plight-yet they have little or nor opportunity 
to recognize the shared aspects of their condition.‖  
 
For these reasons, the poor are underrepresented in the interest community. 
Fortunately, the interests of the poor are also represented by non-membership 
organizations such as public interest law firms, research institutions, public charities, and 
intergovernmental actors.  Public interest law firms are organizations that pursue non-
vocational interests but emphasize legal strategies for influencing policy outcomes, and 
research institutions are groups that seek to influence policy through the creation and 
dissemination of research (Schlozman and Tierney 1986). These institutional actors lack 
the resources that derive from a large and politically active membership base, but many 
have significant financial resources from federal funding, foundation grants, and 
donations (Imig 1999; Weaver 1989).  Like advocacy and citizen groups, public interest 
law firms and research institutions are a relatively small percentage of the pressure 
community, although the number of such organizations – particularly conservative 
organizations – active on poverty-related policy issues has increased in recent decades 
(Rich and Weaver 1998; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Weaver 1989).
6
 
                                                 
6
 It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of research institutions and public interest law firms relative to other 
types of interest groups because few scholars separate these types of organizations from other institutional 
actors. In general, institutional actors are a small percentage of all interest groups: in 1996, institutional 
actors (such as hospitals, universities, etc) represented less than 10 percent of all Washington-based interest 
groups (Baumgartner and Leech 2001). 
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Public charities and intergovernmental groups are institutions that are active on 
the issue of poverty but are frequently overlooked in the interest group scholarship.  Most 
scholars do not classify public charities – also referred to by their IRS designation as 
―nonprofit 501c3 organizations‖ – as interest groups, in part because these groups ―are 
almost always founded for some purpose other than advocacy in the policymaking 
process‖ (Berry and Arons 2003: 24).   Nonprofit 501c3 organizations are also legally 
prohibited from contributing to political campaigns and lobbying national and state 
legislators – two activities that most scholars would consider essential activities of 
interest groups.
7
  Despite these restrictions, many public charities ―act like‖ interest 
groups in their interactions with government officials, especially at state and local levels. 
Additionally, a small number of public charities are ―H-electors‖ – a legal designation 
that allows them to ignore the limits on legislative lobbying (Berry and Arons 2003).  For 
this reason, Berry and Arons (2003) argue that public charities should be classified as 
interest groups:  
―Nonprofits ―speak for,‖ ―act for,‖ and ―look after the interests‖ of those they are 
concerned about. And if an organization speaks for, acts for, or looks after the 
interests of constituents when it interacts with government, it is, by any definition 
of political science, an interest group‖ (Berry and Arons 2003: 30-31).   
Thus although nonprofit actors encounter unique restrictions on their ability to lobby in 
legislative settings, I classify them as interest organizations in this analysis. 
Over the past several decades, intergovernmental organizations have become 
increasingly active on the issue of poverty (Imig 1999; Weaver 2001).  Intergovernmental 
                                                 
7
 Because public charities provide services to needy populations, they receive special tax exemptions that 
allow them to receive tax-deductible donations.  In exchange, public charities are prohibited from 
legislative lobbying.  Technically, nonprofit 501c3 organizations are prohibited from “substantial” lobbying 
of national and state legislators, but the IRS has never explicitly defined this term.  These organizations 
have the option of becoming “H-electors” – a designation that essentially allows them to ignore the limits 
on legislative lobbying.  Few 501c3 organizations become H-electors (Berry and Arons 2003).   
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organizations are groups that represent subnational governments – such as cities, 
counties, and states, and groups of government officials – such as governors, mayors, or 
county welfare directors.  Their presence on this issue has been attributed to an increase 
in the number of social welfare programs created at the national level but administered by 
state and local governments (Cammisa 1995).  Although some social welfare programs 
were devolved to lower levels of government in the 1990s, many remain tied to 
policymaking at the national level, and intergovernmental organizations provide a vehicle 
through which state and local officials can voice their interests to national policymakers.  
Intergovernmental organizations are fairly common in the pressure community. In the 
mid-1990s, subnational governments and intergovernmental organizations represented 
approximately 16 percent of those registered to lobby at the national level (Baumgartner 
and Leech 2001) and research suggests that intergovernmental groups are similarly 
prevalent in state-level pressure communities (Nownes and Freeman 1998). While many 
scholars do not classify intergovernmental organizations as interest groups, this 
distinction is somewhat arbitrary:   
―[Intergovernmental organizations] have so many affinities to private 
organizations that the boundary between these public sector organizations and the 
private ones ordinarily subsumed under organized interest politics is often very 
fuzzy‖ (Schlozman and Tierney 1986: 56).   
 
Particularly in the domain of social welfare policy, intergovernmental actors are an 
important organizational presence.  
Finally, labor unions, which are groups organized for collective bargaining 
purposes, and professional organizations, which are organizations that represent the 
interests of individuals in a particular profession, frequently partner with advocacy 
groups and institutional actors to pursue policies that further the interests of the poor 
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(Imig 1999; Nownes 2006; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  For example, during the 
federal welfare reform of the mid-1990s, unions such as the AFL-CIO, American Postal 
Workers Union, United Farm Workers of America, and Service Employee International 
Union sponsored joint advertisements with anti-poverty advocates in support of policies 
that would maintain cash benefits for needy families (New York Times August 8, 1995).  
Because they are not mobilized around the issue of poverty, the extent to which these 
organizations will ally with anti-poverty advocates is mediated by their own 
organizational needs and those of their membership base. Labor unions and professional 
organizations must first and foremost consider the interests of their members. Only after 
those interests are addressed will they consider allying with organizations in other issue 
areas.
8
   
To summarize, poverty-related policy issues draw many types of organizational 
actors into play.  Institutional actors such as public interest law firms, research 
institutions, public charities, and intergovernmental organizations are among the most 
active, along with advocacy groups and citizen groups.  Many of these groups are 
underrepresented in the pressure community, particularly given the size of their potential 
membership base and the magnitude of the social problems they seek to address.  Many 
are also disadvantaged with respect to the resources that facilitate political influence, 
such as money and votes.   
How then do organizational advocates for the poor achieve influence in legislative 
settings?  To answer this question, it is necessary to review existing research on interest 
                                                 
8
 For example, during the Reagan administration, labor unions – traditional allies of the poor – were unable 
to assist advocacy groups in lobbying against government cuts to poverty-related programs. Imig (1999) 
argues: “Assaults on labor meant fewer grants and organizational support from labor to poor people‟s 
groups and forced labor‟s own lobbying efforts inward, that is, toward their own concerns rather than 
toward the poor” (13).  
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group influence in Congress.  The next section briefly reviews this literature, focusing 
specifically on the way in which interest groups attempt to gain influence by through 
their strategic use of information.  
 
How Interest Groups Influence Legislators: Information and Persuasion in Congress  
Interest group scholars disagree about the precise mechanisms of group influence 
in Congress (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998 and Hall and Deardorff 2006 for 
reviews).
9
  Some scholars argue that interest groups and legislators trade campaign 
contributions for votes, and that lobbying is essentially an exchange relationship (Snyder 
1992; McCarty and Rothenberg 1996). Others understand lobbying as a form of 
persuasion, emphasizing the strategic transmission of information from interest group to 
legislator (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1991, 1994; Kollman 1998), or 
subsidy, in which a lobbyist subsidizes the resources of legislators with similar policy 
goals (Hall and Deardorff 2006).   
My theory characterizes lobbying as a form of persuasion in which interest groups 
use information, rather than campaign contributions, to persuade legislators to adopt 
group-friendly positions.  Conceptualizing lobbying as persuasion is appropriate for two 
                                                 
9
 Baumgartner and Leech (1998) argue that despite decades of thoughtful and systematic research, scholars 
have failed to identify how and when groups gain influence. Several factors lead to a lack of progress in the 
area of interest group influence in Congress. First, scholars conceive of influence occurring in several 
different ways (Hall and Deardorff 2007). Second, underlying divergent theoretical perspectives is a lack of 
shared vocabulary for terms such as interest, interest group, membership, lobbying, and influence. Third, 
even within a given theoretical perspective, empirical analyses yield inconsistent findings. For example, 
some studies find strong evidence that contributions from political action committees (PACs) are associated 
with favorable roll-call votes and/or increased involvement on legislation behind the scenes (in committee 
hearings, for example) (Hall and Wayman 1990). Some find limited or conditional evidence of influence, 
and still others fail to find evidence of any influence at all (see Smith 1995).  Finally, but perhaps most 
importantly, influence is often unobservable, making the measurement of influence a notoriously difficult 
task (Bachrach and Maratz 1962; Dahl 1957; Salisbury 1994; see Baumgartner and Leech 1998 for a 
review).   
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reasons.  First, nearly all legislators have strong incentives to legislate against the 
interests of the poor.  Low-income populations have low levels of political participation, 
and legislators have little to gain by distributing benefits away from politically powerful 
groups and toward politically disadvantaged groups. Consequently, lobbying on behalf of 
the poor often involves an attempt to change the preferences of legislators – typically by 
persuading legislators to adopt group-friendly positions.  
Second, characterizing lobbying as persuasion highlights the important role of 
information, rather than campaign contributions, in social welfare policymaking.  
Advocates for the poor have few monetary resources to exchange for favorable political 
activity and some are legally prohibited from contributing to political campaigns. As a 
result, these organizations rely disproportionately on informational resources to gain 
access and influence in Congress (Berry and Arons 2003; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).   
 
Information as a Mechanism of Influence 
―Of all the resources that an interest group can offer policymakers, information is 
the most specialized. It is not a commodity, but, rather, is endlessly varied, highly 
differentiated in quality, and constantly in demand. As such, it is a way that [an 
interest group] can distinguish itself from the pack, drawing the attention of the 
government officials it wants to cultivate‖ (Berry and Arons 2003:145). 
 
Theories of persuasion view information as the central mechanism of influence in 
legislative settings.  Legislators have extensive informational needs, but neither the time 
nor the resources to develop expertise on every political issue.  In contrast, interest 
organizations possess information about the direction and intensity of constituents‘ policy 
preferences (electoral information), substantive information about the relationship 
between policy instruments and desired outcomes (policy information), and political 
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information about the policy preferences and likely behavior of other political actors 
(political information).
10
 As a result, legislators rely on interest organizations as a low-
cost source of information (Ainsworth 1993; Austin-Smith and Banks 2002; Austen-
Smith and Wright 1992, 1994; Esterling 2004; Hansen 1991; Kollman 1998; Lohmann 
1993; Potters and Van Winden 1992).
11
 
 As introduced above, there are three types of information used to influence 
legislators.  Electoral information reveals the shape and electoral relevance of 
constituents‘ policy preferences (Arnold 1990; Esterling 2004).
12
 Although most 
Americans will never receive benefits such as cash welfare, food subsidies, or housing 
vouchers, many have strong beliefs about policies that provide benefits to low-income 
populations (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Gilens 1999; Hochschild 1981).  Legislators must 
consider both the direction and salience of these beliefs before taking action on poverty-
related issues.  Salience refers to the importance that constituents place on their 
preferences, and helps legislators determine the likelihood that these preferences will 
impact voting behavior.  This attribute is more difficult for legislators to assess than 
direction, because salience can change rapidly in response to a crisis or disaster, media 
coverage of a new problem, or skilled use of an issue by an electoral candidate (Kollman 
                                                 
10
 These three categories are adapted from the work of Arnold (1990), Esterling (2004), Hall and Deardorff 
(2006), Krehbiel (1992), and Schlozman and Tierney (1986).  While most scholars separate technical (or 
policy) information from electoral information, some bundle electoral and political information together 
under the single heading of electoral or political information. 
11
 Interest groups are only one source of information for legislators, who also receive information from 
other members of Congress, political parties, Congressional staff, and the media.  Interest groups compete 
with these other actors for the attention of legislators. Hansen (1991) argues that legislators will grant 
access to interest groups when interest groups provide information more effectively and efficiently than 
other actors, and when legislators expect particular groups, issues, and circumstances to recur. 
12
 Beliefs about policy instruments are referred to as policy preferences, while beliefs about policy 
outcomes are referred to as outcome preferences.  On many issues, the latter are more developed and 
defined than the former (Arnold 1990). For example, an individual may believe that the government should 
reduce air pollution (an outcome preference) without having a strong preference for which strategies are 
enacted to do so. Policies related to poverty frequently evoke both policy and outcome preferences, and as a 
result legislators must be concerned with both (Feldman and Zaller 1992; Hochschild 1981).   
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1998).  However, as representatives of various groups of constituents, interest 
organizations possess ‗channels of communication‘ with constituents, and are able to 
assess the direction and salience of their members‘ policy preferences with relative ease 
and efficiency (Goldstein 1999; Hansen 1991; Kollman 1998).    
 Policy information is substantive information about a policy problem, instrument, 
or outcome, as well as information about the hypothesized relationship between the 
problem, instrument, and outcome (called the causal framework). Although some 
scholars contend that legislators care little about policy information, research shows that 
technical policy expertise is associated with greater access to legislators in Congress 
(Esterling 2004). Esterling (2004, 83) argues that: ―because Congress wants to avoid 
unintended consequences, such as a disastrous or unusually divisive policy, it wants to 
learn about the causal framework [of the policy] to illuminate the likely consequences of 
the intervention….‖  Policy information helps legislators choose policies that have a high 
likelihood of success while avoiding policies with uncertain or undesirable outcomes.  
Interest organizations with technical policy expertise can help legislators by synthesizing 
the state of current research for interested legislators, offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, and drafting legislation.  Many interest organizations invest substantial 
resources in developing policy expertise, and survey and interview data indicate that most 
believe that such expertise helps them gain political access and influence (Esterling 2004; 
Kersh 2007; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).   
 Political information reveals the preferences and anticipated behavior of relevant 
political actors.  Political information helps legislators assess how a particular issue will 
move through the legislature, as well as the likelihood of policy passage. Interest groups, 
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as specialists, have a strong sense of the preferences and likely actions of other actors 
operating within their policy domain. As a result, legislators look to interest groups to 
provide information about the alignment of support and opposition to a proposed policy, 
the level and strength of consensus, and the anticipated tactics of opponents (Kingdon 
1989; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).   
 The relative value of each type of information varies with the policy under 
consideration. On some issues, the causal relationship between the policy instrument and 
outcome may be irrelevant – the intended policy outcome may be so popular or 
unpopular that legislators feel compelled to vote for or against it.  For example, Congress 
passed what Arnold (1990) refers to as a politically-compelling policy when it enacted 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40) a week after the 
September 11
th
 terrorist attacks.  The resolution authorized the President of the United 
States ―to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001.‖  The popularity of the intended outcomes – punishing 
those responsible for the September 11
th 
attacks and preventing future terrorist attacks – 
virtually guaranteed near unanimous legislative support.  In contrast, legislators may seek 
substantive information on issues that are technical, complex, and have the capacity to 
generate gains for society as a whole, such as policies to control acid rain, improve public 





The Credibility of Information 
 It is clear that legislators value the information that interest groups possess, 
whether electoral, substantive, or political. However, whether organizational actors can 
use their informational resources to gain legislative access and influence depends on the 
credibility of information being provided.  Credibility refers to the extent to which 
legislators believe the information that interest groups provide. Organizational influence 
is enhanced when legislators believe interest group arguments that constituents‘ policy 
preferences will influence voting decisions (electoral information), that policy 
instruments will result in a particular outcome (policy information), and that a particular 
policy with move smoothly through the legislature (political information). 
Because credibility is important, interest groups devote considerable time and 
resources to demonstrating the accuracy of the information they are providing and 
establishing a reputation for trustworthiness.  Organizations demonstrate the accuracy of 
information by specializing in narrow policy areas, or providing information that 
effectively and routinely promotes the electoral or policy goals of members of Congress 
(Hansen 1991).  Groups also supplement the informational resources they provide with 
actual evidence of electoral salience or policy accuracy, for example, by mobilizing 
constituents to send letters to Congress or engaging in protests or demonstrations 
(Goldstein 1999; Kollman 1991).  Developing a reputation for being trustworthy is also 
important (Esterling 2004; Hansen 1991; Kersh 2007): over 80 percent of respondents in 
Schlozman and Tierney‘s (1986, 104) study reported ―a reputation for being credible and 
trustworthy‖ as their most important organizational resource.  
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Legislators can also prevent interest groups from exploiting their informational 
advantages by manipulating the costs associated with lobbying (Ainsworth 1993).  In his 
1993 article ―Regulating Lobbyists and Interest Group Influence,‖ Ainsworth argues that 
interest groups have incentives to misrepresent information to legislators – for example, 
by overstating the salience of constituents‘ policy preferences, or manipulating policy 
research to indicate support for their favored policy instrument.  If lobbying is costless, 
organizations have nothing to lose by misrepresenting information.  However, as the 
following paragraph will show, if there is a cost to lobbying, organizations seeking to 
misrepresent information will be deterred from lobbying, while organizations presenting 
credible information will not be deterred from lobbying.  Because only one type of group 
lobbies, legislators can be assured that the information they receive is credible 
(Ainsworth 1993).   
For Ainsworth, the group with credible information is the only group that lobbies 
because the relative benefits of lobbying differ for organizations providing credible and 
non-credible information.  Specifically, a group seeking to misrepresent information will 
lose more than it gains by lobbying even if the legislators adopts the group‘s position, 
while an organization that provides accurate information will gain more than it loses by 
lobbying.  This stems from the fact that the payoff of a policy ‗win‘ differs for each type 
of organization: for the organization with credible information, the payoff is greater than 
the cost of lobbying, while for the organization with non-credible information, the payoff 
is less than the cost of lobbying.   
Using the framework introduced by Ainsworth‘s model, it is also possible to see 
that legislators can gain credible information if the costs of lobbying (rather than the 
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payoff) differ for each type of organization.  Consider two interest groups: the first 
represents a constituency that strongly opposes a policy allowing marijuana use for 
medical purposes and will punish a legislator for voting in favor of such a policy, and the 
second represents a constituency that opposes the policy, but this policy preference is not 
salient enough to impact members‘ voting behavior.  Because the policy is salient to the 
first organization, this group can mobilize its members to send letters to a legislator or 
engage in demonstrations that signal its opposition to medical marijuana policies.  It is 
costly for the first group to mobilize its members, but because the policy preferences are 
salient, the costs are not prohibitive.  It is considerably more costly, however, for the 
second group to mobilize its members.  Because the policy preferences of the second 
group‘s members are not salient enough to impact voting behavior, it is unlikely that they 
are salient enough to compel members to contact legislators or protest.  Therefore, the 
second group must invest more resources in order to convince its members to contact 
legislators, or engage in protests.  If the costs to lobby are greater than the benefits of 
policy victory, then the second group will be deterred from lobbying, and the legislator 
can be assured that the information is credible.  This aspect of a costly lobbying model 
will become an important element of the formal theoretic model presented in the fourth 
chapter.  
This section has argued that interest group influence on poverty-related policy 
issues is best conceptualized as a form of persuasion in which organizational advocates 
for the poor use information to convince legislators to adopt group-friendly positions.  It 
has reviewed the various types of information that legislators value, and introduced a 
model for understanding when legislators will view the information provided by interest 
 32 
groups as credible.  The following section explores interest group strategies for providing 
information to legislators, and introduces coalition-building as a strategy of credible 
information transmission.  
 
The Strategies and Tactics of Interest Group Influence 
 Interest organizations have three general strategies for influencing legislative 
outcomes: inside lobbying, outside lobbying, and coalition-building. Inside lobbying 
refers to groups‘ attempts to influence legislative outcomes through the direct provision 
of money or information to legislators, and outside lobbying refers to their efforts to 
indirectly influence outcomes by mobilizing constituents and public opinion (Gais and 
Walker 1991; Kollman 1998; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).
13
  Within inside and outside 
lobbying strategies, interest groups have an array of lobbying tactics – some of which can 
be viewed as being part of an inside or an outside strategy.  For example, many 
organizations use inside lobbying tactics such as testifying at Congressional hearings or 
contributing money to political campaigns. Others employ outside lobbying tactics by 
publicly endorsing political candidates or mobilizing group members in support of 
candidates and issues.  Most groups use a combination of techniques, although inside 
lobbying tactics are more prevalent among business, trade, and professional 
organizations, as well as groups with close ties to government, while outside lobbying 
tactics are more commonly employed by labor unions and citizen groups (Berry and 
Arons 2003; Gais and Walker 1991; Kollman 1998). 
                                                 
13
 According to Baumgartner and Leech (1998): “Tactics describe the individual external activities in which 
groups engage: meeting with legislators, filing suit, or mounting an advertising campaign. Strategies 
involve some particular combination of tactics and imply a mechanism by which influence is believed to be 
achieved.  Strategies are combinations of tactics used in particular situations” (Baumgartner and Leech 
1963: 162; see also Milbrath 1963).   
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Previous scholarship tends not to categorize coalition building as a strategy of 
legislative influence, focusing instead on coalition-building as a strategy of 
organizational maintenance (Kollman 1998) or coalitions as a type of interest group 
(Schlozman and Tierney 1986). Yet it makes sense to conceptualize coalition-building as 
a lobbying strategy distinct from inside and outside strategies, for several reasons.  
First, while collaborative behavior surely has other functions – for example, to 
facilitate networking or monitor political developments, interest group leaders clearly 
believe that coalition-building is an important strategy for achieving desired outcomes in 
Congress.  As Charls Walker, the ‗dean of the Washington lobbyists‘ wrote: ―Coalitions 
are the most important factor in getting a bill through Congress‖ (Walker 1998, as quoted 
in Hula 1999, 32).  Studies of interest group leaders consistently indicate their belief in 
the efficacy of coalitions. For example, over three-quarters of group leaders in one study 
agreed with the statement: ―Coalitions are the way to be effective in politics‖ (Hula 1999: 
32-33).   
Second, existing research suggests that coalition building is associated with 
particular characteristics of groups and policy environments, indicating that 
organizational actors engage in collaborative activity strategically to secure gains in 
particular policy environments (Heaney 2004; Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999).  For example, 
groups work together when opposition groups are perceived to be strong and when policy 
debates are broad (Hojnacki 1997).   
Third, the fact that much of the scholarship of interest group influence does not 
conceptualize coalition building as a strategy of influence may simply reflect that 
widespread use of this strategy is a relatively recent phenomenon.  Over the past several 
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decades, institutional changes including the growth of interest communities and the 
expansion and decentralization of government have greatly increased the opportunities 
and incentives for interest groups to collaborate (Hula 1999).  In nearly every policy 
domain, the pool of potential allies has expanded.  While creating opportunities for 
collaboration, this expansion has the additional paradoxical effect of giving any one 
group less power in the political system (Salisbury 1990; Hula 1999).  Coalitions provide 
a vehicle through which organizations with similar policy goals can exhibit political 
strength and demonstrate consensus in a political system in which policymakers can 
effectively choose which interests to listen to and which to ignore (Hula 1999; Mahoney 
2007).  Joint activity also allows groups to pool the resources necessary for gaining 
access to an increasingly decentralized political agenda (Hojnacki 1998; Hula 1999, 27-
30; Mahoney 2007).  For example, a coalition lobbying on a particular bill can reach a 
larger number of political actors than can an organization working alone.  ‗Spreading the 
workload‘ in this manner is particularly important in a political system characterized by 
multiple points of political access (Hula 1999, 27). 
Thus while coalition-building may have been primarily a strategy of 
organizational maintenance several decades ago, it is increasingly being used as a 
strategy of political influence today (Baumgarnter, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech 
2009).  This is true at both national and state levels.  As Thomas and Hrebenar (2004, 
112) argue: ―Increasingly these days, the view of state lobbying efforts as being 
conducted by individual groups is misleading. Coalitions of groups and particularly ad 




 This chapter has reviewed existing research on interest group lobbying and 
influence in legislative settings, focusing specifically on interest groups that advocate on 
behalf of the poor – who they are, how they lobby, and how they gain influence of behalf 
of poor constituents.  It has introduced coalition-building as a strategy of political 
influence, arguing that policy coalitions are increasingly employed by interest groups to 
gain influence in a dense and decentralized political system.  
The next chapter elaborates on this topic by exploring the conditions and 
consequences of coalition building in legislative settings.  In the domain of social welfare 
policy, coalitions allow relatively resource-deprived organizations to pool the resources 
necessary for gaining access and influence in legislative settings.  Perhaps more 
importantly, coalitions provide a vehicle for credibly conveying information to legislators 
skeptical of enacting programs for America‘s least advantaged. 
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Chapter 3 
Diverse Coalitions and Legislative Influence 
 
 This chapter presents a theory of diverse coalition building and legislative 
influence by organizational advocates for the poor.  As discussed in the previous chapter, 
interest groups that advocate for the poor have limited financial and electoral resources. 
Many membership-based advocacy groups have small budgets, relying heavily on 
individual dues, gifts, and donations.  Financial constraints limit their ability to engage in 
all forms of lobbying.  Many institutional advocates for the poor, such as research 
organizations and intergovernmental actors, are similarly disadvantaged because they 
lack a formal membership base and thus have few voters to call upon when attempting to 
influence legislative decisions. Public charities face legal restrictions on legislative 
lobbying and political campaign contributions. And although professional organizations 
and labor unions sometimes represent the interests of the poor in legislative settings, 
these groups are organized for a purpose other than anti-poverty advocacy. Consequently, 
the organizational resources that are devoted to lobbying on poverty-related policy issues 
are limited. 
 These characteristics lead advocates to pursue strategies of legislative influence 
that do not rely on the monetary or electoral resources of any single organization. In this 
chapter, I argue that to mitigate their resource disadvantage, advocates for the poor turn 
to diverse coalition building as a strategy of legislative influence.  Diverse coalitions help 
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organizations gain influence because they are capable of providing a wider range of 
informational resources to representatives wary of the consequences of legislating in 
support of social welfare programs.  In addition, because they are costly to form, diverse 
coalitions are more likely to convince legislators that the information being provided is 
credible. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first section provides an overview of 
coalition building in interest group communities.  The second section examines the 
informational role of coalitions, arguing that formal and ad-hoc policy coalitions can 
provide credible electoral, policy, and political information to legislators.  The third 
section explores how the diversity of a coalition impacts both the costs of collaboration 
and the likely influence of the coalition.  The fourth section outlines when coalitions are 
likely to be utilized as a strategy of legislative influence.  The fifth section presents the 
empirical implications of the theory, and the final section concludes. 
 
Interest Group Coalitions 
Coalitions are common in the interest group community.  Nearly all groups 
engage in some type of informal networking, and formal participation in coalitions is 
common (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech 2009; Heaney 2004; 
Hojnacki 1998; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2007; Schlozman and Tierney 1986).  Coalitions 
vary with respect to their structure and political purpose.  Some coalitions have a formal 
structure and are organized around long-standing issues.  In one recent study, formal 
coalitions represented approximately 7 percent of a nationally representative sample of 
interest organizations (Baumgartner et al. 2009).  Others are highly informal, organized 
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for a short period of time around a discrete issue or policy fight. Within coalitions, 
participants have varying degrees of interest and engagement.  For example, 
collaboration is often initiated by resource-rich organizations willing to pay the high costs 
of coalition formation and maintenance to achieve broad policy success.  Other 
participants may simply be specialists who join coalitions to shape specific provisions of 
a policy, or to secure non-policy benefits such as information and symbolic benefits 
(Hula 1999).   
Interest organizations participate in coalitions for a variety of reasons: to provide 
opportunities for networking and social engagement, to obtain information at low costs, 
to signal activity to group members, and to pursue common policy goals.  My dissertation 
focuses on policy coalitions, which are “groups of organizations united behind a 
symbiotic set of legislative or regulatory goals” (Hula 1999: 22).  Research suggests that 
interest organizations have increasingly turned to policy coalitions as a strategy of 
influence as the size and scope of the interest community has expanded (Baumgartner et 
al. 2009).  Policy coalitions also tend to form in particular political contexts: 
collaborative behavior is much more prominent when political conflict is high, 
organizational opponents are strong, and issues are broad (Hojnacki 1998).  
Much of the existing work on coalitions and legislative influence assumes the 
political power of a coalition derives exclusively from its size.  However, size is not the 
only important property of coalitions (Hinkley 1978).  Viewing coalition building as 
information transmission helps illuminate how other properties of coalitions generate 
opportunities for coalitions to gain political access and influence. The following section 
describes how coalitions provide legislators with electoral, policy, and political 
 39 
information, and provides for a basis for understanding how the diversity of a coalition, 
either in conjunction with, or irrespective of its size, can translate into political power in 
legislative settings.   
 
The Informational Role of Coalitions 
As discussed in the previous chapter, interest groups have three general strategies 
for influencing Congress: inside lobbying; outside lobbying; and coalition building.  Prior 
research indicates that inside and outside lobbying tactics convey information, even if 
they do not actually change a legislator‘s preference or the outcome of a floor vote 
(Esterling 2004; Goldstein 1999; Kollman 1998).  For example, by talking with a 
legislator or testifying at a hearing, an interest organization makes its preferences known 
and reveals substantive information about the policy under consideration (Esterling 
2004).  Similarly, mobilizing constituents at the grassroots level provides information 
about the direction and salience of constituents‘ policy beliefs (Kollman 1998).  Because 
these lobbying efforts are costly, legislators also gain insight into the credibility of the 
information being provided (Ainsworth 1993; Austin-Smith and Banks 2002; Austin-
Smith and Wright 1992, 1994; Grossman and Helpman 2001; Lohmann 1993; Potters and 
Van Winden 1992).   
In much the same way, policy coalitions provide information about the shape of 
public opinion (electoral information), the policies under consideration (policy 
information), and the alignment of support and opposition across interested actors 
(political information). Because coalitions are costly to form, coalition-building also 
provides evidence that the information offered by coalition members is credible. 
 40 
With respect to electoral information, policy coalitions indicate the direction and 
intensity of policy preferences across multiple interested actors.  In doing so, they can 
reduce legislators‘ uncertainty about the electoral consequences of legislative action.  For 
example, coalitions indicate that many groups support (or oppose) an issue and will 
notice a legislator‘s decision on that issue.  This is important because a legislator rarely 
relies on just one group of constituents to remain in office (Fenno 1978).  In addition, 
―broad coalitions create an aura of legitimacy‖ (Hula 1999, 29), generating ‗electoral 
cover‘ for a legislator should she make an unpopular decision.  If a legislator can point to 
widespread support for her decision, she will be better able to defend herself against 
challengers who seek to use that decision against her in the next election. 
Coalitions also provide information about the substantive effects of a policy.  The 
experiences and expertise of multiple groups can help policymakers better evaluate the 
causal framework of a policy intervention (Esterling 2004).  Legislators may be more 
likely to believe that a particular policy instrument will produce a specific outcome if 
multiple outside actors agree that the outcome will result from the instrument.  In 
addition, different interest groups possess information about different aspects of a policy 
intervention – for example, research organizations are skilled at summarizing and 
drawing inferences from existing research, but advocacy organizations may be better able 
to speak to the immediate needs of the poor or the implementation of a program. When 
multiple actors agree that a policy instrument will (or will not) yield a particular outcome, 
legislators‘ uncertainty about the substantive impact of legislative action is reduced.  
Finally, coalitions provide political intelligence about the ease of moving a policy 
through the legislature. Coalitions indicate whether a legislative subsidy exists.  Interest 
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groups acting collaboratively can in effect ―subsidize‖ legislators‘ activities by forging 
agreement across actors, thereby minimizing the work that a legislator must do to move a 
policy through the legislature (Hall and Deardorff 2006).  In contentious areas with many 
different types of interest groups, a coalition may signal a particularly large subsidy. 
Coalitions also provide information about the level of consensus once a policy reaches 
the floor. This is important because legislators‘ choices in Congress are based to some 
extent on the perceived level of conflict and consensus surrounding a particular policy 
issue (Kingdon 1989).  When possible, legislators seek to avoid issues that will become 
entangled in controversy on the floor.
 
 Because consensus is more likely to result in 
policy passage, interested actors have an incentive to pursue strategies that signal high 
consensus and low conflict. 
 
Diverse Coalitions as Costly Lobbying 
Because coalitions are costly to build, they also indicate that the electoral, 
substantive, and political intelligence offered to legislators is credible. With respect to 
resources such as time and money, coalition founders must provide the initial capital and 
labor to organize and host a coalition, provide administrative support, and direct its early 
activities. Participants must also devote resources to gathering information on the 
preferences and likely activities of potential allies and opponents, and to ongoing 
coordination and maintenance efforts (Hula 1999; Loomis 1986).   
An organization may also incur policy costs if collaboration requires it to deviate 
from its preferred policy position in order to facilitate collaboration.  For example, a 
liberal advocacy group may have to moderate its position in order to collaborate with a 
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centrist group. Collaborating also entails substantial opportunity costs. In an increasingly 
crowded interest group environment, competition creates incentives for groups to develop 
distinctive identities and occupy specific policy niches.  An organization that cultivates a 
unique identity gains a ‗marketable good‘ to exchange for legislative access and influence 
(Browne 1990).  In collaborating with other groups, an organization trades an opportunity 
to differentiate itself for a chance at increased policy influence.   
Finally, organizations that collaborate with one another may face reputational 
costs. An organization‘s reputation is among its most important resources, and groups 
may damage their reputations by collaborating with other actors (Schlozman and Tierney 
1986), particularly as the diversity of the collaboration increases.  For example, a 
nonpartisan research organization may damage its reputation for being nonpartisan if it 
allies with a liberal or conservative advocacy group. Similarly, a liberal child advocacy 
organization may alienate its membership base if it collaborates with a conservative 
―family values‖ group.  
Coalition building is therefore costly – in terms of resources, policy positions, lost 
opportunity, and reputation.  These costs are greater when coalition members are diverse, 
either with respect to organizational type, issue focus, or ideology.  Diversity in 
organizational type can increase costs because different types of organizational actors 
face different constraints with respect to lobbying activities.  For example, membership 
organizations are constrained by the policy preferences of their membership base, while 
institutional actors are not so constrained.  Citizen groups that receive funding primarily 
through membership dues are often inclined to pursue highly visible and often 
confrontational outside strategies to demonstrate activity and effectiveness to their 
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members (Gais and Walker 1991).  In contrast, institutional actors – particularly those 
that interact with government officials or receive government funding – tend to prefer 
inside strategies.  For example, Gais and Walker (1991, 106) argue that for nonprofits:  
―…the desires of their members to protect their professional standing and the 
requirements of organizational maintenance arising from their close association 
with federal agencies encourage groups with members from the nonprofit sector 
to avoid controversy and seek influence through inside political strategies.‖ 
 
Intergovernmental actors and nonprofits that are funded by government sources tend to 
have close relationships with officials in government and consequently are less likely to 
employ confrontational outside strategies.  Because different types of organizations 
encounter different constraints on their lobbying activities, it may be more difficult for 
them to agree on a lobbying strategy, and hence more costly for them to engage in 
collaborative behavior.  
Second, organizations focused in different policy domains or with different 
ideologies are less likely to have what Hula refers to as intergroup links or group 
interlock, both of which facilitate coalition building (Hula 1999).  Intergroup links refer 
to the connections that develop when staff members move from one organization to 
another, while group interlock results when one person works simultaneously for two 
organizations (Hula 1999, 55).  Such links facilitate the flow of information about 
organizational preferences, strategy, and resources.  In doing so, they lower the 
informational and resource costs of coalition building.  Because organizations focused in 
different policy areas have fewer intergroup connections, the costs of coalition building 
are likely to be greater.  In addition, such groups are less likely to have a history of shared 
collaborative behavior, which is a predictor of future collaboration (Heaney 2004). 
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Furthermore, organizations with different specializations or ideologies prioritize 
issues differently.  For example, two advocacy groups for the homeless are likely to agree 
that homelessness is an important problem, that certain policy instruments should be 
utilized to address this problem, and that organizational resources should be spent on 
lobbying on issues related to homelessness.  It is more difficult (and hence more costly) 
to convince a child health organization to expend resources to lobby on this issue because 
the organization is focused on a broad range of health-related policy issues, which may or 
may not be related to homelessness.   
In addition, organizations that have different and opposing preferences risk 
alienating their membership base by collaborating on an issue on which their preferences 
are aligned.  Perhaps for this reason, organizations that are similar with respect to 
ideology and organizational type are most likely to identify as allies and coalition 
partners across a wide range of policy domains (Hula 1999; Salisbury et al. 1987).  
 
Diverse Coalitions and Legislative Influence 
Although diverse coalition building is costly, there are reasons to suspect that it is 
likely to result in more legislative influence than either independent lobbying or non-
diverse collaboration.  First, diverse collaboration can bring more resources to the table, 
including monetary, electoral, substantive, and political resources.  As Baumgartner and 
colleagues (2009, 205) argue: ―…[C]onstructing a successful team implies recruiting 
players who have complementary, not duplicative, skills.‖   While Baumgartner and 
colleagues view collaboration in terms of what collaboration brings to organizations, the 
implicit message is that such collaboration can be powerful because it provides more of 
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what legislators need and want. From a legislator‘s perspective, coalitions that can 
provide monetary and informational resources may reduce uncertainty more than a group 
with only one of these resources. 
 In addition to providing different resources, diverse collaboration can also provide 
a wider array of informational resources on a particular topic.  With respect to substantive 
information, if organizations‘ technical expertise derives from different sources, diversity 
can reveal the support for the causal framework of a policy intervention from a wider 
range of perspectives. For example, when a nonpartisan research organization, nonprofit 
service provider, and advocacy group collaborate, this alliance may indicate that research 
supports the causal framework implicit in the policy instrument, that the policy will be 
implemented as intended, and that the policy is providing a support that a vulnerable 
population needs.  In addition, two groups can be more informative than one when the 
groups are natural opponents. This is very similar to Krehbiel‘s (1991, 84) heterogeneity 
principle in Congressional committees, which posits that ―specialists from opposite sides 
of a policy spectrum are collectively more informative than specialists from only one side 
of a spectrum.‖    
Diversifying electoral resources is important because legislators rarely rely on a 
single group for electoral support.  While adding membership organizations to a coalition 
does increase the size of (potential) electoral support for a policy, the diversity of the 
membership organizations is an important factor.  For example, a coalition of labor and 
business organizations may reduce electoral uncertainty more than a coalition of labor or 
business alone in a district where both types of organizations are key players.  Similarly, 
with respect to Congress as a whole, diversifying the electoral resources behind a 
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particular policy position is important because legislators respond to different 
constituencies, and membership organizations have ties to different districts.  
Diverse collaboration can also yield greater influence than independent lobbying 
or non-diverse collaboration because it offers a strong signal that the information being 
provided is credible.  Because the costs of collaboration among organizations that differ 
with respect to organizational type, issue focus, or ideology are so great, diverse coalition 
building is unlikely to occur unless the issue is salient to coalition founders.  At the same 
time, even if the issue is salient to a founder, the costs of diverse coalition building are 
likely to be prohibitive unless the issue is also salient to coalition partners.   
Salience refers to the importance that an organization‘s members place on an 
issue.  When an issue is salient, the relative advantages of a policy ‗win‘ will likely 
exceed the costs associated with building a coalition.  In the context of electoral 
information, salience refers to the extent to which constituents‘ policy preferences will 
actually impact their voting behavior.  Policy preferences are salient to constituents if 
they impact voting decisions, but are not salient if they do not impact voting decisions.  
With respect to substantive and political information, salience refers to the value that 
organizations place on technical information or a policy victory, whether or not this 
directly impacts the electoral fortunes of legislators. For example, a piece of technical 
information may be salient to research organizations if there is overwhelming evidence 
that a particular policy instrument will produce a favorable policy outcome – such as 
decline in acid rain, or an overall gain in students‘ educational achievement.  
Recall that an important element of Ainsworth‘s model of costly lobbying is that 
organizations that misrepresent information will lose more than they gain by lobbying. 
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For Ainsworth, this loss is captured in the value of the policy victory, which differs for 
the two types of organizations (credible and non-credible).  However, the ability of 
organizations to collaborate depends not only on the salience of the issue to the coalition 
founder, but also the salience of the issue to potential partners. It is possible that even 
when an issue is salient to an advocate (or when the value of a policy victory is great), it 
will be unable to build a diverse coalition because it has no other organizations with 
which to partner. This can be captured in the costs of coalition building to the founder (as 
opposed to simply the payoff).   
Thus diverse collaboration provides evidence of salience to a coalition founder 
and salience to coalition partners.  If an issue is unimportant to a coalition founder, the 
value of the policy victory will not exceed the cost of diverse coalition building, and the 
founder will not build a coalition.  At the same time, if an issue is unimportant to 
coalition partners, the costs of coalition building will be prohibitive, and the founder will 
not build a coalition.  In this way, a legislator can be assured that when she sees a diverse 
coalition, the issue is salient to the range of partners involved.  In other words, a diverse 
coalition provides evidence of credibility.   
Finally, it is important to note that this theory builds primarily on a body of 
formal work that views costly lobbying as facilitating information transmission between 
interest groups and legislators (Ainsworth 1993; Austin-Smith and Banks 2002; Austin-
Smith and Wright 1992, 1994; Lohmann 1993; Potters and Van Winden 1992; see 
Grossman and Helpman 2001 for a review).  In this work, scholars hypothesize that 
interest groups‘ engagement in costly lobbying can, under certain conditions, provide 
information to legislators about the true state of the world.  My theory is most similar to 
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theories that focus on endogenous cost lobbying, in which the costs of lobbying are not 
fixed but rather vary according to preferences and effort level of organizational actors.  
This theoretical orientation is appropriate for thinking about diverse coalition building 
due to my focus on the varying costs associated with forming a coalition across diverse 
actors.   
However, it is clear from both the theoretical and empirical analysis (presented in 
subsequent chapters) that an important aspect of diverse coalition building and legislative 
influence is that diversity itself can provide important information to legislators, absent 
any formal collaborative activity.  This insight draws from a separate body of research, 
focusing on heterogeneous signals and legislative influence (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; 
Krehbiel 1992). While the theoretical focus in this dissertation is on endogenous cost 
lobbying, future iterations of the theory will more explicitly incorporate work on 
heterogeneous signals.  These future extensions are described in greater detail in my 
concluding chapter. 
 
Choosing a Lobbying Strategy 
Interest organizations have several strategies at their disposal for providing 
information to legislators and gaining legislative influence.  How does an organization 
decide which strategies and tactics to employ? Perhaps more importantly for this project, 
when will an organization decide to build coalitions? This section explores the factors 
affecting an interest group‘s choice of lobbying strategy, focusing specifically on factors 
that create incentives for advocates for the poor to engage in coalition building.   
 49 
 An interest group‘s decision of how to lobby is first and foremost associated with 
its organizational resources. As Schlozman and Tierney (1986) argue: ―Perhaps the most 
important factor affecting an organization‘s strategic choice of lobbying techniques is its 
resources‖ (161).  Groups with ample financial resources – such as corporations and trade 
associations – have the ability to pursue a range of inside lobbying tactics, such as hiring 
multiple lobbyists, maintaining offices in Washington DC, and contributing to political 
campaigns. Groups with significant electoral resources have the ability to employ outside 
tactics, such as encouraging members to contact legislators or engaging in media 
campaigns.  
As discussed previously, organizations that advocate for the poor are relatively 
resource-poor – particularly with respect to monetary and electoral resources. This makes 
them more likely to rely on informational resources, and to pursue strategies that do not 
rely on the resources of any single organization.  In addition, because many 
organizational advocates have close ties to government officials (either because they 
receive federal funding or administer government programs), they are more likely to 
pursue less confrontational, inside strategies (Gais and Walker 1991).   
 In addition to organizational resources, lobbying strategies are strongly shaped by 
contextual factors including the level of conflict in the issue environment and the scope 
of the issue under consideration (Gais and Walker 1991; Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney and 
Baumgartner 2004).   In general, political conflict tends to increase all forms of lobbying 
(Gais and Walker 1991). With respect to coalition building, organizations are more likely 
to collaborate with one another on issues that are salient and broad in scope (Hojnakci 
1997; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2004).  Some research shows that contextual factors 
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are far more important than organizational factors in determining coalition activity 
(Mahoney 2007).  This suggests that organizational advocates for the poor will engage in 
coalition building only in particular issue environments: when conflict is high and the 
scope of the issue is broad.   
 Coalition formation is also related to features of the interest group community, 
specifically the strength of political opponents and the salience of the issue to potential 
coalition partners.  Coalitions are more likely to form when political opponents are 
perceived to be strong – a group‘s assessment of their opponents is more strongly 
associated with the decision to pursue collaborative activities than are their assessments 
of Congress (Hojnacki 1998).  Strong opponents are also likely to encourage coalition 
building that is diverse with respect to resources such as money, electoral support, and 
information, as organizations will seek to mobilize a broader range of resources in order 
to fight a strong opponent.  In addition, as the theory above suggests, diverse coalition 
formation is related to the salience of the issue among potential organizational allies. 
 
Empirical Implications of the Theory of Diverse Coalitions 
 This theory yields two empirical implications: (1) advocates for the poor will 
build diverse coalitions, under some conditions, and (2) diverse coalitions will have a 
greater likelihood of achieving legislative influence. 
 First, because advocates for the poor are disadvantaged with respect to the 
resources that facilitate influence in Congress, they will pursue diverse coalition building 
as a strategy of legislative influence.  This strategy will be more common in policy 
environments in which political conflict is high and issue scope is broad.  As the fifth 
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chapter will show, these characteristics were present during the welfare reform debates of 
the mid-1990s, making welfare reform an appropriate object of empirical study.  
In addition, diverse coalitions will only form when advocates and their (potential) 
partners view an issue as salient.  When this occurs, the theory posits that advocates will 
build coalitions that are diverse with respect to the informational resources that advocates 
can provide to legislators.  Because diversity is an important factor, coalitions will 
actively signal this diversity to legislators, rather than the coalition‘s size alone. 
It is important to note that diversity is, to some extent, in the eye of the beholder.  
For example, a Republican legislator viewing a coalition of liberal advocates, research 
organizations, and service providers may see a coalition of ―usual suspects‖ while a 
Democrat interested in the effect of a policy on low-income populations may see diverse 
support for the argument that the policy will yield favorable outcomes.  To systematize 
‗diversity,‘ I focus on the following types of diverse alliances – those that are diverse 
with respect to organizational type (namely, institutional actors and membership 
organizations), those that are diverse with respect to their primary policy domain, and 
those that are diverse with respect to liberal and conservative ideology.   
 The second implication is that diverse coalitions will be associated with 
legislative influence.  This means that when diverse coalitions form, organizational 
advocates for the poor will be more likely to achieve influence in the form of increased 
legislative attention to an issue, committee support, floor votes, and ultimately, policy 
passage.  It is important to note that within the interest group literature, influence has 
been and continues to be extremely difficult to measure.  Baumgartner and Leech (1998) 
argue that despite decades of research, interest group scholars have yet to find systematic 
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evidence of interest group influence.  Some scholars find limited or conditional evidence 
of influence, and still others fail to find evidence of any influence at all (see also Smith 
1995).  Underlying the discrepancy in research findings is the fact that influence is often 
unobservable, making its measurement a notoriously difficult task (see Baumgartner and 
Leech 1998 for a review).   
 I address these difficulties in several ways.  First, I examine a range of policy 
decisions across a single issue and across states to increase the number of observations in 
my sample.  Much of the evidence of interest group influence comes from analyses of 
single cases (Smith 1995).  Focusing on multiple issues within welfare reform, across 
multiple states, allows me to test whether relationships between diverse coalitions and 
policy decisions are systematic.  Second, I explore examples of relatively small policy 
‗wins‘ – for example, the adoption of a policy in the House but its defeat in the Senate, or 
the revival of a policy reform bill in Congress.  These instances of influence may provide 
greater evidence of interest group influence.  Finally, I focus in part on the conditions of 
diverse coalition building.  If groups engage in such behavior systematically in certain 
settings, this suggests that they have some expectation that such a behavior will lead to 
influence in that setting over other types of behavior.   
 
Conclusion  
 This chapter has theorized that organizations turn to diverse coalition building as 
a strategy of influence in legislative settings.  Diverse coalitions provide a wide range of 
information, and the diversity of coalition partners signals to legislators that the 
information being provided is credible. As a result, diverse coalitions are likely to be 
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associated with legislative influence.  The next chapter uses formal theoretic modeling to 
predict the conditions under which diverse coalitions will form and gain influence in 
legislative settings.    
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Chapter 4 
A Formal Theoretic Model of Coalitions and Legislative Influence 
 
In the previous chapter, I hypothesized that organizational advocates for the poor 
gain influence in legislative settings by providing electoral, policy, and political 
information to address legislators‘ uncertainty about the consequences of supporting 
social welfare programs. To diversify the range of information they can provide to 
legislators, and to signal that the information is credible, anti-poverty advocates build 
diverse coalitions. In this chapter, I develop a formal theoretic model to predict the 
conditions of diverse coalition formation and legislative influence.  The goal is to identify 
how features of the political context, including the presence of opposing interest groups, 
level of political conflict, and partisan control of government, impact collaborative 
behavior and influence.  This is important, in part, because my dissertation uses cross-
state comparisons to test the empirical predictions of the theory.  If coalition formation is 
affected by contextual features that vary at the state level, such factors are important to 
take into account. 
I model the process of coalition building and influence as a signaling game with 
three players: an anti-poverty advocacy group, an ―opposition‖ group opposed to 
generous programs for the poor, and a median legislator.  My model predicts that an anti-
poverty advocate gains influence in one of two ways: by bargaining with an opposition 
group or by building a diverse coalition with other advocates.  Both types of 
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collaboration require that an opposition group perceive an advocacy group as being 
strong, which means it is capable of building a diverse coalition with other advocates.  
The value of bargaining and the costs of lobbying – operationalized in my empirical 
chapters as the level of political conflict and the partisan control of government, 
respectively – affect whether an advocacy group bargains with an opposition group or 
builds a coalition with other advocates.  When political conflict is low and Democrats 
control the legislature, the model predicts that advocates will gain influence through 
bargaining with opponents of social programs.  When political conflict is high and 
Republicans control the legislature, advocates will gain influence by building diverse 
coalitions.   
I begin the chapter by justifying my use of formal methods to analyze antipoverty 
advocacy and legislative influence.  Second, I introduce and explain my signaling model.  
In the third section, I identify a solution that has strong behavioral implications.  The 
fourth section describes the empirical predictions of the model, and introduces 
hypotheses to be tested in the empirical chapters of my dissertation. 
 
A Signaling Model of Legislative Influence 
In the interest group literature, empirical and anecdotal data suggest that special 
interests influence legislative processes and outcomes, yet scholars have struggled to 
identify how and when this influence occurs.  A relatively recent body of research uses 
formal-theoretic methods to better understand the mechanisms and conditions of interest 
group influence (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992, 1994; Denzau and 
Munger 1986; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Helpman and Persson 2001; Mitchell and 
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Munger 1991; Persson and Tabellini 2000; see van Winden 2003 for a review).  
Theoretical models require considerable abstraction, but allow scholars to simplify 
complex relationships by isolating key interactions and mechanisms of influence.  
Formal-theoretic methods thus provide a strong foundation for building coherent theory 
about the conditions of interest group influence (Mitchell and Munger 1991; 
Baumgartner and Leech 1998).  
Signaling models are particularly useful for analyzing lobbying as an attempt to 
use information to persuade legislators because they highlight informational asymmetries 
between groups and legislators (Banks 1991; Smith 1995).  Information is asymmetric in 
legislative settings when organizational actors possess information that legislators lack.  
In a typical signaling game, a legislator is modeled as having incomplete information 
about the electoral, substantive, or political consequences of a policy decision, while an 
interest organization is modeled as having private information in one or more of these 
areas. The assumption that interest groups and legislators have different preferences over 
outcomes creates incentives for groups to misrepresent their information to legislators.  
For instance, an interest group such as the AARP has an incentive to overstate the extent 
to which its members support a policy if doing so will result in greater legislative 
attention and enactment of the AARP‘s favored policy.  Legislators, however, have little 
to gain (and often much to lose) by enacting a policy if it is not actually important to the 
AARP‘s membership base, will produce unintended impacts, or will generate divisive or 
contentious debates among other interested actors.  The question for the legislator is 
whether, and under what conditions, to believe the AARP.  Political scientists use 
signaling models to identify the conditions under which lobbying can credibly convey 
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information despite incentives for interest groups to misrepresent their informational 
resources.   
Like many formal theoretic models of interest group lobbying and legislative 
influence, my model characterizes information between an interest organization and 
median legislator as asymmetric.  In my model, an anti-poverty advocate must persuade a 
median legislator to reject a policy that reduces or eliminates a program for the poor.
14
  
The anti-poverty advocate has information that the proposed policy change will produce 
more harm than good.  The legislator does not want to enact a policy that will produce 
negative outcomes, but will only reject the policy if the advocate can provide credible 
evidence of future harm to the legislator.  Advocates signal credibility by building diverse 
coalitions. 
I build upon existing models by introducing informational asymmetries between 
organizational actors on opposing sides of a policy issue.  While opposing interest groups 
may have more information than legislators about the preferences, resources, and likely 
activities of their opponents, this information is not necessarily complete.  For instance, 
the National Right to Life Committee (NRTLC) may have a strong sense of the issues 
that will lead Planned Parenthood to devote resources to lobbying, but informational 
asymmetries between the two groups are still likely to exist. The NRTCL does not 
necessarily know how much Planned Parenthood intends to spend on lobbying on a 
particular issue, whether it will pursue inside or outside lobbying strategies, and who it 
                                                 
14
 This setup means that the model depicts a situation in which advocates are in a defensive position, as 
protectors of the status quo.  This is an appropriate setup for analyzing the relative success of anti-poverty 
advocates in legislative settings over the last several decades, which were characterized by decreasing 
federal involvement in many areas of social welfare policy.  It is important to note that the strategies and 
relative success of advocates are likely to differ when advocates are proposing rather than defending the 
status quo.  As a result, the predictions and implications of the model are intended to apply only to 
situations in which advocates are defending existing policies, rather than proposing policy change. 
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intends to target in lobbying efforts.  These informational asymmetries are likely to be 
particularly pronounced with respect to collaborative efforts.  Although the NRTCL may 
know the policy preferences of Planned Parenthood, it is unlikely to know the policy 
preferences of the Planned Parenthood‘s potential allies, particularly if the allies differ 
with respect to policy domain or ideology.  If interest groups opposed to social welfare 
programs think that advocacy groups are capable of building a diverse coalition and 
winning a policy battle, they may act strategically to prevent coalition formation.  My 
model explicitly takes this possibility into account. 
 
A Formal-Theoretic Model of Coalition-Building and Legislative Influence 
This section presents my formal-theoretic model.  As introduced above, I model 
the process of diverse coalition building and legislative decision making as a signaling 
game with three players: an anti-poverty advocacy group, an opposition group, and a 
median legislator. The game begins when the opposition group, named for its opposition 
to social welfare programs, proposes a policy that will reduce government benefits to the 
poor. The advocacy group does not want the policy change, but lacks the resources to 
defeat the opposition group alone.  The advocacy group must therefore decide whether to 
build a diverse coalition to defeat the opposition‘s policy proposal.   
There are two types of advocacy groups in the model: strong and weak. I simplify 
the model by assuming that both types of advocacy groups value a policy ‗win‘ (i.e. the 
issue is salient to both types), but that they exist in different environments. The strong 
advocacy group exists in an environment in which other interest groups (potential 
partners) view the issue as salient; the weak advocacy group exists in an environment in 
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which no other interest groups view the issue as salient.  When the issue is salient to 
partners, the strong type can build a diverse coalition to defeat the opposition‘s proposed 
policy change.  The weak advocacy group would like to build a diverse coalition, but 
because no partners view the issue as salient, it is too costly to do so. 
The opposition does not know the advocacy group‘s true type (or does not know 
whether potential partners view the issue as salient), but generally prefers to interact 
differently with strong and weak types.  The opposition prefers to bargain with a strong 
advocate because if it does not, the advocate can defeat the opposition‘s policy by 
building a coalition. The opposition prefers not to bargain with a weak advocate because 
this type cannot defeat the opposition by building a diverse coalition.  Because the 
advocacy group‘s true type is hidden from the opposition, the opposition will bargain 
with the advocacy group if it believes it to be a strong type, but will simply oppose the 
advocacy group if it believes it to be a weak type.  
The median legislator, motivated by reelection, prefers to adopt the opposition 
group‘s policy change unless advocates can provide credible information that the policy 
would result in more harm than good. The only way that an advocate can provide credible 
information that will lead the median legislator to reject the policy is by building a 
diverse coalition.  A diverse coalition forms when advocates and opponents bargain or 
when an advocacy organization successfully builds a coalition with other advocates.  
Recall from the previous section that diverse coalitions provide credible information by 
signaling that organizations of different types, specializations, ideologies, and preferences 
view an issue as salient. When advocates and opponents bargain, they form a temporary 
policy coalition that is diverse with respect to the partners‘ original preferences. When an 
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advocacy organization builds a coalition to challenge opponent‘s proposed policy change, 
coalition partners are similar in preference, but diverse with respect to group type, policy 
domain, or ideology.  Diverse collaboration is costly, but because the issue is salient to 
coalition partners, the expected payoff exceeds the costs, making coalition building 
worthwhile.  An organization‘s ability to pay a cost to collaborate with diverse actors 
convinces a legislator that both the advocate and the partners view the issue as salient. 
Thus legislators will accept the policy of a diverse coalition. 
The key outcomes are as follows. If advocates do not challenge opponents, then 
the legislator simply accepts the opposition‘s policy proposal (a). If the opposition 
believes that it is dealing with a strong type advocacy group, then advocates and 
opponents will bargain and compromise on a new policy and the legislator will accept 
that policy (b). If the opposition believes that it is dealing with a weak type advocacy 
group, it will not bargain and the advocacy group will decide whether to lobby 
independently against the opposition group (c) or whether to build a diverse coalition (d). 
Following (c), the legislator will accept the opposition‘s proposal and the advocacy group 
will lose. Following (d), the legislator will reject the opposition‘s proposal and the 
advocacy group will succeed.   
 
The Players 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the key variables and their descriptions.  The 
advocacy group is labeled Gi, the opposition group is labeled OG, and the median 
legislator is labeled LM.  The advocacy group is one of two types: strong or weak (labeled 
Gi, where i  {W, S}).  The advocacy group‘s type reflects the environment in which the 
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advocacy group operates: a strong type exists in an environment in which other 
organizational actors view a policy as salient, while a weak type exists in an environment 
in which no other actors view the issue as salient.   
The policy outcomes are represented by xj, where j  {sq, o, b}.  The policy xsq 
refers to the status quo policy, xo refers to the opposition‘s proposed policy, and xb refers 
to the policy achieved through bargaining. An advocacy group‘s utility is determined by 
the value that it places on the legislative (or policy) outcome αAG; the costs of lobbying 
independently γAG; the costs of building a coalition building ci, where i  {W, S}; the 
value of bargaining βAG; and the future loss of not engaging in legislative battle f.  Of the 
three policy outcomes, the advocacy group places the highest value on the status quo 
policy xsq, and the lowest value on the opposition‘s proposed policy change xo.  For the 
advocacy group: xo < xb < xsq. 
An important decision for the advocacy group is whether to signal to the 
opposition group that it will invest resources in building a coalition to contest the 
proposed reduction in social welfare benefits.  Building a coalition is costly for both 
weak and strong types because groups must invest resources in organizing and 
maintaining a coalition and gathering information on potential coalition partners. 
However, the strong type pays a smaller cost to build a coalition (cS) because there is 
already strong resistance to the opposition‘s proposed policy change.  The weak type 
pays a large cost to build a coalition (cW) because no other actors strongly oppose the 
policy change.  For a weak type to build a diverse coalition, it would have to devote 
considerably more resources to convincing partners to engage in political activity.  The 
cost of coalition building for the weak type is greater than the value of a policy win, 
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while the cost for the strong type is less than the value of a policy win.  Lobbying alone 
without building a coalition is also costly (γAG), but requires fewer resources than 
coalition building. Thus for Gi: γAG < cS < αAG < cW. 
Advocacy organizations lose standing within the pressure community if they do 
not lobby against the opposition‘s proposal.  This loss is represented by f because the loss 
occurs in the future.  In lobbying to preserve benefits to the poor, advocates demonstrate 
that the organization is actively engaged in political activity on behalf of the poor.  For 
membership organizations, such activity is important for maintaining the support of 
current members and attracting new members. Lobbying can also attract funding, and can 
help organizations build relationships with like-minded groups and legislators. By 
abstaining from legislative activity, the advocacy group loses the future benefits that 
accrue from bargaining, collaborating, or lobbying. 
 The utility of the opposition group (OG) is a function of the policy choice xj, 
where j  {sq, b, o}, the value of bargaining βOG; and the costs of lobbying γOG.  OG 
places a value of αOG on the policy change (policy xo), a value of βOG on the policy 
achieved through bargaining with the advocacy group (policy xb), and a value of 0 on the 
status quo (policy xsq). Thus for OG: xsq < xb < xo. As for the advocacy group, the costs of 
lobbying are represented by γOG.   
Absent coalition building by anti-poverty advocates, the median legislator (LM) 
derives electoral benefits from supporting the proposed policy change.  Her payoff is 
either 1 or 0.  If she supports the opposition‘s proposed change and the opposition is 
unopposed by the advocacy group, then she gains the support of the opposition in the 
next election.  If the opposition and advocates bargain and agree on a policy and she 
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accepts the policy, then she also gains the future support of the opposition.  However, 
when there is credible evidence that the opposition‘s policy will result in more harm than 
good (or the advocacy group is a strong type), then the legislator will lose more than she 
gains by supporting the policy change. Thus the legislator receives a payoff of 1 when 
she accepts the policy change and the opposition is either unopposed, has bargained, or is 
facing a weak advocacy group. When the opposition is facing a strong advocacy group 
and the advocacy group builds a coalition, the legislator receives of payoff of 0 when 
accepting the policy and 1 when rejecting the policy.   
 
The Game 
The extensive form of the game is shown in Figure 4.1.  In this figure, the 
advocacy groups‘ decision nodes are striped vertically, the opposition‘s nodes are striped 
horizontally, and the legislator‘s decision nodes are spotted. The initial and terminal 
nodes are solid black. The vertical dashed lines at the opposition‘s decision nodes and 
legislator‘s decision nodes indicate that these actors do not know the advocacy group‘s 
true type. The game begins after the opposition group proposes a change to an existing 
policy – for example, by proposing to reduce cash benefits to low-income families.   
 
(1) Stage 1: Signaling 
In the first stage, chance (or ―nature‖) selects the strong advocacy group GS with 
probability (p) and the weak advocacy group GW with probability (1 - p).  All players 
know the initial probability distribution, but only the advocacy group knows whether it is 
a strong or weak type.  Upon viewing its type, the advocacy group decides whether to 
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signal to the opposition OG that it will build an ad-hoc policy coalition to lobby against 
the opposition‘s proposed policy change. Signaling at this stage is costless and takes the 
form of an unobserved communication between the two interest groups.  If an advocacy 
group decides not to signal, then the game ends, the legislator accepts the proposal, and 
the opposition group achieves its preferred outcome.  
 
(2) Stage 2: Bargaining 
Upon viewing the advocacy group‘s decision to signal, OG updates its beliefs 
regarding the advocacy group‘s type, and decides whether to enter into a bargaining game 
with the advocacy group or challenge the advocacy group by lobbying for its preferred 
policy in the legislature.  If OG chooses to bargain with the advocacy group, then the two 
agree on a policy xb that is somewhere between the two groups‘ ideal points. Bargaining 
assures a payoff of βm for both groups because the legislator LM‘s dominant strategy is to 
accept the policy achieved through bargaining, regardless of the advocacy group‘s type.  
If OG decides to lobby at cost γAG, then the game moves to the next stage. 
 
(3) Stage 3: Lobbying and Coalition-Building 
If OG chooses to lobby independently for its proposed policy xo, the advocacy 
group must decide whether to build a coalition to lobby against the opposition at cost ci, 
or to lobby independently against the opposition group at cost γAG. The cost of building a 
coalition for the strong advocate is cS and the cost of building a coalition for the weak 
advocate is cW, where cS < αAG < cW.  If the weak advocacy group builds a coalition, it 
will receive a payoff of (0 – cW) if the legislator accepts the opposition‘s policy proposal 
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and a payoff of (αAG – cW) if the legislator rejects the opposition‘s proposal.  If the weak 
type lobbies independently, it receives a payoff of (0 - γAG) if the legislator accepts the 
proposal and a payoff of (αAG - γAG) if the legislator rejects the proposal.  The strong 
advocacy group will receive a payoff of (0 - γAG) if it lobbies independently and the 
legislator accepts the proposal, a payoff of (αAG - γAG) if the legislator rejects the proposal, 
a payoff of (0 – cS) if it builds a coalition and the legislator accepts the proposal, and a 
payoff of (αAG – cS) if it builds a coalition and the legislator rejects the proposal. 
 
(4) Stage 4: Policy Decision 
If advocacy and opposition groups bargain or engage in a legislative battle, then 
the median legislator (LM) decides whether to accept or reject the proposed policy change 
(labeled policy xj). LM is adopting the opposition‘s preferred position if she accepts policy 
xo and the advocacy group‘s preferred position if she rejects the policy.   Following 
bargaining, LM‘s dominant strategy is to accept the policy achieved via bargaining 
regardless of the advocacy group‘s type.   If the opposition and advocacy group do not 
bargain but rather engage in legislative battle, then the legislator chooses whether to 
accept or reject policy xo.  The advocacy group‘s actions in this stage of the model reveal 
its true type to the legislator.  If the legislator encounters a diverse coalition, she knows 
that the information being provided by the advocacy group is credible, and will reject the 
proposal of the opposition. This is the only circumstance in which the legislator will 
reject the opposition’s proposal. If the legislator encounters an advocacy group lobbying 
independently, then she will accept the opposition‘s policy change xo. 
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Description of Equilibrium Results 
The equilibrium concept used in this game is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.  
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of a set of strategies and beliefs that satisfy the 
following conditions: (1) at an information set, a player has a belief about which node in 
the information has been reached; (2) players‟ strategies are sequentially rational given 
their beliefs; (3) beliefs are determined by Bayes‟ rule and the players‟ equilibrium 
strategies at the information sets on the equilibrium path, and (4) off the equilibrium path 
where possible (Gibbons 1992: 173-190).  This equilibrium concept permits players with 
incomplete information to update their beliefs about other players‟ types based on their 
previous behavior in the game.  An important implication for this game is that the median 
legislator is able to update her beliefs about the advocacy group‟s type based on 
behaviors that occur prior to her decision node. 
Although multiple equilibria are possible, I identify a semi-pooling equilibrium 
that has strong behavioral implications (Banks 1991).  This equilibrium identifies the 
conditions under which coalitions form and convey information to legislators – 
specifically, when both advocacy groups signal to the opposition group, the opposition 
sometimes opposes and sometimes bargains, the strong advocacy group builds a coalition 
but the weak advocacy group does not, and the legislator rejects the policy change 
opposed by a diverse coalition but accepts the policy change when a diverse coalition 
does not form.  
The conditions for this equilibrium are as follows.  First, for the advocacy group, 
the future losses of abstaining from signaling exceed the costs of lobbying alone, or f > 
γAG. This ensures that both advocacy group types will signal. Second, for the advocacy 
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group, cS < αAG < cW, and third, (αAG – cW) < (0 - γAG). The second condition means that 
the strong type advocacy group will build a diverse coalition because the anticipated 
benefits of a policy win exceed the costs of coalition building.  The second and third 
conditions together mean that the weak type advocacy group will not build a diverse 
coalition because the costs of coalition building even in the presence of a policy win are 
less than the value of losing the policy battle and lobbying alone.  The fourth condition is 
that the opposition group will oppose only when the expected value of opposing exceeds 
the value of bargaining, or when βOG < αOG (1 – q) – γOG.  The opposition will bargain 
when the βOG > αOG (1 – q) – γOG.  I elaborate on each of these conditions below. 
The first condition makes it optimal for both advocacy group types to signal 
because the anticipated benefits of signaling – even for the weak type – exceed the 
certain benefits of not signaling, or (0 – f) < (0 – γAG).  Put another way, both advocacy 
group types can receive a greater payoff from signaling, regardless of the outcome. For 
the strong type, if OG chooses to bargain, the strong type will receive a payoff of βAG; if 
OG chooses to oppose, the strong type will build a coalition and will receive a payoff of 
αAG - cS. For the weak type, signaling will yield a payoff of greater than zero if OG 
chooses to bargain. This will occur only when OG believes that the benefits of bargaining 
exceed the benefits of engaging in legislative battle.  If OG opposes, the weak type will 
lobby independently and will receive a payoff of 0 – γAG.  Because f > γAG, this payoff is 
still greater than the payoff that the weak type receives by abstaining. 
The second and third conditions ensure that the strong advocate will build a 
diverse coalition while the weak advocate will not.  If an opposition group opposes, the 
optimal strategies for strong and weak advocacy groups differ because the costs of 
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coalition building for each type differ.  For GS, the costs of coalition building are less 
than αAG, which means that the group will receive a payoff greater than 0 if the legislator 
rejects the opposition‘s policy proposal (thereby deciding in favor of the advocacy 
group). For GW, the costs of coalition building are greater than αAG, meaning that the 
group will receive a payoff less than 0 even if the legislator rejects the opposition’s 
proposal and decides in favor of the advocacy group.  It is these differential costs that 
prevent the weak type from building a diverse coalition, and offer a signal to the 
legislator that the information provided by the advocacy group is credible.  The high 
costs of coalition building for the weak advocacy group deter it from building a coalition 
that will misrepresent the true extent of resistance to the opposition‘s policy proposal.  
The costs of coalition building for the strong advocacy group are lower, allowing it to 
build a coalition that provides credible evidence to the legislator that she will lose more 
than she gains by enacting the opposition‘s proposal.   
The fourth condition identifies when an opposition group will bargain and when it 
will oppose.  To understand when the opposition group will oppose rather than bargain, 
consider how the opposition group‘s payoff changes as the costs of lobbying (γOG), value 
of bargaining (βOG), and probability of a strong type advocacy group (q) change. Figure 
4.2 shows the relationship between OG‘s payoffs and the value of lobbying γOG, 
bargaining βOG and q.  In this figure, the payoff to the opposition group is shown on the 
y-axis, while the probability of a strong type advocacy group (q) is shown on the x-axis.  
The costs of lobbying are shown in two different ways – as small (γOG1) and large (γOG2). 
Similarly, the payoff from bargaining is shown as high (βOG1) and low (βOG2).  
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This figure shows that when the costs of lobbying for the opposition are small 
(γOG1) and the payoff from bargaining is high (βOG1), OG‘s strategy depends on its 
beliefs about the advocacy group‘s type.  In this scenario, OG always prefers to bargain 
with a strong advocacy group and oppose a weak advocacy group. When q equals 1 (or 
when the advocacy group is a strong type) and OG bargains, it will receive a payoff of 
βOG1.  If OG opposes, the strong type advocacy group will build a coalition and the 
legislator will reject the policy proposal, yielding a payoff of 0- γOG to OG.  Because 0- 
γOG is less than βOG1, OG‘s best option is to bargain with a strong type. The opposition 
prefers to oppose a weak type because a weak type cannot build a coalition.  When q 
equals 0 (or when the advocacy group is a weak type), the payoff when OG opposes is 
αOG – γOG, which the figure shows is greater than the payoff from bargaining (βOG1). 
However, because it does not know the advocacy group‘s true type, OG’s strategy 
depends on its beliefs about the advocacy group‘s type.  For example, assume that the 
value of bargaining βOG1 is equal to one-fourth the value of lobbying and winning, or 
βOG1 = .25(αOG – γOG1).  This is roughly equivalent to the position of βOG1 in Figure 2.  
When the probability that OG is dealing with a strong group is less than 75 percent (or 
q<0.75), OG prefers to oppose because the payoff of opposing exceeds the payoff of 
bargaining.  As the figure shows, the solid diagonal line is greater than βOG1 for all values 
of q < 0.75.   As the probability that OG is dealing with a strong advocacy group 
increases above .75, OG prefers to bargain rather than oppose, because the payoff of 
bargaining is greater than the payoff of opposing.  Therefore, when q is less than 0.75 
OG‘s optimal strategy is to oppose rather than bargain; when q is greater than 0.75, OG‘s 
best strategy is to bargain. Formally, OG will bargain when βOG > αOG (1 – q) – γOG and 
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oppose when βOG < αOG (1 – q) – γOG.  When the value of bargaining remains at βOG1 and 
the costs of lobbying increase from γOG1 to γOG2 (or as the diagonal line moves down), 
OG becomes less likely to oppose and more likely to bargain for lower values of q.  
When the costs of lobbying are γOG2, OG‘s opposes roughly half of the time (when q < 
0.5) and bargains half of the time (when q > 0.5).   
The opposition group‘s strategy also depends on the relative value of bargaining.  
Figure 2 shows how OG‘s optimal strategy changes as the value of bargaining moves 
from βOG1 to βOG2.  As the value of bargaining decreases, the opposition group becomes 
less likely to bargain and more likely to oppose, even when it believes it is dealing with a 
strong type. Whenever the value of bargaining β is less than the value of a policy win 
after lobbying independently for all values of q, the opposition will choose to oppose 
rather than bargain. 
 
Empirical Predictions of the Theoretical Model 
The model yields two types of behavioral implications. The first implication is 
outcome-oriented and produces hypotheses regarding the conditions under which 
Congressional representatives legislate in favor of anti-poverty advocates. The second 
implications are process-oriented, generating predictions for how opposing interest 
groups interact in different environmental contexts.   
First, the outcome-oriented hypothesis is called the Diverse Coalitions 
Hypothesis.  This hypothesis predicts that advocates will gain influence – either through 
bargaining or coalition building – when the advocacy group is perceived as being a 
―strong‖ type.  Advocacy groups are perceived as being strong types when the issue is 
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salient to advocates and to partners.  When an issue is salient, it means that an advocacy 
group (or the advocacy group‘s membership base) values an issue.  When the issue is not 
salient to coalition partners, partners are not willing to expend their own resources to 
collaborate with the advocacy group, and it is not possible for the advocacy group to 
convince them to do so. In this situation, the costs of collaboration effectively preclude 
the advocacy group from building a diverse coalition.  When advocates are perceived as 
being strong, they will gain influence, but the process of influence will vary based on the 
costs of legislative battle and the relative value of bargaining  
Second, the model produces a set of process-oriented implications, which I call 
the Advocacy Coalition Hypothesis and the Strange Bedfellows Hypothesis.  The 
Advocacy Coalition Hypothesis predicts that diverse coalition building by anti-poverty 
groups will occur when advocates are “strong” types, when the costs of legislative battle 
are low for the opposition group, and the value of bargaining is low.  Figure 2 shows that 
when the costs of lobbying are low and the value of bargaining is low, opposition groups 
receive a higher payoff from opposing even when advocates are perceived as being 
capable of winning the policy battle.  Thus, provided that an issue is salient to an 
advocacy group and salient to potential partners, diverse coalitions will be more likely to 
form when costs are low and bargaining yields a minimal reward 
The Strange Bedfellows Hypothesis predicts that when advocates are perceived as 
being “strong” types, bargaining between advocates and opponents will be more likely 
when the costs of legislative battle are high. As the costs of engaging in legislative battle 
increase from low to high, opposition groups will prefer the certain outcome of 
bargaining over the potential policy loss and certain resource loss associated with 
 72 
opposing. When the costs of lobbying are great enough, opponents will prefer bargaining 
over opposing regardless of the advocacy group‟s type.  This is particularly true when the 
value of bargaining is high.  This implies that when the costs of legislative battle are high 
for the opposition group, coalitions between anti-poverty groups will rarely form because 
opponents of social welfare programs will preempt coalition building by advocacy groups 
through bargaining.   
The costs of lobbying refer to the amount that an opposition group must spend to 
convince the legislative body to enact its preferred policy.  In the empirical chapters of 
my dissertation, these costs are operationalized as the partisan control of the legislature.  I 
assume that the Democratic Party generally favors more generous programs for the poor, 
while the Republican Party generally favors fewer and less costly programs for the poor.  
As the percentage of Democrats increases, it becomes increasingly costly for opponents 
of social programs to convince legislators to adopt policies that would restrict or 
eliminate social welfare benefits. Because it is so costly, opponents receive a greater 
payoff by preempting coalition building and bargaining with advocates.  Thus, when the 
percentage of Democrats in the legislature is high, diverse coalitions will be less likely to 
form, even when advocates are strong.  When the percentage of Republicans in the 
legislature is high and advocates are strong, diverse coalitions will be more likely to 
form. 
The value of bargaining refers to the value placed on a compromise policy less the 
costs of forging agreement between opposing interest groups.  This is operationalized as 
the level of political conflict. When political conflict is high, opposition groups are likely 
to experience low gains and encounter high costs when bargaining with anti-poverty 
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advocates.  However, when political conflict is low, opposition groups may experience a 
large payoff from bargaining because the costs of forging agreement are low relative to 
the value of a compromise policy.  This implies that when the political conflict is high, 
and advocates are strong, diverse coalitions will be more likely to form 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has utilized formal theoretic modeling to identify the conditions of 
diverse coalition formation and legislative influence.  Together, the conditions imply that 
diverse coalitions will be more likely to form when ―strong‖ advocates exist, when there 
are fewer Democrats in the legislature, and when political conflict is high.  However, 
advocates will gain influence whenever they are perceived as being ―strong‖ – which 
means that advocates consider an issue to be salient, and partners consider an issue to be 
salient. In the next two chapters, I test these implications using data from the federal 
welfare reform of 1996. 
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Figure 4.1. Extensive Form Representation of Signaling Model
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Interest Groups, Diverse Collaboration and the  
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
 
This chapter explores collaborative behavior among national interest 
organizations in the years preceding the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), or welfare reform. The PRWORA, 
enacted in 1996 after two presidential vetoes, ended a 60-year guarantee of cash 
assistance to needy families by replacing the entitlement program Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) with the block grant program Temporary Assistance to 
Needy Families (TANF).  TANF differed from its predecessor in that benefits were time-
limited and made conditional on employment-related activities. Many programmatic 
decisions were devolved from the national to state level, and states were granted 
significant discretion over a wide range of issues, including work incentives, generosity 
of benefits, program time limits, and sanctions for non-compliant behavior. 
 In the two years preceding the PRWORA‘s passage, the breadth of proposed 
changes to the welfare program activated a large number of interest organizations at 
national and state levels. Anti-poverty advocates lobbied in favor of reforms that would 
maintain the safety net for poor families, conservative organizations sought to make 
welfare benefits time-limited and conditional on reproductive behavior, and 
intergovernmental groups lobbied for increased control over welfare programs.   
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In this chapter, I provide empirical support for the hypothesis that anti-poverty 
advocates engage in diverse coalition building as a strategy of legislative influence.  I use 
case studies, media reports, and hearings testimony to examine the partnerships that 
formed in the years preceding the passage of PRWORA, both among anti-poverty 
advocates and among those that opposed existing welfare programs. I find that anti-
poverty advocates, as well as conservative organizations and intergovernmental groups, 
engaged in diverse collaboration in an attempt to influence policymaking.  Most 
partnerships were informal rather than formal, and diverse collaboration was sometimes, 
but not always, associated with legislative influence.   
I show that organizational actors engaged in coalition building that was diverse 
with respect to the informational resources that advocates could provide to legislators.  
During welfare reform, collaboration diversified the types of informational resources 
organizations provided to legislators – for example, when a group with substantive 
expertise (policy information) collaborated with an organization with a large membership 
base (electoral information).  Diverse partnerships also functioned to provide a wider 
range of the same type of informational resource, for example, when organizations with 
different areas of substantive expertise worked together (policy information).  In both 
instances, the resources of one organization complemented, rather than simply 
augmented, the resources of its partner organization.   
The theory predicts that because it is costly for organizations that differ from one 
another to work together, collaboration signals that the information being provided is 
credible. Thus, diverse coalitions are more likely to be associated with legislative 
influence.  In this chapter, I show that although advocates were described as influential 
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during welfare reform, the data provide very little evidence that diverse partnerships in 
particular helped antipoverty advocates gain influence.  The fact that groups engaged in a 
wide array of strategies makes it difficult to prove that diverse partnerships alone were 
the cause of their influence.  However, an analysis of the collaborative strategies of social 
conservatives and intergovernmental groups provides additional evidence that diverse 
collaboration can help organizational actors achieve influence. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  In the first section, I review the history of the 
welfare program in order to frame the policy changes proposed in the early 1990s. The 
next section provides an overview of the organizational actors that were involved in 
lobbying at the national level.  The third section offers evidence of informal and formal 
collaborative efforts among anti-poverty advocates, focusing on the extent to which 
collaboration diversified the informational resources of advocates. In the fourth section, I 
examine the relationship between diverse collaboration and legislative outcomes and in 
the fifth section, I provide evidence of diverse partnerships and legislative influence 
among other groups involved in welfare reform – namely, social conservatives and 
intergovernmental groups. The final section offers a summary and conclusion. 
 
Setting the Stage for the PRWORA: Welfare Policymaking Prior to the 1990s 
Many scholars have written about the history of the welfare program in the United 
States (Danziger 2001; Heclo 2001; Katz 1989, 2001; Patterson 1994; Trattner 1994; 
Weaver 2000).  In this section, I briefly review this history in order to contextualize the 
changes proposed by President Clinton and the Republican Party in the early 1990s.   
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For nearly 60 years, cash benefits were provided to needy families through the 
program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
15
  AFDC originated in the 
Social Security Act of 1935, having developed out of a series of state-level pension 
programs that were designed to provide destitute families (typically widows) with a cash 
benefit that would allow children to remain with their mothers and prevent them from 
being moved into orphanages or foster care. From its inception, the structure of the 
program was such that national and state governments shared the cost of the program, 
while states retained broad discretion over components such as eligibility, benefit levels, 
and program administration.
16
   
The first major reforms to AFDC occurred in the early 1960s as part of the Great 
Society reforms, a set of domestic social policy reforms that aimed, among other things, 
to eradicate poverty and racial injustice.  Early changes to AFDC were fairly liberal and 
oriented towards extending welfare eligibility, raising benefit levels, and providing 
services to help needy families transition out of poverty.  New programs sought to fight 
poverty by providing educational, employment, and training opportunities to low-income 
populations in order to improve their labor market prospects (Danziger 2001).  To 
address disparities in program eligibility across states, a series of court decisions struck 
down state-level requirements that essentially disqualified blacks from participation in 
AFDC, and in doing so changed the structure of the program from one that entitled states 
                                                 
15
 The program was originally called Aid to Dependent Children, or ADC. In the 1960s, the name was 
changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC. 
16
 Technically, AFDC was a state entitlement program, meaning that states were entitled to federal funds 
that were not subject to the annual appropriations process in Congress, and that funding for AFDC could 
not be decreased without significant effort on the part of Congress. 
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to federal funding for the program, to one that entitled individuals to cash benefits 
through AFDC (Weaver 2000).
17
   
The liberalizing reforms of the 1960s contributed to an increase in the size and 
cost of the AFDC program.  The welfare caseload grew from 3 million in 1960 to 10.2 
million in 1971, with program costs increasing from $1 billion to $6.2 billion (Weaver 
2000).  Policymakers grew increasingly uncomfortable with rising caseloads, costs, and 
low levels of work activity among program participants.  In 1967, Congress attempted to 
arrest the growth of AFDC by enacting policies aimed at moving recipients into the labor 
market, employing a combination of policy tools that both liberalized AFDC and 
imposed new work requirements.
18
  In the late 1960s and 1970s, Nixon and Carter sought 
to enact reforms that would bolster work activity while providing a minimum welfare 
benefit or income guarantee, but the policies were never enacted (CQ Press 1989).
19
   
By the 1980s, the era of liberalizing welfare was over and focus had shifted to 
from reducing poverty to reducing welfare caseloads and costs (Danziger 2001).  The 
Reagan administration achieved some caseload reduction by enacting changes to AFDC 
that restricted eligibility and removed many working recipients from the welfare rolls.  In 
1998, Congress enacted the Family Support Act (FSA), a bipartisan act that expanded 
                                                 
17
 Prior to the 1960s, many states set requirements that essentially disqualified certain groups (notably 
blacks) from participation in AFDC. Although states were subsequently required to provide benefits to all 
individuals that qualified under state law, other programmatic components such as benefit levels varied 
widely across states.   
18
 For example, recipients were permitted to keep a portion of earned income without a reduction in 
benefits (known as the earnings disregard), but were also required to register for employment and training 
activities under the Work Incentives Program, or WIN. These policies were for the most part unsuccessful 
in increasing work activity among program participants, in part because many of the work requirements 
lacked adequate enforcement mechanisms.   
19
 Nixon‟s Family Assistance Plan (FAP) would have imposed a minimum income guarantee alongside 
work requirements for women with older children, but the legislation failed in the Senate in 1970.  
Similarly, Carter‟s proposed Program for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) of 1977 would have provided an 
income guarantee to welfare recipients and created public service jobs for those unable to find employment, 
but the proposal was never enacted, largely due to its cost.   
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AFDC while increasing work requirements.  The FSA, which represented a compromise 
between liberals and conservatives, expanded the safety net by extending benefits for 2-
parent families, instituting child care and Medicaid for families transitioning off of 
welfare, while requiring states to enact employment and training programs for welfare 
recipients under the new Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS), and 
imposing work requirements and sanctions for non-compliance with program rules (CQ 
Press 1989). 
The early 1990s witnessed renewed interest in reforming the welfare program 
after Bill Clinton promised to ―end welfare as we know it‖ in his presidential campaign.  
Clinton‘s welfare reform proposal consisted of a time-limited welfare program that would 
offer employment supports to program participants while requiring work activity and 
imposing time limits on benefit receipt, and was to the right of most Democratic 
proposals.  Once in office, however, the administration‘s efforts to reform welfare took a 
back seat to its focus on health care, and a welfare reform bill was not introduced until 
the summer of 1994.  At this time neither party had strong incentives to push the bill 
forward so close to the November elections and Clinton‘s welfare reform bill died in 
committee (DeParle 1994; Haskins 2006; Weaver 2000). 
 
The Personal Responsibility Act (PRA) 
In the fall of 1994, Republicans swept into power at both national and state levels, 
becoming the majority in both houses of Congress for the first time in 40 years.  At the 
national level, the party gained 52 seats in the House and 8 seats in the Senate.  At the 
state level, Republicans assumed control of 31 gubernatorial seats and a plurality of state 
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legislatures (Balz 1994; Balz and Brownstein 1996).  This victory fundamentally changed 
the course of welfare policymaking, as policies that had been unlikely under unified 
Democratic control became a possibility once Republicans gained the majority in 
Congress (Haskins 2006).  
Like Clinton, the Republican Party had made electoral commitments to reform 
welfare, albeit in a more conservative direction.  Republican candidates had campaigned 
under the ―Contract with America,‖ a list of 10 policies that candidates pledged to enact 
if elected to power. Third on the list was the Personal Responsibility Act (PRA), which 
aimed to:  
―Discourage illegitimacy and teen pregnancy by prohibiting welfare to minor 
mothers and denying increased AFDC for additional children while on welfare, 
cut spending for welfare programs, and enact a tough two-years-and-out provision 
with work requirements to promote individual responsibility‖ (Contract with 
America, 1994).  
 
The PRA reflected the belief, held by many conservatives, that upward trends in martial 
dissolution, out-of-wedlock childbirth, and teen pregnancy were the result on an overly 
permissive social welfare state.  Reforming welfare was seen as a key component in 
halting the moral decay of America (Mead 1968, 1992; Murray 1984).   
Table 5.1 describes several key provisions of the Personal Responsibility Act as it 
was introduced in the 104
th
 House (CQ Press 1997; Weaver 2000).  With respect to 
program structure, the bill sought to end the individual entitlement to cash benefits by 
converting AFDC into a block grant program in which grants to states were capped to 
avoid spending increases.  The bill also included provisions to convert social welfare 
programs such as Child Support Enforcement, the Child Supplemental Security Income, 
and food and nutrition programs, into block grant programs, thereby ending the 
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individual entitlement to such benefits.  These programmatic changes were opposed by 
anti-poverty advocates, but were favored by conservative organizations and some 
intergovernmental actors, in part because block grants would permit increased discretion 
and flexibility over social programs. 
The legislation incorporated provisions that were important to conservatives by 
prohibiting the payment of additional benefits to children born to mothers currently 
receiving AFDC (called the family cap), prohibiting states from paying cash benefits on 
behalf of children born to unmarried mothers under the age of 18 (called the teen-mother 
exclusion), and requiring states to establish paternity before paying benefits on behalf of 
needy children.  With respect to work requirements, the policy required welfare recipients 
who had been receiving benefits for 2 years to work at least 35 hours per week in order to 
continue participating in the program, and required that states move 2 percent of their 
welfare caseload into work programs by 1996 and 50 percent by 2003, or risk financial 
penalties. Benefits would be time-limited at 5 years, and states were allowed to enact 
policies that would terminate benefits at 24 months.  Finally, alongside these changes in 
program structure, program entry, and activities requirements, the bill proposed to 
eliminate eligibility of legal immigrants for 60 means-tested programs, require drug 
testing as a condition of receiving benefits, and impose stricter rules governing admission 
into the child SSI program (Weaver 2000).   
The Republican Congressional victory put organizational advocates for the poor 
in a very difficult position.  Republican leaders were committed to enacting a large 
number of conservative reforms, many of which represented fundamental shifts in 
American social policy.  Additionally, for the first time in nearly forty years, advocates 
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lacked access to legislators in key leadership positions in Congress, and few had 
membership bases that they could mobilize to influence newly-appointed Republican 
leaders (Toner 1995).  Finally, in opposing conservative proposals, advocates were in the 
difficult position of appearing to defend a set of welfare policies that most Americans 
disliked, as well as cash benefits for a population that many viewed as ‗undeserving‘ of 
government support (Gilens 1999).   
 
Organizational Involvement in the 104
th
 Congress 
Despite these disadvantages, a wide array of organizational actors attempted to 
influence welfare policymaking during the 104
th
 Congress (1995-1996). Table 5.2 shows 
the extent of participation by different types of interest organizations during the House 
and Senate hearings on welfare reform during the 104
th
 Congress. This table categorizes 
all organizational actors that testified or submitted written testimony during 
Congressional committee hearings that occurred between January 1995 and August 1996, 
when the PRWORA was signed into law. While Congressional hearings do not provide a 
complete picture of all the groups that lobbied during welfare reform, they do offer a 
snapshot of some of the major organizational actors. This table excludes individuals 
testifying on behalf of national governmental representatives, Congressional officials, 
and individuals with no obvious organizational affiliation.
20
  
In total, nearly 300 interest organizations and individuals were involved in 
Congressional hearings on welfare reform. Over 24 percent of participants were advocacy 
groups organized around issues related to vulnerable populations, such as the Center for 
Law and Social Policy, the Children‘s Defense Fund, and the Coalition on Human Needs.  
                                                 
20
 Witness lists are drawn from hearings data and Winston (2002). 
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Intergovernmental organizations were almost as numerous, representing nearly 23 
percent of those testifying. Sixteen percent of those testifying were nonprofit service 
providers such as the United Way and Catholic Charities, and 15 percent were experts 
from university settings and research organizations.  Approximately 7 percent 
represented for-profit companies and business groups, 5 percent represented traditional 
values groups like the Eagle Forum, and 5 percent represented professional organizations 
such as the American Medical Association. Unions represented only 2 percent of 
organizations that testified. 
Figure 5.1 shows that advocacy groups were mobilized around several different 
issues.  Organizations focused on poverty-related issues were 28 percent of all advocacy 
groups, while child advocacy groups were 17 percent.  These two categories include 
some of the most prominent organizational advocates for the poor, including the Center 
for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP) 
and the Children‘s Defense Fund (CDF).  Groups mobilized around issues related to 
underrepresented minorities, such at the National Council of La Raza, constituted 
approximately 22 percent of advocacy groups, while women‘s organizations like the 
National Organization of Women were approximately 14 percent.  An additional 14 
percent were mobilized around issues related to health and disability, and 6 percent 
represented other vulnerable populations or social policy issues.   
 Although relatively few organizational actors were mobilized specifically around 
the issue of poverty and child wellbeing, a number of these were well-funded, had been 
central players in the social welfare policy domain for many years, and were relatively 
well-positioned to influence policymaking.  In particular, the Center for Budget and 
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Policy Priorities (CBPP), the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), and the 
Children‘s Defense Fund (CDF) had a strong history of advocacy on welfare-related 
issues (Haskins 2004; Weaver 2000; Winston 2002).  The CBPP and CLASP are research 
organizations that were founded in the early 1980s and late 1960s, respectively, and had 
budgets of approximately $4 million and $1.24 million in 1995, respectively. The CDF 
developed in the early 1970s from a coalition of groups brought together by Marian 
Wright Edelman and in 1995, had a budget of $15 million (Weaver 2000). The operating 
budgets of these organizations are nowhere near as large as organizations like the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, which in the late 1990s spent $17 million on lobbying in a single 
year (Center for Responsive Politics, 1998), but neither do they indicate organizations 
operating on ‗shoe-string‘ budgets or only tangentially engaged in the policy process.  
These organizations had actively participated in the most recent rounds of welfare 
reform, and both the CBPP and CLASP were well-respected by members of both political 
parties (Haskins 2006; Winston 2002).  The CDF also had close ties to the Clinton 
administration: Hillary Clinton had been a former chair of the CDF, and Marion Wright 
Edelman, CDF‘s founder, was a close friend (DeParle 1994; Price 1993). 
  
Diverse Collaboration among Advocates for the Poor during the 104
th
 Congress 
This section explores the extent to which organizational advocates for the poor 
turned to coalitional strategies in an effort to exert greater legislative influence.  Case 
studies and media reports show that advocates collaborated with one another as a strategy 
of legislative influence on many of the issues within welfare reform.  Much of the 
collaboration was informal in nature, and occurred between organizations that were 
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similar ideologically, but differed with respect to the substantive or electoral resources 
they could provide to legislators.  Some instances of collaboration appeared to diversify 
the types of informational resources that advocates could offer to legislators – for 
example, when institutional advocates with technical policy expertise worked with 
membership organizations with large membership bases.  In other instances, diversity 
functioned to provide a broader array of the same type of information – for example, 
when two research organizations with different areas of specialization worked together. 
 
Informal Collaboration 
 During welfare reform, the vast majority of collaborative efforts were informal.  
Many of these were designed to diversify either the substantive or the electoral resources 
that advocates could offer to legislators. For example, the Children‘s Defense Fund 
(CDF), the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), and the Center for Law and 
Social Policy (CLASP), three of the leading organizational advocates for the poor, 
collaborated frequently in an effort to widen the range of substantive information they 
could provide to legislators.  In discussing the organization‘s collaborative efforts with 
CDF and CLASP, for example, an official from CBPP noted:  
―We work most closely with CLASP. Our styles are most similar. We have a very 
close working relationship with CDF, but our approaches are somewhat different. 
… [W]e divide up. [The CDF] clearly has an expertise on child care and child 
support which we don‘t have. It would be the same thing with CLASP: they have 
child support. We have an expertise with food programs that they don‘t have. 
With the [Earned Income Tax Credit] we obviously are the lead group in town…‖ 
(Official from the CBPP, as quoted in Weaver 2000, 203).  
  
While similar with respect to their liberal ideology, the CBPP, CLASP, and CDF had 
different areas of substantive expertise.  In collaborating, the organizations were able to 
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provide legislators with a wider range of substantive information, which was important 
given the breadth of the Republican‘s social policy agenda.  Much of this collaboration 
occurred behind the scenes, in an effort not to alienate allies in the Clinton administration 
(DeParle 1994).    
Other instances of informal collaboration were quite public, designed to diversify 
the electoral resources that advocates could offer to legislators.  For example, in early 
1995, a national research organization called Children Now partnered with the Coalition 
for America's Children, a bipartisan group of over 300 children‘s organizations, to 
produce a ―Contract with America‘s Children.‖  The Contract, mirrored after the 
Republican‘s Contract with America and signed by over 100 mainstream children‘s 
organizations, listed a set of ten principles that Congressmen were asked to honor when 
legislating on issues such as welfare reform.  Copies of the Contract were distributed to 
each Congressional office, while advocates organized a rally on the capital steps, urging 
leaders to sign the document (DeParle 1994; Stepp 1995).    
Similarly, on June 1, 1996 in Washington DC, the Children‘s Defense Fund 
organized a rally called ―Stand for Children,‖ designed to focus public attention on the 
needs of America‘s children.  The event, designed to be non-partisan and non-political in 
order to attract a wider range of partners, was attended by over 200,000 people and 
endorsed by over 3,000 organizations, including parents‘ organizations and child 
advocates, educators, unions, religious organizations, and service providers (Weiner 
1996; Wetzstein 1996; Vobejda 1996).
21
   
                                                 
21
 Stand for Children later developed into a formal, diverse partnership of advocacy organizations devoted 
to the elevating the needs of children in public and political discourse and policy. 
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Anti-poverty advocates also cosponsored advertisements against social policy cuts 
with partners that were similar ideologically, but differed with respect to their type and 
policy domain.  Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show advertisements displayed in the New York 
Times in 1995.  The first, titled ―The Contract with America: How much will all this cost 
our kids,‖ was sponsored by a relatively prominent set of groups, including the National 
Education Association and National Parenting Association, Children‘s Defense Fund and 
Center for Law and Social Policy, Child Welfare League of America, Center for Law and 
Social Policy, and Food Research and Action Center (New York Times, 1995a).
22
  These 
organizations were leaders in different areas of poverty and child well being.  Some 
groups, like the National Education Association, boasted an extensive membership base – 
the organization had over 2 million member in 1995 (Ornstein, Levin, and Gutek 2010). 
Other groups had considerable substantive expertise, often deriving from different 
sources.  For example, the Center for Law and Social Policy‘s expertise derived from 
research activities, while the expertise of the Child Welfare League of America, a 
partnership of private and nonprofit service agencies, resulted from on-the-ground service 
experience.  
Figure 5.3 shows a similar advertisement run in the New York Times on August 
8, 1995, describing ―Why every woman in American should beware of welfare cuts‖ 
(New York Times, 1995b).  In this instance, a small number of anti-poverty organizations 
were joined by an array of women‘s organizations, such as the National Organization of 
                                                 
22
 The ad‟s co-sponsors included the National Education Association, the Coalition for America‟s Children, 
the Children‟s Defense Fund, the National Association of Child Advocates, the Child Welfare League of 
America, the National Parenting Association, Children Now, the National Black Child Development 
Institute, the Center for Law and Social Policy, the Child Care Action Campaign ,the Food Research and 
Action Center, the Children‟s Partnership, Statewide Youth Advocacy, and the Citizens‟ Committee for 
Children in New York. 
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Women and Center for Women Policy Studies, and labor unions, such as the AFL-CIO 
and the National Health and Human Service Employees Union.
23
   The women‘s 
organizations had electoral and substantive resources in a different, although overlapping, 
policy domain than antipoverty advocates, while labor unions had extensive electoral 
resources.  This is one of the few examples of collaboration between anti-poverty 
organizations and labor unions, which were focused on opposing cuts to Medicare and 
Medicaid (Weaver 2000).   
 
Formal Collaboration 
Although most collaborative efforts were informal, both ad-hoc and formal policy 
coalitions lobbied against cuts to welfare programs. Perhaps the most unusual 
partnerships occurred between anti-poverty advocates, liberal citizen groups, pro-life, and 
religious organizations on child exclusion policies. Child exclusion policies denied 
welfare benefits to a child if the mother was under the age of 18 (referred to as the ―teen 
mother exclusion‖), gave birth while receiving welfare for a different child (referred to as 
the ―family cap‖), or failed to establish paternity for the child.  These provisions – 
particularly the teen mother exclusion and family cap – were favored by conservatives as 
a way to ―de-incentivize‖ out-of-wedlock childbirth and teen pregnancy by restricting 
                                                 
23
 The full list of co-sponsors is: 1199 National Health and Human Service Employees Union, National 
Association of Social Workers, Coalition of Labor Union Women, Catholics for a Free Choice, American 
Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, Welfare Reform Network of New York, Ms. Foundation for Women, 
Feminist Majority, Wider Opportunities for Women/Women and Poverty Project, Communications 
Workers of America, Democratic Socialists of America, Women‟s Actions for New Directions (WAND), 
National Committee of Pay Equity, United Farm Workers of America, Center for Women Policy Studies, 
National Council for Research on Women, National Jobs for all Coalition, National Coalition for the 
Homeless, and NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund. Readers were encouraged to send donations to 
the Women‟s Committee of One Hundred, an organization founded the previous year by a group of 
scholars, activists, elected officials, and other professional to “defend women‟s security.”   
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access to cash benefits.  However, they were opposed by liberal advocates who argued 
that such policies would increase the extent of child poverty. 
Both ad-hoc and formal policy coalitions were active on child exclusion issues. 
For instance, the Child Exclusion Task Force was an ad-hoc policy coalition organized to 
prevent the adoption of the family cap, teen mother exclusion, and paternity 
establishment requirement.  Headed by the National Organization of Women (NOW) and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Task Force was composed of nearly 100 
organizations.  Its membership consisted of research organizations such as the Center for 
Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) and the Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), 
pro-life groups such as Feminists for Life, and a variety of (primarily liberal) religious 
organizations.  The Task Force testified several times in committee hearings during the 
104
th
 Congress, lobbied legislators and administration officials, and sponsored media 
events with advocates, pro-life organizations, and religious groups such as Catholic 
Charities USA (US House of Representatives 1995; US Newswire 1995; Weaver 2000).   
Formal coalitions such as the Coalition on Human Needs (CHN) were also active 
on child exclusion issues. The CHN is group of organizations engaged in the study and 
provision of services for low-income and vulnerable populations, including research 
organizations, services providers, religious organizations, and advocacy groups.
24
  During 
welfare reform, the CHN adopted formal positions on only two sets of issues, one of 
which was child exclusion issues.  This is significant because the organization could have 
adopted policy positions on a large number of issues – child care, food/nutrition 
programs, immigrant provisions, and drug/alcohol testing, for example.  The fact that the 
                                                 
24
 Interesting, the CHN began as an ad-hoc policy coalition founded in response to President Reagan‟s 
efforts to consolidate funding for human needs programs into block grants in the early 1980s. 
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CHN restricted its opposition to a select set of policies signaled that coalition members 
actually were united in their opposition.  The organization demonstrated its opposition to 
these policies by testifying in committee hearings and lobbying allies in Congress (US 
House of Representatives 1995; Winston 2002).   
These examples provide evidence that advocates for the poor collaborated with an 
array of partners.  To the extent that these lobbying efforts were costly, such 
collaboration also offered evidence of the credibility of the electoral, policy, and political 
information being provided. It is important to note that the costs of collaboration vary by 
activity. For example, co-sponsorship of an advertisement may cost less than mobilizing 
members to contact Congressional officials or attend a rally. However, the costs 
associated with activities such as media advertisements, or cosigning a document, should 
not be dismissed, particularly for the organizations leading the collaborative efforts. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, nearly all collaborative activity entails opportunity 
costs. At a minimum, such activities require organizations to trade opportunities to 
differentiate and distinguish themselves for opportunities for enhanced influence via 
collaborative behavior.   In addition, in many instances (such as demonstrations), 
partnerships require organizations to allocate time and resources away from other issues 
that may be more important to the organization‘s membership base. Thus, despite the fact 
that some of the collaborative efforts did not result in actual coalition formation, the 
activities still may have provided credible information about the electoral and substantive 





The Importance of Diversity 
For all types of collaborative behavior, diversity was held to be an important 
feature. For example, Marian Wright Edelman, president of the Children's Defense Fund 
(CDF), emphasized the diversity of participants in her description of the Stand For 
Children March, noting that participants were ―coming to stand together across race and 
class and age and region and faith…" (Wetzstein 1996), and suggesting that the CDF 
viewed the variety of participants as one of its primary strengths.  Similarly, the Child 
Exclusion Task Force‘s media advisory announcing a joint press briefing with the 
American Civil Liberties Union, National Organization of Women, Feminists for Life, 
and Catholic Charities highlighted the ideological diversity among participants by stating 
that: ―Despite intense disagreement over reproductive rights issues, both pro-choice and 
pro-life groups are united in opposition to child exclusion proposals (US Newswire 
1995).   
Hearings data also indicate that the formal and ad-hoc policy coalitions believed 
their diversity in particular (as opposed to simply their size) to be an important quality to 
signal to legislators. For example, the Child Exclusion Task Force, in its first line of 
written testimony to Members of Congress, stated: ―As national, state and local 
organizations with a diversity of views on many issues, we are united in our efforts to 
promote the health and welfare of America‘s children‖ (U.S. House of Representatives 
1995, 1625-1626). This is noteworthy because the Task Force says nothing about the size 
of the coalition, or the size of its extended membership base, but rather focuses 
exclusively on the diversity of viewpoints united behind a particular set of reforms.  
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Similarly, Jennifer Vasiloff, Executive Director of the Coalition on Human 
Needs, immediately identifies her organization as: 
―…an alliance of over 100 national organizations working together to promote 
public policies which address the needs of low-income Americans. The 
coalition‘s members include civil rights, religious, labor and professional 
organizations and those concerned with the well-being of children, women, the 
elderly and people with disabilities‖ (US House of Representatives 1995, 1065). 
 
In this statement, Vasiloff emphasizes the diversity within the group, rather than its size 
alone. Although the speaker notes that the group contains over one hundred 
organizations, members of Congress have no way of knowing how many constituents 
these organizations represent.  
This introduction is in stark contrast to that of membership organizations like the 
Service Employees International Union, in which the witness introduces himself as: ―the 
director of the Public Sector Division of the 1.1 million member Service Employees 
International Union‖ (US House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means 
1995, 1119).  In contrast to the testimony of the SEIU, in which the witness immediately 
draws attention to the size of the organization, the testimony of the Task Force and CHN 
indicates that the coalitions felt that their diversity was an important characteristic to 
signal to legislators. 
Additionally, both the Contract with America‘s Children and the Stand for 
Children rally were explicitly designed to engage a more diverse range of participants by 
downplaying partisan and political elements of the events.  The wording of the Contract 
was intentionally broad, designed to appeal to a wide range of individuals and 
organizations. For example, legislators promised ―to consider children's needs and well-
being, first and foremost, in evaluating health and welfare reforms, or any other national 
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policy‖ and ―to promise to help working families stay out of poverty‖ (Children Now 
1994).  Similarly, the nonpartisan character of the Stand for Children rally was advertised 
as one of its key strengths, and no political officials were invited to speak (Weiner 1996).  
This suggests that anti-poverty advocates were not simply interested in building support 
for their policies among other anti-poverty advocates, but rather where interested in 
diversifying the types of organizations with which they could ally. 
The efforts of child poverty advocates in particular reflected, in part, a larger 
effort by child advocates to increase their legislative influence by partnering with groups 
engaged in different aspects of child wellbeing.  Fragmentation among children‘s groups 
was noted as hindering the effectiveness of child advocates in Congress (State Legislative 
Leaders Foundation 1995; Vobejda 1996).  Arnold Fege, director of governmental 
relations at the National Parent Teaching Association (PTA), argued that child advocates 
historically found their influence limited because each advocate lobbied exclusively for a 
―narrow piece of the child‖ – for example, advocates interested in education lobbied only 
on education bills while child health advocates participated only in health-related 
legislation.   
To augment its influence, the PTA and other organizations were attempting to 
engage other organizations in a ―whole-child approach‖ to lobbying by collaborating with 
groups interested in a range of issues related to children (Stepp 1995).  During welfare 
reform, this collaboration often took the form of outside lobbying, as child advocates 
engaged in partnerships designed to diversify and augment public support for policies 
that put children first.  Advocates did not simply aim to ally with other welfare and child 
poverty advocates, but rather sought partnerships with a wide range of organizations 
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engaged in numerous issue areas.  In the language of the theory, collaborative efforts by 
child advocates functioned to diversify the electoral resources that advocates could use to 
influence legislators. 
 
The Impact of Diverse Collaboration 
Diverse collaboration – both informal and formal – can be seen as helping anti-
poverty advocates in two ways.  First, partnerships between anti-poverty advocates, right-
to-life groups, and religious organizations can be seen as diversifying the types of 
informational resources that organizations offered to legislators.  In this instance, the 
right-to-life and religious organizations supplemented the substantive information that 
advocates could provide to legislators with electoral information. Whereas most anti-
poverty groups lacked members, many of the right-to-life groups and religious 
organizations had state and local chapters and strong grass-roots membership.  For 
example, in the mid-1990s, slightly less than a quarter of the population identified as 
Catholic (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996), and both the Catholic Conference and the National 
Right to Life committee, the country‘s largest pro-life organization, had an organizational 
presence in nearly half of all states (Gray and Lowery2001).  The participation of 
organizations like the National Right-to-Life Foundation and the Catholic Church 
signaled to legislators that in supporting policies like the family cap, they risked 
alienating these organizations and their constituents.   
Collaboration also signaled the salience of the issue; because right-to-life and 
religious organizations were willing to collaborate with anti-poverty advocates, 
legislators could be assured that deterrence policies were in fact salient to these 
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organizations. In other words, the costly collaboration provided information about the 
credibility of the substantive and electoral information being provided. 
Second, diverse collaboration can be seen as diversifying a single type of 
resource.  In the case of formal coalitions like the CHN, the fact that diverse actors were 
united in their opposition to child exclusion policies provided a broader range of 
substantive support for advocates‘ argument that such policies would lead to an increase 
in child poverty without addressing growing rates of teen pregnancy or out-of-wedlock 
childbirth.  This is because organizations engaged in different aspects of social policy 
have informational resources that stem from their different experiences with an issue.  An 
organization like the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities, for example, could attest to 
the fact that research did not support the conclusion that child exclusion policies would 
decrease teen pregnancy and illegitimacy.  In contrast, organizations like the United Way 
could offer information deriving from its ‗on-the-ground‘ experience providing services 
to the poor. The fact that a variety of organizations with different vantage points were 
united in their opposition to policies like the family cap provided substantive support for 
the idea that these policies would result in more harm than good.  The collaboration on 
the issue – in the form of an organizational policy statement from a diverse set of 
organizations – signaled that the substantive information being provided was credible.   
But did this collaboration have an actual impact on policy decisions?  Although 
the PRWORA undoubtedly reflected a conservative approach to welfare reform, it is 
clear that advocates for the poor achieved important policy victories. Table 5.3 shows 
how a set of policies evolved from the Republican‘s Personal Responsibility Act 
proposals to the policies enacted under the PRWORA.  In this table, the first column 
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describes the policy, the second column shows the policy as it existed under AFDC, the 
third column describes the policy changes proposed by the Personal Responsibility Act 
(PRA), and the final column shows the policy as enacted by the PRWORA (CQ Press 
1997; Weaver 2000).  
This table shows that proponents of entitlement programs achieved important 
victories with respect to the structure of welfare programs.  The Personal Responsibility 
Act (PRA) proposed structural changes to the child protection program, which provided 
federal dollars on behalf of abused and neglected children, the child Supplemental 
Security Income program, which provided benefits to disabled children and their 
families, and several child nutrition programs (such as the school lunch program).  Most 
of these programs were open-ended entitlements, meaning the federal expenditures on 
such programs were not capped but rather rose with the number of children in need.   The 
PRA proposed to change the structure of these programs – and in some cases, consolidate 
multiple programs – into a series of block grants that would be capped to control 
spending.  Spending caps did not necessarily mean that needy children would not receive 
benefits, but it did imply that abused, disabled, or hungry children could be denied 
benefits if expenditures exceeded spending limits.   
Although Republicans attempted to convert several child welfare programs from 
entitlement programs into capped block grant programs, the final column of Table 5.3 
shows that many of the proposed structural changes were not enacted.  AFDC was 
converted into a block grant structure, but the proposed structural changes to child 
protection programs were dropped, and the child SSI program remained an entitlement 
program, although eligibility rules for the program were tightened.  The PRWORA did 
100 
 
not convert nutrition programs into block grants although it did restrict the eligibility of 
some participants for Food Stamps and reduced average benefit levels.
 25
  In addition, 
although AFDC was converted into a block grant program and individual entitlement 
eliminated, PRWORA instituted a ―maintenance of effort‖ provision that required states 
to maintain 80 percent of their historic spending levels or lose federal TANF funds – a 
provision that was absent from the House bill, but present in the Senate bill as well as in 
the PRWORA.  The maintenance of effort provision was designed to ensure that states 
did not significantly reduce their welfare spending (CQ Press 1997; Haskins 2004; 
Weaver 2000).   
With respect to child exclusion policies, the PRA explicitly prohibited states from 
paying benefits on behalf of children born to mothers currently receiving welfare and 
whose paternity had not been established, and prohibited cash benefits on behalf of 
children whose mothers gave birth before age 18.  The child exclusion policies included 
in the PRWORA were less stringent than those proposed by the Personal Responsibility 
Act.  The PRWORA included the family cap and teen mother exclusion at state option 
only, meaning that states were allowed but not required to enact these policies.  Paternity 
establishment policies were also eased: the PRWORA did not eliminate benefits for 
children whose paternity was not established but rather imposed a benefit reduction on 
behalf of children whose parents were not cooperating in establishing paternity (CQ Press 
1997). 
The second panel of Table 5.3 shows that advocates achieved fewer victories on 
work-related policies.  As described earlier, work requirements under AFDC were 
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relatively lenient – only a small percentage of welfare recipients had to engage in work 
activities, and no hard time limits existed. The PRA imposed stiff work requirements on 
single parents within two years of benefit receipt, required states to move escalating 
percentages of their caseloads into work activities, and instituted a five-year time limit on 
the receipt of welfare benefits. Under the PRWORA, adult recipients were required to 
work within two years of receiving benefits, states had to meet escalating work 
participation rate requirements, and states were prohibited from using federal TANF 
funds to provide benefits after a five year period, although up 20 percent of a state‘s 
caseload could receive an exemption (CQ Press 1997).  
Advocates therefore achieved some important victories.  The next chapter will 
examine some of the policy issues that were devolved to the state level, such as the 
family cap and work requirements.  However, it is far from clear that the victories were 
the result of diverse collaboration.  This is, in part, because advocates engaged in many 
different types of lobbying in the two years between the Republican electoral victory and 
the passage of the PRWORA.  For example, the CBPP and CLASP muted their criticism 
of some issues in order to secure access to Republican legislators (Haskins 2004; Weaver 
2000; Winston 2002).  Advocates also focused attention on lobbying administration 
officials, rather than Republican legislators (Vobejda 1996).  Groups such as MDRC, a 
national social policy research organization with expertise on welfare, chose not to 
engage in diverse collaboration, relying instead on their reputations for nonpartisan 
affiliation and objective research.  A wide array of organizations, and many well-
respected scholars, also lobbied independently or provided information in committee 
hearings (Haskins 2004; US House of Representatives 1995). 
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A closer examination of child exclusion policies provides no additional support 
for the idea that diverse coalitions led to increased legislative influence.  As noted 
previously, formal, ad-hoc diverse coalitions only formed on child exclusion issues.  The 
family cap and teen mother exclusion policies were mandatory in the House bill on 
welfare reform, but amendments requiring states to enact these policies failed to pass in 
the Senate.  In both chambers, Democratic legislators were united in their opposition to 
these policies. In the Senate, a group of Republicans joined Democrats in opposing 
policies that would deny benefits to teenage mothers or women who had an additional 
child while on welfare (Haskins 2004; Wetzstein 1995).   
Did diverse collaboration lead to the defeat of child exclusion policies in the 
Senate?  Some participants attributed legislative outcomes on these issues to the activities 
of anti-poverty advocates.   For example, Ron Haskins, chief Republican staffer for the 
Subcommittee on Human Resources of the House Ways and Means Committee during 
the 104
th
 Congress, argued that: ―…[T]hese votes [to defeat]…the Faircloth [teen mother 
exclusion] and Domenici [family cap] amendments represented a hard-fought and all-too-
rare victory for the child advocacy groups‖ (Haskins 2004, 220).  Haskins, at least 
partially, attributes the defeat of the family cap and teen mother exclusion amendments to 
the work of the advocacy organizations.   
However, while advocates may have played a role in influencing the Senate 
outcomes, there is limited evidence that it was diverse collaboration that led to this 
influence.  Using data on interest group registrations at the state level,
26
 I examined 
whether Republicans who voted against the family cap in the Senate were any more 
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 This data consists of a list of all interest organizations registered to lobby at the state level in 1997, and is 
described in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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likely to be from states in which the National Organization of Women, American Civil 
Liberties Union, Catholic Conference, or National Right to Life Committee had an 
organizational presence, relative to other Republican senators.
27
  If they were, this would 
provide initial support for the hypothesis that diverse coalition partners influenced 
legislative outcomes on child exclusion issues. However, I found no indication that 
Republican senators who opposed family caps and teen mother exclusions were any more 
likely to be from states in which one or more of these groups had an organizational 
presence.  In addition, media reports indicate that child exclusion policies were defeated 
in the Senate because moderate Republicans, rather than Republicans with a strong tie to 
religious or pro-life constituencies, voted against them (Havemann and Vodegda 1995; 
Wetzstein 1995).   
Thus while it is clear that advocates engage in diverse coalition building as a 
strategy of influence, there is limited evidence that diverse coalitions actually impact 
legislative outcomes.  Part of the difficulty in establishing influence is the fact that 
advocates engaged in a wide range of lobbying strategies in the two years preceding 
welfare reform.  My concluding chapter will discuss next steps in testing the relationship 
between diverse coalitions and policy outcomes at the national level.  
 
Diverse Collaboration and Legislative Influence by Other Organizational Actors 
While the chapter was intended to focus on the activities of anti-poverty 
advocates, an analysis of diverse collaboration by intergovernmental organizations and 
socially conservative groups does provide support for the hypothesis that diverse 
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 The Child Exclusion Task Force was headed by the National Organization of Women and the American 
Civil Liberties Union.  The Catholic Church and National Right to Life Committee collaborated informally 
with the Child Exclusion Task Force, although these organizations were not members of the Task Force. 
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coalitions help organizations gain influence over legislative policy outcomes.  The goal 
of this section is to show how intergovernmental actors and social conservatives, in 
diversifying their coalitions, were able to gain increased influence over the legislative 
process and outcomes. 
As noted in previous sections, intergovernmental groups were active participants 
in welfare reform. Groups such as the National Governors Association (NGA) provided 
legislators with information about the substantive and political consequences of enacting 
various policy instruments (Haskins 2004; Heclo 2001).  Many states had experimented 
with new welfare programs by applying for welfare waivers, which allowed states to 
adapt their welfare programs in state-specific ways.   Intergovernmental groups thus had 
information about how such policy instruments impacted individual outcomes, caseloads, 
and budgets, and how welfare policy changes affected the electoral fortunes of governors 
and state legislators.  In addition, the National Governors Association, under the 
leadership of Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas and Governor Michael Castle of 
Delaware, had been key participants in the most recent round of welfare reform (Rovner 
1988).  
For the most part, governors were united in their support of policies that would 
transfer more authority to the state level. Early in 1995, however, the National 
Governors‘ Association (NGA) was unable to reach a bipartisan consensus regarding the 
transition of welfare from an entitlement to a block grant program.  The organization‘s 
bylaws required a supermajority to adopt formal, organizational policy positions.  While 
the 30 Republican governors were united in their support of a block grant structure, 
Democratic governors were wary of such a policy, and the NGA was unable to muster the 
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3/4 vote necessary for adopting an organizational policy position (Pear 1995).  Because 
they could not come to agreement, Congress interacted primarily with the Republican 
Governors‘ Association and three key Republican governors –John Engler of Michigan, 
Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin and William Weld of Massachusetts (Haskins 2006; 
Katz 1995). 
After Clinton‘s second veto of welfare reform in early 1996, the status of the 
welfare reform was uncertain: ―[W]hen President Clinton vetoed the welfare reform bill 
for the second time on January 9, 1996, it was undeniable that the bill had been deeply 
wounded, perhaps fatally‖ (Haskins 2006, 268).  Although they had previously been 
unable to reach an agreement, the NGA was able to reach a bipartisan consensus on 
welfare reform at their meeting on February 6, 1996. Agreed to by all 50 governors, the 
NGA‘s agreement introduced slight modifications to the bill that Clinton had vetoed.  
The agreement preserved a block grant structure but relaxed some of the work 
requirement and illegitimacy provisions, while adding more federal dollars for child care 
(Haskins 2006; Rubin 1996).    
This agreement was widely perceived as reviving welfare reform (Fitzgerald 
1996; Haskins 2006; Weaver 2000). According to one Congressional aide: "What the 
governors did is being perceived around here as providing enormous tail wind to push for 
a deal" (Katz 1996).  In this instance, the actions of the National Governors Association 
can be seen as an effort to influence policymaking by diversifying a coalition. The 
addition of Democratic support provided information to legislators that their efforts to 
resurrect welfare reform would likely have a different outcome.  As Haskins (2006, 271) 
noted: ―How could Clinton refuse a bill that was endorsed by every Democratic 
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governor?‖  In addition, although it may seem obvious that a bipartisan coalition will 
gain more influence, an important point is that it was not legislators who built this 
bipartisan coalition, but rather an organizational actor that diversified its coalition in 
order to gain more influence over the legislative process.  In forging agreement between 
Democratic and Republican governors, the NGA provided key political information to 
legislators that their efforts to revive welfare reform would likely be rewarded by with 
Clinton‘s signature. In doing so, the NGA gained influence over the legislative process. 
Informal alliances between conservative research organizations and membership 
groups also provided critical resources to each side, allowing conservative groups to gain 
greater influence over legislative outcomes.  Proponents of conservative welfare reform 
included research organizations like the Heritage Foundation and the American 
Enterprise Institute, and membership organizations such as the Christian Coalition, the 
Family Research Council, the Eagle Forum, and the Traditional Values Coalition. Both 
sets of organizations argued that AFDC perpetuated problems including illegitimacy, teen 
pregnancy, and a retreat from traditional family values (see Mead 1968, 1992; Murray 
1984).  These groups supported tough reforms that would eliminate benefits to 
individuals that engaged in ‗problematic‘ behaviors, with many of the membership 
organizations prioritizing such policies over those focused on program costs or 
employment (Haskins 2004).  
For these groups, the substantive resources of research organizations 
complemented the electoral resources of the membership organizations.  Membership 
organizations like the Christian coalition lacked substantive expertise in the area of 
welfare.  Unlike some of the most prominent liberal anti-poverty advocates, these 
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organizations focused on a large number of issues and had relatively limited staff in 
Washington. As a result, their knowledge of welfare was narrow (Weaver 2000).  
However, policy intellectuals like Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation and Charles 
Murray of the American Enterprise Institute had extensive knowledge of the welfare 
program and were able to offer recommendations for reform.  Their work in the 1980s 
and 1990s had ―brought unprecedented credibility and political appeal to Republicans as 
potential architects of welfare policy‖ (Heclo 2001, 182).  Rector, in particular, ―knew 
how to harness data to make his case with intuitive appeal and the strong appearance of 
validity‖ (Winston, 90) and was cited as an active participant in the 104
th
 Congress 
(Haskins 2004).   
What the membership organizations lacked in substantive expertise, they made up 
for in electoral resources.  These groups had access to newly-appointed Republican 
legislators following their impressive turnout in the 1994 elections (Heclo 2001; Witham 
1994).  The Christian Coalition, for example, distributed 33 million voter guides prior to 
the 1994 election and claimed a membership of over 1.5 million in 1995 (Mathis 1994; 
Witham 1994).  Alliances with intellectuals provided membership organizations with 
substantive arguments to support their policy beliefs.  Politically active groups ―could 
explain why the criticisms [of exiting welfare policy] were more than just tight-fisted 
hostility to poor people, why in fact the existing AFDC system was an unmitigated 
disaster for families, women, and children‖ (Heclo 181-182).  Together, policy 
intellectuals and social conservative groups were able to keep pressure on legislators to 
include illegitimacy-related provisions in the final welfare bill.  Although the family cap 
and teen mother exclusion were ultimately included at state option only, conservative 
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groups succeeded in securing funding for states that reduced abortion, and convincing 
legislators to make illegitimacy the focal point of the bill (Haskins 2004; CQ Press 1997). 
 These two examples provide evidence of organizational actors gaining influence 
in legislative settings by diversifying the informational resources of their coalition.  In the 
case of the governors, the National Governors Association was able to reach a bipartisan 
consensus, thus diversifying its coalition with respect to ideology, and providing 
legislators with key political information about how a revived welfare bill would travel 
through Congress. Social conservatives were able to combine informational resources – 
electoral and substantive – to gain increased influence over legislators. Those with 
electoral resources were able to utilize grass roots membership to keep pressure on 
legislators, but also used the substantive information provided by policy intellectuals. The 
policy intellectuals in turn were able to maintain pressure on legislators to enact their 
favored policies by employing the electoral resources of membership organizations. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis provides support for the hypothesis that advocates engage in diverse 
collaboration as a strategy of legislative influence.  During welfare reform, diverse 
collaboration sometimes functioned to provide multiple types of information, and other 
times functioned to provide a wider range of the same type of informational resource.  In 
addition, diverse collaboration appeared to be an important signaling device even when 
the collaboration was largely informal.  The Child Exclusion Task Force, for example, 
included a range of welfare and women‘s organizations, religious organizations, and pro-
life organizations, but did not include the Catholic Conference or the National Right to 
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Life Committee. However, these groups were repeatedly described by participants, media 
reports, and in existing case studies as working closely with anti-poverty advocates to 
prevent the adoption of child exclusion policies.  Their collaboration is further evident in 
the joint sponsorship of media events at the national level, and in partnerships that 
developed to challenge state policies in court.  Thus it appears that there are several ways 
that advocates can signal diverse collaboration, whether or not this collaboration results 
in the actual formation of coalitions. 
There is limited evidence to support the hypothesis that diverse coalitions help 
antipoverty advocates achieve legislative influence, although an analysis of coalitions 
among intergovernmental groups and socially conservative organizations provides some 
support for this idea.  However, two points are important to note.  First, the fact that most 
collaborative efforts are informal suggests that some instances of collaboration during 
welfare reform may have been unobserved in this study.  Second, advocates faced 
considerable constraints in their efforts to build diverse coalitions during welfare reform.  
The sheer breadth of the Republicans‘ policy proposals meant that many potential allies 
were engaged in fighting legislative battles of greater concern to their members.   
In addition, advocates often found themselves opposing intergovernmental actors.  
As a staff member of one advocacy group noted: ―An important aspect of our strategy 
was to have some governors on our side, hopefully from both parties.  We knew it would 
not be easy, but it was more than that. It didn‘t happen‖ (As quoted in Winston 2002).  
Welfare was also an unpopular policy, making advocates less able to finds partners with 
whom to ally.  Thus it is possible that while diverse coalition building was an important 
strategy of advocates, during welfare reform, formal, ad-hoc coalitions tended to form 
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Table 5.1. Personal Responsibility Act Policies 
Program Structure 
 Converts AFDC into capped block grants and allows states to opt out of AFDC 
program and receive fixed block grant funds. 
 Converts other social programs, including Child Protection Program, Child 
Supplemental Security Insurance, child nutrition programs, and child care 
programs from entitlement programs into capped block grant programs. 
Program Entry Issues 
 Prohibits payment of additional benefits for children born to mothers while 
receiving AFDC in most circumstances. 
 Prohibits states from paying cash benefits on behalf of children born to 
unmarried mothers who gave birth before age 18 but continued Medicaid.  
 Requires paternity to be established before benefits paid for children; states 
required to establish paternity for children in 90 percent of AFDC cases 
Activities Requirements & Program Exit Issues 
 Imposes minimum 35 hrs/wk requirements on single parent recipients who 
have received cash benefits for at least two years  
 Requires states to move 2 percent of caseload into work program by 1996, 
rising to 50 percent by 2003 




Table 5.2. Organizational Involvement During Welfare Reform Hearings, 1995/1996 
Type Number Percentage 
Anti-poverty Advocates 66 24.2 
Intergovernmental 62 22.7 
Nonprofit service providers 44 16.1 
Experts/Research Organizations 42 15.4 
For-profit companies and business groups 19 7.0 
―Traditional values‖ groups 14 5.1 
Professional associations 14 5.1 
Unions 5 1.8 
Miscellaneous 7 2.6 
Total 273 100 
This excludes national governmental representatives Congressional officials and individuals with no 
obvious organizational affiliation. 
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Figure 5.1. Advocacy Groups, By Issue Area  
114 
 








Table 5.3. Transformation of Select Issues within Welfare Reform 
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Interest Groups, Diverse Coalitions, and Legislative Influence at the State Level 
 
In the previous chapter, I used data from the national level to show that anti-
poverty advocates build diverse coalitions as a strategy of legislative influence, and that 
diverse coalitions are sometimes, but not always, associated with legislative influence.  In 
this chapter, I analyze the formation and influence of diverse coalitions across the 50 
states.  I take advantage of cross-state variation to test two predictions of the formal 
theoretic model.  To test the Diverse Coalitions Hypothesis, I use a series of logistic 
regressions to determine whether the presence of advocacy groups and partners was 
associated with the adoption of three types of welfare policies: child exclusion policies, 
strong welfare-to-work policies, and strict policies.  To test the Advocacy Coalitions 
Hypothesis, I analyze how diverse coalition formation at the state level varied with the 
strength of anti-poverty advocates, partisan control of the government, level of political 
conflict within a subset of 15 states.  
To preview the key findings, I find little support for the hypothesis that states with 
strong advocates were more likely to enact generous policies for the poor, controlling for 
other economic, social, and political characteristics of the state.  However, it is not clear 
whether the absence of a significant finding is due to variable measurement issues, or due 
to the fact that diverse coalitions, when they form, are not influential.  The analysis of 15 
states confirms that diverse collaboration did occur in some states, but often seemed to 
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function more to provide information to legislators interested in the consequences of 
various policy issues.  Future tests are necessary to provide a more rigorous test of the 
theoretical model. 
I begin the chapter by describing the data sources used to examine state-level 
interest communities and policy outcomes.  The subsequent section provides an overview 
of the policy issues that were devolved to the state level following the enactment of the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.  The 
remaining sections present my empirical tests.  First, I provide an overview of interest 
group communities at the state level.  Next, I present the quantitative tests of the Diverse 
Coalitions Hypothesis, followed by the qualitative tests of the Advocacy Coalitions 
Hypothesis.  The final section concludes. 
 
Description of Data Collection and Method 
The cross-state comparisons employ data compiled from a wide range of sources, 
including existing studies of state policy decisions following the PRWORA (Blank and 
Schmidt 2001; Pavetti and Bloom 2001; Soss et al. 2001); public databases of state-level 
characteristics and welfare policies (the Urban Institute Welfare Rules Database and 
University of Kentucky Poverty Research Center); and a dataset of interest group 
registrations at the state level (Gray and Lowery 2001).  Measures of state-level policy 
outcomes are constructed from two sets of sources: the Urban Institute‘s Welfare Rules 
Database (WRD) and existing studies of state policy decisions. The Urban Institute‘s 
WRD is a detailed database of AFDC/TANF rules for each state for each year from 1996-
2008. These rules were compiled from caseworker manuals in each state, and reviewed 
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by state administrators for accuracy.  I used the WRD to generate measures of family cap 
policy adoption and to provide supplementary information about state employment 
policies.  To maintain consistency with other scholarly work in this field, I use measures 
of employment-related policies that have been used by other scholars in published work. 
Specifically, I use Soss and colleagues‘ measure of work requirements (2001), Blank and 
Schmidt‘s measure of benefit generosity and earnings disregards (2001), and Pavetti and 
Bloom‘s measure of sanction and time limit policies (2001). 
28
 
I explore diverse coalition formation at the state level by reviewing case studies of 
state welfare policy choices (Heaney 2004; Winston 2002; the Urban Institute 1998) and 
newspaper articles about welfare reform at the state level.  The case studies that I review 
either focused on interest group advocacy during welfare reform (Heaney 2004; Winston 
2002), or provided an overview of the political context of welfare policy making 
following the enactment of the PRWORA (Urban Institute).  Heaney (2004) explores 
interest group involvement in welfare reform in Wisconsin, while Winston (2002) 
examines organizational involvement in Maryland, Texas, and North Dakota.  The Urban 
Institute‘s Assessing the New Federalism project includes a series of case studies on the 
income support and social services following welfare reform across 13 states: Alabama, 
California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
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 Soss and colleagues‘ (2001) work requirement variable is coded as 1 if a state requirement work earlier 
than the federal governments‘ requirement of 24 months and 0 otherwise.  Blank and Schmidt‘s (2001) 
measures of benefit generosity and earnings disregard code a variable as ‗low‘ if the maximum state 
benefit/disregard was less than $100 below the median state benefit/disregard, ‗medium‘ if the maximum 
benefit/disregard was within $100 of the median state benefit/disregard, and ‗high‘ if the maximum 
benefit/disregard was greater than $100 of the median benefit/disregard. Pavetti and Bloom‘s (2001) 
sanction variable codes a state as ‗lenient‗ if it imposed only a partial benefits reduction and did not impose 
a 100 percent sanction on Food Stamp benefits, ‘strict‘ if it imposed immediate sanctions that revoked the 
entire cash benefit, and ‗medium‘ otherwise. Pavetti and Bloom‘s (2001) time limit measure codes a state 
as ‗lenient‘ if a state used state funds to extend TANF benefits beyond 60 months, ‗medium‘ if a state 
enacted the federally-prescribed 60 month benefit, and ‗strict‘ if the state adopted shorter time limits.  
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Jersey, New York, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.  In developing the case studies, 
all authors interviewed the primary organizational participants in each state.  It seems 
reasonable to suspect that if diverse coalitions formed and were active at the state level, 
these case studies would identify them.  To provide additional information on the 
organizational actors involved in welfare reform at the state level, I reviewed newspaper 
articles from each state from January 1, 1995 and January 1, 1999, during which time 
most states passed their welfare reform legislation. 
 
State Policy Choices under the PRWORA 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) ushered forth a wide range of changes at the state level.  The 60-year old 
entitlement program Aid to Families with Dependent Children was replaced by the block 
grant program Temporary Aid to Needy Families, or TANF.  Under TANF, cash benefits 
were made conditional on employment activities and time-limited.  The program also 
granted states increased discretion over a wide range of programmatic issues, including 
generosity of benefits, stringency of work requirements, and sanctions for non-compliant 
behavior (Blank and Haskins 2001; Danziger 2001; Haskins 2006; Rowe 1999; Soss et al. 
2001; Weaver 2000).  
The programmatic issues over which states had discretion can be grouped into 
three categories that roughly correspond to the formal goals of TANF block grant: (1) 
provide assistance to poor families; (2) end the dependence of poor families on 
government benefits by encouraging employment and marriage; and (3) reduce the 
incidence of child birth out of marriage (Gais et al. 2001).  Table 6.1 provides a brief 
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description of select programmatic issues falling within each of these categories, as well 
as the frequency of strict, moderate, and lenient policy adopt across the 50 states.  
The first goal of the TANF program was to provide assistance to needy families 
with children. To this end, states provided cash benefits to households falling below a 
predetermined, state-specific income threshold.  Cash benefit levels typically differed 
according to the income level and size of a household, and varied widely across states.  
For example, in 1999 the maximum monthly benefit under TANF for a family of three 
with no income ranged from a low of $120 in Mississippi to a high of $923 in Alaska 
(Rowe 2000).  Table 6.1 shows that most states had moderate or high generosity with 
respect to the value of the TANF benefit, meaning that the maximum benefit was either 
within $100 of the median state benefit (medium) or greater than $100 of the median 
state benefit (high).  Nine states were characterized as having low benefit generosity, 
meaning that the maximum benefit was less than $100 below the median state benefit 
(Blank and Schmidt 2001).
29
 
Second, the program aimed to reduce needy families‘ reliance on cash benefits by 
encouraging employment. This was accomplished through a series of policies that 
imposed activities requirements on TANF recipients (for example, employment 
activities), sanctions for noncompliance with activities requirements, and time limits for 
the receipt of benefits.  With respect to activities requirements, federal law requires that 
all adult recipients engage in work activities after two years of receiving benefits, but 
states were permitted to demand work from recipients at an earlier point.  As shown in 
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 Because my dependent variables are summary measures, I employ the relative generosity of the benefit 
in 1999, rather than the change in the generosity of the benefit before and after the enactment of PRWORA.  
I use summary measures because these may be better able to capture compromises between generous and 
strict policies. 
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Table 6.1, half of all states adopted a work requirement stricter than the federal standard, 
or required work before 24 months of receiving TANF benefits (Soss et al. 2001). 
When a TANF recipient does not comply with activities requirements, states are 
required to impose a benefit reduction – or sanction – until that family meets the 
requirement.  States vary in the stringency of sanctioning policies – for example, some 
state policies punish noncompliant behavior in areas other than employment, or impose 
sanctions that affect Food Stamp or Medicaid coverage.  The most lenient sanctioning 
policies impose only a partial benefits reduction and do not impose a 100 percent 
sanction on Food Stamp benefits, while the strictest sanctioning policies impose 
immediate sanctions that revoke the entire cash benefit (Pavetti and Bloom 2001). 
Twenty-five states adopted the strictest sanctions, in which the sanction was imposed 
immediately and impacted Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits; thirteen states had 
moderate sanctions in which gradual full family sanctions did not affect other benefits; 
and 12 states had lenient sanctions. In addition to sanctions, benefits are time-limited at 
sixty months for the majority of TANF recipients.  States are permitted to set earlier time 
limits, but may not use federal TANF funds to provide cash benefits beyond sixty months 
(although they may use state funds to do so).  Following the PRWORA‘s passage, the 
majority of states enacted moderate time limits, which mirrored the federal standard of 
sixty months. Seventeen states adopted shorter time limits, and 9 states used state funds 
to extent TANF benefits beyond sixty months (Pavetti and Bloom 2001).  
Finally, many states increased incentives for recipients to engage in work 
activities through the use of earnings disregards, which essentially disregard a share of 
earnings when calculating a household‘s eligibility for welfare benefits. Prior to 
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PRWORA, the earnings disregard was 33 percent, which translated into a benefit 
reduction of 67 cents for every additional dollar earned (Blank and Schmidt 2001).
30
  
Following PRWORA, most states expanded this initial earnings disregard, with 
considerable variation across states (Matsudaira and Blank 2008).  Table 6.1 shows that 
by 1999, 19 states had enacted a policy of low generosity, meaning that the amount that 
was disregarded for a single mother working full time at $6/hour was less than $100 
below the median state disregard. Fourteen states had a medium generosity policy 
(disregarded earnings within $100 of median disregard) and 17 states had a high 
generosity policy (disregarded earnings above $100 of median disregard) (Blank and 
Schmidt 2001).   
The third goal of TANF was to reduce the extent of out-of-wedlock childbearing 
by altering the costs and benefits associated with having children out of marriage and/or 
at a young age.  The family cap prohibits additional benefits to children born to mothers 
who are currently receiving welfare benefits, while policies targeting teen mothers 
prevent unmarried mothers under a certain age (typically 18) from receiving benefits.  
These policies were included in PRWORA only at state option, meaning that states were 
allowed but not required to adopt the policies.  By 1999, 21 states had enacted a family 
cap policy but no states precluded teen mothers from receiving welfare benefits; the latter 
is therefore excluded from Table 5.1 (Rowe 2000).   
Table 6.2 shows the correlations between the policies described above.  All 
policies are coded on either a 1-3 (time limits, sanctions, earnings disregards, and benefit 
generosity) or a 0-1 scale (work requirements and family caps), with higher values 
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 This earnings disregard applied during the first year of benefit receipt, after which time benefits were 
reduced 1 dollar for every dollar earned.  Under AFDC, 30 dollars were automatically disregarded every 
month and some child care and work costs were exempted (Blank and Schmidt 2001).   
 125 
indicating more stringent policies.  As the table shows, most states adopted ―packages‖ of 
lenient and strict policies, with few states adopting either all lenient or all strict policies.  
The highest correlations are between strict time limit and sanctioning policies (0.414) and 
earnings disregards and benefit generosity (0.37), suggesting that these policy choices 
tended to cluster together across states.  However, most correlations are quite low – of the 
15 correlations, 11 are below 0.30.  
 
Interest Group Advocacy at the State Level 
The central independent variables measure the strength of anti-poverty advocates 
across states.  To create these variables, I use Gray and Lowery‘s dataset of interest group 
registrations in 1997 (Gray and Lowery 1996, 2001).  Gray and Lowery collected lists of 
all organizations registered to lobby at the state level in 1975, 1980, 1990, and 1997. In 
1997, these lists were created from lobbying registration rolls provided by each state.  
The lists include organizations that were registered to lobby at the state level (or 
organizations on whose behalf individual lobbyists were registered to lobby), but exclude 
governmental actors.  In the dataset, each organization is included only once, even if 
multiple lobbyists were registered to lobby on their behalf, and organizations are coded 
according to economic sector (small business, health, education, etc.) and organizational 
structure (membership, association, or institution).  For each organization, there is also an 
indicator of whether the group was also registered to lobby in 1990. 
Table 6.3 illustrates variation in the size, strength, and diversity of interest group 
communities across the 50 states in 1997.  In this table, Column 1 shows the total number 
of interest group registrations per state in 1997.  Nearly 34,000 organizations were 
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registered to lobby at the state level during this year.  The average number of registrations 
per state was 690, and ranged from a low of 192 in Hawaii to a high of 2,118 in 
California.  Columns 2-4 show the number of interest groups registered to lobby on 
issues including welfare, women, civil rights, and other public interest issues.  These 
numbers are designed to provide an estimate of the relative size and strength of anti-
poverty advocates and their potential coalition partners.  Column 6 shows the strength of 
state interest groups in the early 1990s – measured as the ratio of the number of interest 
groups to the state‘s gross state product (Gray and Lowery 2001). This measure captures 
the average state dollars behind each organization.
31
 
As shown in this table, the vast majority of state interest groups were not 
registered to lobby on social welfare policy issues. On average, 26 groups were registered 
to lobby on welfare issues in each state (4 percent), 6 on women‘s issues (1 percent), 4 on 
civil rights issues (0.5 percent), and 10 on public interest issues (1.5 percent).
32
  Although 
the relative prevalence of such organizations varies considerably across states, it is clear 
from these data that such organizations comprise a small percentage of pressure 
communities.  Summing across all four categories, an average of 7 percent of groups 
lobbied on welfare, public interest issues, civil rights, or women‘s issues; in only three 
states did the percent registered to lobby on any of these issues exceed 10 percent.
33
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 This measure is used as a measure of „density‟ in Gray and Lowery‟s work. High density states have 
many organizations relative to the size of the state‟s economy (or low ratio values), while low density states 
have few organizations relative to the economy (or high ratio values). 
32
 The largest economic sectors represented in the data are health and manufacturing: 13 percent of all 
organizations were registered to lobby on health (88 groups on average), while 12 percent were registered 
to lobby on manufacturing (79 groups on average). 
33
 It is important to note that data on interest group registrations understate the actual number of groups 
lobbying on social policy issues at the state level. There are many organizations that „act like‟ interest 
groups in the sense that they provide information to legislators, often in an effort to influence policy, but do 
not consider themselves to be interest groups.  Nonprofit 501c3 organizations – or public charities – 
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The Diverse Coalitions Hypothesis 
The first tests analyze the relationship between the presence of advocacy groups 
and their partners and policy outcomes, focusing on the following question: were states in 
which advocates were ―strong‖ types more likely to enact generous policies for the poor?  
The Diverse Coalitions Hypothesis predicts that generous policies for the poor will be 
more likely in states where strong advocates are more likely.  Strong advocates are those 
that consider an issue to be salient, and exist in an environment in which potential 
partners consider an issue to be salient.  For this set of tests, I employ three measures of 
state welfare policy choices, shown in Table 6.4.  The first dependent variable equals one 
if a state adopted a family cap policy, and zero otherwise.  The second and third 
dependent variables are summary measures of employment-related policies.  I created 
summary measures, rather than testing each employment policy individually, because 
summary measures will be better able to show tradeoffs or compromises made across 
policy issues between those that supported and opposed generous welfare policies.  
The second dependent variable measures the enactment of policies that would 
facilitate welfare recipients‘ transition from welfare into work, rather than simply impose 
harsh penalties for noncompliance with program rules.  This variable equals 3 if a state 
enacted the strongest ―package‖ of employment policies – low benefit generosity, high 
earnings disregards, strict sanctions, and short time-limits; 1 if a state enacted the weakest 
package of employment policies – high benefit generosity, low earnings disregards, 
lenient sanctions and long time limits; and 2 if a state enacted a mixed package of 
policies.  The third dependent variable captures the enactment of the strictest sanctions, 
                                                                                                                                                 
provide services to disadvantaged populations but are legally prohibited from lobbying state and federal 
legislators.  These organizations were likely to be active during welfare reform. 
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time limits, and work requirements. For this variable, each state is given one point for 
each strict policy adoption, and the variable ranges from zero (for states that enacted no 
strict employment policies) to three (for states that enacted the strictest sanctions, time 
limits, and work requirements).   
The independent variables are shown in Table 6.5. The central independent 
variables measure the strength of state anti-poverty advocates in 1997.  Recall that strong 
advocates are those that view an issue as salient and exist in environments in which 
potential partners view an issue as salient.  The measure of the strength of anti-poverty 
advocates thus has two parts: the salience of an issue to advocacy groups and the salience 
of an issue to potential partners.   
Because of the difficulty of gauging salience for each state-level organization 
registered to lobby on welfare-related issues, I assume that if anti-poverty advocates 
existed at the state level, then they viewed the issue as salient. A review of interest group 
activity at the national level, and of existing case studies of welfare reform at the state 
level, provides support for this assumption (see Heaney 2004; Weaver 2000; Winston 
2002).  Case studies indicate that the changes to the welfare program were so great, and 
the consequences of such policy changes so uncertain, that advocates for the poor were 
strongly committed to lobbying against such changes.  Advocates claimed that policies 
that restricted or eliminated benefits while imposing stricter work requirements would 
lead more need families into poverty – particularly in states where when few jobs were 
available.  If legislators enacted more lenient time limits, sanctioning policies, and work 
requirements, or more generous earnings disregards and benefits, outcomes such as 
material hardship, hunger, and destitution could be minimized.  Given the severity of 
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these outcomes, it seems reasonable to assume that welfare reform was a salient issue to 
anti-poverty advocates. 
As a result of this assumption, the measure of advocacy group strength that I use 
is actually a measure of the presence of anti-poverty advocates and potential partners at 
the state level.  To measure the presence of anti-poverty advocates, I identify all 
organizations registered to lobby on ―welfare‖ issues in 1997.  In states with higher 
values, low-income populations have more representation through a greater number of 
advocates; in states with lower values, the poor have less representation.
34
   
I measure the presence of potential partners in two different ways, based on the 
analysis of welfare reform at the national level.  For child exclusion issues (family cap), 
the national-level analysis indicates that the key partners for anti-poverty advocates were 
the National Organization of Women, the American Civil Liberties Union, Catholic 
Charities and the Catholic Church. The National Right to Life Committee was also active 
in opposing child exclusion policies, though its collaboration with anti-poverty advocates 
was much more informal.  Each of these organizations had branches at the state level. 
Thus when the state‘s adoption of a family cap is the dependent variable, the presence of 
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 I developed several measures of the presence of anti-poverty advocates at the state level, but ultimately 
concluded that the number of welfare groups was the best measure of the presence of advocates at the state 
level.  For example, I created a variable measuring the percent of advocates in the interest group 
community by dividing the number of advocates by the total number of interest groups, a variable 
measuring the number of advocates relative to the size of the poor population by dividing the number of 
advocates by the number of poor people in a state, and a variable measuring the number of welfare 
advocates relative to the size of the welfare caseload. I also created a measure of the number of nonprofit 
organizations in a state using IRS records.  I compared all measures to a variable that coded for whether a 
state contained a (non-governmental) interest group that testified or submitted testimony during the federal 
welfare reform hearings.  State-level interest groups that participated in the federal hearings clearly viewed 
the issue as salient, and thus this measure may provide a window into states with “strong” type advocates.  
The following states contained interest organizations that participated in the federal hearings: CA, TX, MI, 
IL, OH, PA, MN, OK, MA, NY, NJ, WA, MD, SC.   The number of welfare groups in a state correlated the 
most strongly with the measure of state group participation at the federal level (roughly .60), and all other 
measures were either not correlated or related in a negative direction with the federal measure.  As a result, 
I decided that while the number of welfare groups in a state is not an ideal measure, it is the best way to 
assess the presence of advocates at the state level using these data. 
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diverse partners is measured as a scale in which each state receives 1 point for each of the 
four groups registered at the state level.  States with higher values had more potential 
partners that viewed the issue as salient, and in these states, advocates were more likely 
to be perceived as being strong types. 
On employment-related issues, the national analysis is much less precise about the 
organizations likely to act as diverse partners for anti-poverty advocates.  Diverse 
coalitions did not form on employment-related issues at the national level, in part because 
many potential partners were busy lobbying in other areas.  However, the analysis of 
hearings data presented in the previous chapter does offer some guidance as to which 
groups were likely to act as partners at the state level.  The hearings testimony shows that 
in addition to anti-poverty organizations, groups mobilized around issues related to 
race/ethnicity, children, health/nutrition, and women participated in welfare reform 
debates (see Figure 5.1 in Chapter 5).   
The data of interest group registrations provide classifications that roughly mirror 
several of these categories. For example, the data classify organizations registered to 
lobby on civil rights, women‘s issues, and groups registered to lobby on other public 
interest issues.  To measure the presence of these actors in each state, I include the total 
number of organizations in each of the three categories.  The hypothesis is that in states 
with a larger number of potential partners, anti-poverty advocates were more likely to be 
perceived as ―strong‖ types.  In tests of employment-related policy outcomes, both 
measures of interest group strength are coded on the same scale, with larger numbers 
indicating a great number of organizational actors.  Because the theory posits that the 
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influence of anti-poverty organizations depends on their joint, rather than individual, 
presence, I include an interaction term for advocates and potential partners. 
Research identifies four additional mechanisms of influence on state-level social 
policy decisions: government pressure, racial politics, policy-specific problem indicators, 
and budgetary politics (Soss et al. 2001; Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Kingdon 1995). First, 
government pressure should be associated with welfare policy choices.  Specifically, 
restrictive policies should be less likely in states that are more liberal or states that are 
more generous to low-income populations in areas other than welfare.  I use Berry et al.‘s 
(1998) measure of government ideology to measure state liberalism.  This measure 
estimates the ideological position of five key sets of actors (governors, and the two major 
party delegations in each Congressional house),
35
 and then aggregates these positions 
based on the relative power of each actor in the state (see Berry et al. 1998).  Because 
higher values indicate more liberal governments, this variable should be negatively 
associated with strict policies.   To measure the state‘s generosity to low-income 
populations in non-welfare social policy areas, I use the state‘s percentage of uninsured 
children.  States with a larger percentage of uninsured children have less generous 
programs for disadvantaged individuals, and may have been more likely to enact 
restrictive policies under TANF.  Thus, the percentage of uninsured children should be 
positively associated with strict policy choices.   
Second, previous scholarship has shown racial politics to be strongly associated 
with welfare policy choices.  Particularly for family cap policies, research shows that 
states with a larger percentage of minority recipients were significantly more likely to 
adopt restrictive welfare policies (Soss et al. 2001).  Soss and colleagues (2008) argue 
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 The ideological positions are based on the partisan identification of each actor (see Berry et al. 1998). 
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that when race is salient in policy debates, policymakers turn to racial group reputations 
to assess policy instruments and outcomes.  In the case of welfare, some viewed racial 
minorities who received welfare as having motivational or behavioral deficiencies that 
led them to prefer and become dependent on welfare (Gilens 1999).  This theory holds 
policymakers from states with larger minority representation on welfare caseloads were 
more likely to view themselves as enacting policies for people who faced behavioral or 
motivational barriers to economic self-sufficiency (as opposed to structural difficulties) 
and were thus more likely to enact strict measures (Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008).  
Third, welfare policy decisions should vary according to the severity of the policy 
problem in each state. During the welfare reform debates, one key indicator of problem 
severity was the unmarried birth rate (Soss et al. 2001).  Welfare was viewed by many as 
encouraging dependence on government benefits, teen pregnancy, and out-of-wedlock 
childbirth.  If state policy choices are an attempt to discourage such ‗deviant‘ behavior, 
then higher unmarried birth rates within a state may be associated with the adoption of 
restrictive policies such as the family cap.  Fourth, a state‘s economic wellbeing is likely 
to be related to the adoption of social welfare programs because better economic 
conditions free up money for such programs.  Case studies suggest that states with tighter 
budgets were more likely to propose and enact strict policies that would move women 
quickly off the welfare rolls (Winston 2002).  Economic wellbeing is measured as the 
gross state product in 1996. 
Two controls are also included in each model, including the professionalism of 
the state legislature and the earliest year in which a state received a waiver allowing it to 
change its welfare program.  These measures are included to control for the state‘s 
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propensity to deviate from the federal welfare rules.  Under the PRWORA, states were 
permitted but not required to enact policies that differed from the federal standards.  
Representatives in professionalized legislatures spend more days in session, and have 
more staff and larger salaries, allowing legislators more time and ability to develop 
policies (Squire 2007).  Organizations may be more likely to lobby in states that had the 
capacity to propose and enact state-specific welfare policies.  The second control 
measures the state‘s propensity to innovate in welfare policy, and is measured as the 
earliest year in which a state applied for and received a welfare waiver allowing it to 
change its welfare program.  States that innovated in earlier years may have been more 
likely to enact policy changes under the PRWORA.   
 
Results 
Table 6.6 shows the results of a logistic regression of a state adoption of a family 
cap on the set of independent variables.  If states with strong advocates were more likely 
to enact strict policies, the coefficient on the interaction term between advocates and 
partners should be negative and statistically significant.  This table shows no support for 
the Diverse Coalitions Hypothesis.  Both the number of advocates and the number of 
diverse coalition partners are positively and significantly related to the adoption of a 
family cap, but the interaction term, while in the expected direction, is not significant.  
This suggests that states with either advocates or partners were more likely to enact a 
family cap, but states with both advocates and partners were no less likely to do so.  The 
results indicate that states with a higher concentration of racial minorities on the welfare 
caseload, and states with less generous social policies, were more likely to enact family 
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cap policies.  In addition, states with a higher rate of births to unmarried women were less 
likely to adopt family caps.  These findings are generally consistent with other work on 
state social policy adoption following the PRWORA (Soss et al.2001; Fellowes and 
Rowe 2004).   
The positive and significant relationship between the presence of advocates or 
partners and the adoption of family caps is not entirely inconsistent with the model, but it 
is somewhat surprising. Why were states with strong advocates or strong partners (but not 
both) more likely to enact a family cap?   
One possibility is that the variable used to proxy for the strength of welfare 
advocates is actually measuring the strength of both liberal and conservative welfare 
organizations.  Conservative, pro-family groups were extremely engaged in welfare 
reform at the national level – particularly after Republicans took control of Congress in 
1994.  Organizations including the Christian Coalition, the Family Research Council, and 
the Traditional Values Coalition supported policies that would end long-term dependence 
on government benefits and end out-of-wedlock childbirth and teen pregnancy (Weaver 
2000).  Many of these organizations had strong state and local branches, which increased 
their leverage with Republican legislators at the national level.   
To assess this possibility, I looked at the names of all organizations registered to 
lobby on welfare issues in 1997.  There is some indication that a few of these 
organizations were actually conservative organizations, and therefore likely opposed 
generous government benefits for the poor. For example, the Family Forum, a research 
organization affiliated with the conservative organization Focus on the Family, was 
registered to lobby on welfare in two states.  However, I could find few other 
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conservative family values organizations.  Most groups registered on the issue of welfare 
seemed to be traditional advocacy groups for the poor, and were therefore likely 
supportive of generous programs for the poor.  In addition, Winston‘s (2002) analysis of 
organizational involvement in three states provides no evidence that conservative groups 
were involved in state-level welfare reform. 
 An alternative possibility is that advocates and coalition partners were more likely 
to mobilize in states where they knew they would be at a disadvantage – for example, in 
those states where strong welfare advocates were unlikely to exist.  As noted in the 
previous chapter, welfare reform entered the political agenda during Clinton‘s 1992 
presidential campaign. Advocates had several years to mobilize at the state level before 
welfare policy decisions were actually devolved to the state level.  The positive and 
significant relationship between advocates, partners, and strict policy outcomes therefore 
would reflect the mobilization of groups in the years leading to the passage of the 
PRWORA.   
To assess this possibility, I examined the percentage increase in welfare 
organizations and coalition partners between 1990 and 1997.  The dataset of interest 
group registrations records whether a group registered in 1997 was also registered in 
1990.  The data show that there was considerable growth in the advocacy community 
over this period.  Of the 1,276 organizations registered to lobby on the issue of welfare in 
1997, only 342 had also been registered in 1990 (results not shown).  The percentage 
increase in welfare organizations varied considerably across states: Rhode Island‘s and 
South Dakota‘s populations increased the least – from 6 to 12 organizations, while 
Oklahoma‘s population increased the most – from 1 to 22 organizations.  A simple t-test 
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provides evidence that welfare organizations were more likely to mobilize in states that 
ended up enacting the strictest welfare policies.  For example, the percentage increase in 
welfare organizations was greater in states that enacted family cap policies (500 percent 
versus 300 percent increase, p<.10). 
 Because the two measures of interest groups are potentially endogenous to the 
policy outcomes, I reran the regression using measures that restricted the set of advocates 
and partners to those groups that were also registered at the state level in 1990.  While 
these measures do not capture the entire universe of groups registered to lobby in 1990, 
they do eliminate groups that mobilized in response to President Clinton‘s bid to ―End 
welfare as we know it,‖ or in response to the Republican‘s ―Contract with America.‖  It is 
possible that groups that were registered in 1990 were also more likely to be central 
players in the social policy domain, which is one factor related to successful coalition 
building (Heaney 2004; Hojnacki 1997).  Table 6.7 shows that when the measures from 
1990 are used, the significant association between advocacy groups, partners, and family 
cap adoption disappears.  In fact, in this test, the only significant relationship that remains 
is the positive association between the percent of minorities on the AFDC caseload and 
the adoption of family cap policies. 
Table 6.8 shows the regression of strict ―packages‖ of employment policies on the 
set of independent variables.  The first column presents coefficients and standard errors 
for the ordered logistic regression of strong welfare-to-work policies on the set of 
independent variables, while the second column presents the results for the ordered 
logistic regression of strict policy adoption.  These regressions differ from the previous 
regressions in that diverse coalition partners are measured as the total number of groups 
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registered to lobby on women‘s issues, civil rights issues, or other public interest issues.  
To address potential endogeneity issues, I use the interest group measures from 1990 
rather than 1997.  In addition, the ―problem indicator‖ variable (percent illegitimate 
births) has been removed because the ―problem‖ being addressed by employment policies 
was low employment rates, rather than out-of-wedlock childbirth.  These results provide 
no additional support for the hypothesis that anti-poverty advocates, either alone or in 
combination with diverse coalition partners, influenced policy outcomes. The table shows 
that government ideology is a significant predictor of the strictest ‗package‘ of welfare 
policies – states with more liberal governments were less likely to adopt the strictest 
sanctions, time limits, and work requirements. As with the previous regressions, percent 
minority on the AFDC caseloads is significantly associated with policy adoption.  
Regressions showing each policy individually are shown in Appendix A. 
 
Discussion 
 Together, these tests provide little support for the hypothesis that the strength of 
the advocacy community – as measured by the ability of advocates to build diverse 
coalitions – is associated with more generous programs for the poor.  What explains this 
lack of a finding?  
One set of possibilities relates to the measurement of key concepts. For the 
dependent variables, I transformed continuous measures of policy adoption into 
dichotomous measures to maintain consistency with previous research in this area, and to 
allow for the creation of composite policy adoption variables.  However, the dichotomous 
measures obscure some of the actual variation in state policy adoption.  For example, the 
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‗work requirement‘ variable measures whether welfare recipients were required engage in 
employment activities earlier than the federal requirement of 24 months.  Some states 
enacted strict policies by requiring recipients to work within 6 months or 12 months of 
benefit receipt.  Other states mandated work at a later point, such as 48 months. A 
dichotomous variable treats all states that enacted a requirement less than 24 months the 
equally, and all states that adopted the federal requirement of 24 months or enacted a 
more lenient requirement equally.   
In collapsing the categories, the dichotomous measure loses some of the actual 
variation in policy adoption that would be available in a continuous measure.  It may be 
that states with strong advocates were less likely to enact the strictest policies (for 
example, a 6 month work requirement) and more likely to enact the most generous 
policies (for example, a 48 month work requirement), but that other political, social, or 
economic factors were more important in determining whether a state simply deviated 
from the federal standard by adopting a requirement of less than 24 months.  If this were 
the case, then a continuous measure of policy adoption would be more likely than the 
dichotomous measure to pick up the influence of advocates.  While I do not explore 
continuous measures of policy adoption in this chapter, I plan to do so in the future.  My 
next steps in this area are outlined in Chapter 7.    
With respect to the independent variables, it may be that the central independent 
variables of interest do not provide an adequate measure of the diversity of real or 
potential advocacy group coalitions.  The current independent variables measure state-
level advocacy group strength as the presence of organizational actors likely to oppose 
strict policy adoption.  For example, for family cap policy adoption, the independent 
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variables are measured as (1) the number of welfare groups in a state in 1990 (welfare 
organizations), and (2) the total number of potential partners in 1990, of the following: 
NOW, ACLU, the Catholic Conference, and Right-to-Life Committee (partner 
organizations).  States with a large number of welfare organizations and a large number 
of partner organizations are measured as having ―strong‖ advocates, meaning that 
advocates would have been able to build coalitions because diverse organizations existed 
at the state level. 
While these measures provided a starting point for testing the relationship 
between diverse interest group support and policy adoption, they may not go far enough 
in measuring the actual involvement of diverse actors, or the diversity of support behind a 
particular policy.  For example, while a state like California had both a large number of 
actors and all four of the potential partners (NOW, ACLU, Catholic Conference, and the 
Right-to-Life Committee), it is not clear whether any of these state-level branches 
organizations were active during welfare reform, or whether the activity of the partners 
diversified the support that advocates could bring to the policy debate.   
For example, if the California branch of the ACLU actively opposed the family 
cap policy, but the NOW, Catholic Conference, and Right-to-Life Committee did not, this 
would not necessarily increase the diversity of opposition to the family cap policy, 
because the ACLU and anti-poverty organizations have similar types of informational 
resources.  Furthermore, because the ACLU and anti-poverty organizations have a history 
of working together, the costs of collaboration are lower and thus any partnerships 
between the ACLU and anti-poverty organizations would be less likely to signal 
credibility (through the costliness of collaborative activity).   
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In contrast, if the California Right-to-Life Committee actively opposed a family 
cap and the other organizations did not, this would diversify opposition to the policy 
because anti-poverty organizations and the Right-to-Life Committee have different types 
of informational resources (policy and electoral).  In addition, this would increase the 
costs of lobbying because the two organizations do not have a history of working 
together, and thus would provide greater evidence of credibility.   
The current independent variable would code both cases similarly, despite the fact 
that the first example would not diversify information and would provide less evidence of 
credibility than the second example, which would both diversify information and provide 
evidence of credibility.  
Due to these measurement issues, it is not possible to wholly reject the hypothesis 
that the diversity of real or potential advocacy group coalitions influenced welfare policy 
outcomes at the state level.  While it is possible that advocacy groups did not collaborate 
at the state level as they did at the national level, or that even despite collaboration, state 
policy decisions during welfare reform were influenced by other factors, issues related to 
the measurement of dependent and key independent variables raise questions involving 
the validity of the current quantitative tests.  The concluding chapter of my dissertation 
provides an overview of next steps on the project that may help sort out these questions.  
Before proceeding to the conclusion, however, I examine diverse coalition building in a 
subset of 15 states to explore the process-oriented hypotheses, and to help provide 




The Advocacy Coalitions Hypothesis 
 In this section, I analyze diverse coalition building across 15 states in the years 
immediately preceding and following the enactment of the PWORA.  The Advocacy 
Coalitions Hypothesis predicts that advocacy coalitions will be more likely in states with 
strong advocates, Republican control of the legislature, and high political conflict.  Table 
6.9 presents information on interest group strength, partisan control of the legislature, and 
level of political conflict, for the following states: Maryland, Texas, North Dakota, 
Alabama, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Washington, and Wisconsin..  In this table, the first 
column shows the number of welfare advocates registered to lobby in 1997 while the 
second shows the number of groups registered to lobby on women‘s issues, civil rights 
issues, and public interest issues in 1997.  The third column indicates whether 
Republicans were the majority in either one or both houses of Congress, while the fourth 
summarizes the level of political conflict surrounding welfare reform in the state.
36
  The 
fifth column indicates whether a diverse coalition formed, and the final column shows 
whether a diverse coalition already existed and was cited as a key participant in welfare 
reform, for those states in which diverse coalitions did not form in response to welfare 
reform.  In this table, states are listed in order of decreasing professionalism of the state 
legislature.  Shaded boxes represent instances of diverse coalition formation.   
There is limited evidence of diverse coalition formation at the state level, 
particularly with respect to ideological diversity.  Ad-hoc, diverse collaborative activities 
                                                 
36
 To provide a rough estimate of the level of political conflict in each state, I searched for all newspaper 
articles containing the words “welfare reform” and the state‟s name, for the leading newspaper in each 
state.  States are coded as high political conflict if the number of newspaper articles was above the mean 
number of articles for the subset of 15 states, and coded as low political conflict if the number was below 
the mean. 
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were evident in only four of the states (New York, Wisconsin, Texas, and Minnesota).  
For example, in New York, a ‗strange bedfellows‘ coalition of anti-poverty advocates and 
Fortune 500 companies created a state welfare reform proposal to circulate to legislators 
in anticipation of welfare reform at the national level. The authors of the proposal 
included the United Jewish Appeal-Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, Business 
Council of New York States, United Way of New York State, and the State Communities 
Aid Association (Dao 1995; Stashenko 1995).  In 1997, a similar set of organizational 
actors joined together to write a statement urging the state to increase spending to help 
welfare recipients find jobs.  This coalition consisted of groups including the Business 
Council of New York State, the National Federation of Independent Business, and the 
State Association of Counties, as well as the League of Women Voters, the State 
Communities Aid Association, the New York State Child Care Coordinating Council, 
and the Citizen‘s Committee for Children of New York (Perez-Pena 1997). 
In Wisconsin, advocates for the poor formed a diverse coalition called the "Policy 
Group on Welfare Reform.‖  This coalition included organizations such as the Lutheran 
Office for Public Policy, Church Women United, Center for Public Representation, 
League of Women Voters of Wisconsin, National Association of Social Workers of 
Wisconsin, Wisconsin Council on Children and Families, Wisconsin Coalition Against 
Domestic Violence, the Wisconsin National Organization for Women and the Wisconsin 
Women's Network.  Among other activities, the statewide coalition of advocates met to 
assess ways to influence welfare reform (including exploring alliances with business and 
government groups) and publicize opposition to Wisconsin‘s welfare program in 1995 
(Dresang 1995; Heaney 2004; Renard 1995).   
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There were several instances of diverse coalition formation in Minnesota.  For 
example, a group of religious organizations came together to form the Interfaith 
Campaign for Welfare Reform.  The Minnesota Council of Churches and the Minnesota 
Council on Foundations, the Council of Nonprofits organized to spearhead efforts to deal 
with welfare reform policies, while nonprofit organizations from across the state formed 
a group called Affirmative Options for Welfare Reform.  In addition, the Minnesota 
Council of Nonprofits and the Children's Defense Fund formed a partnership to address 
issues raised by changes in federal-state relations (Inskip 1996).  In Texas, there was only 
one example of diverse coalition formation.  A prominent state advocacy group called the 
Center Public Policy Priorities (CPPP) organized an ad-hoc policy coalition of advocates, 
nonprofit providers, and government participants to monitor and influence the direction 
of welfare reform. Coalition partners included anti-poverty groups and service providers 
alongside groups like the National Association of Social Workers, the AFL-CIO, 
ACORN, and the NAACP (Winston 2002).   
States that witnessed coalition formation had several characteristics that mirrored 
the federal level.  With the exception of Wisconsin, these states had a large number of 
advocates and partners.  Minnesota had the largest number of advocates and partners, in 
both 1997 and 1990.  Both New York and Minnesota had 22 advocacy groups registered 
to lobby on welfare in both 1990 and 1997, far above the average of 7 groups across all 
states.  New York, Wisconsin, and Texas had legislatures that were either divided in 
terms of partisan power or exclusively within the hands of Republicans, and had above-
average professionalism scores.  The states were split with respect to level of political 
conflict: New York and Wisconsin had extremely high levels of political conflict, while 
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Texas and Minnesota had low levels.  Thus there is some support for the Advocacy 
Coalitions Hypothesis: states with the largest number of anti-poverty organizations (New 
York and Minnesota) and highest level of political conflict (New York and Wisconsin) 
witnessed the formation of diverse coalitions.  There was also some association between 
partisan control of government and diverse coalition formation. 
Clearly, though, the presence of strong advocates, Republican control of the 
legislature, and a high level of political conflict does not automatically lead to diverse 
coalition formation.  For example, diverse coalitions did not form in Florida and 
Washington – states in which advocates existed, Republicans controlled the legislature, 
and conflict was high.  Other states with strong advocates, high conflict, and divided 
control of government (between the legislative and executive branches) also did not 
witness the formation of diverse coalitions (such as California and Massachusetts).   
One characteristic that all diverse coalition states had in common was the 
presence of at least one non-governmental advocacy group that had been a central player 
in social welfare policymaking for many years.  In Texas, this group was the Center for 
Public Policy Priorities, or CPPP (Gamboa 1997; Winston 2002).  The Wisconsin 
Council on Children and Families, founded in the late 1800s, cited as a key participant in 
welfare reform, was active in the ―Policy Group on Welfare Reform‖ (Mead 2004; 
Rinard 1995). Minnesota had several organizations that had emerged in the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s, including the Urban Coalition (1968), Jobs Now (1982), and the Minnesota 
Council of Nonprofits (1987) (Inskip 1996).  In New York, the State Communities Aid 
Association, founded in the late 1800s and the United Way of New York State were 
regularly referenced as important players in welfare reform (Dao 1995; Perez-Pena 1997; 
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Shashenko 1995). This suggests that a necessary but not sufficient condition for diverse 
coalition formation is the presence of an advocacy group with experience, and a strong 
reputation for involvement in state-level social policymaking. 
In addition, despite the fact that diverse coalitions only emerged in only four 
states, existing coalitions were described as key participants in several states.  These 
coalitions were often diverse with respect to type of organizational members, region (all 
were state-wide), and to a limited extent, policy domain, but did not tend to differ with 
respect to ideology.  For example, the Michigan League of Human Services, an advocacy 
group with organizational members in the business, labor, religious, and human services 
policy domain, was one of the only advocacy groups mentioned in newspaper articles 
about Michigan‘s welfare reform policies.  In Alabama and Maryland, formal coalitions 
were also described as active in welfare reform.  In Alabama, for instance, one of the key 
participants was a state-wide coalition of close to 100 religious, civic, and social groups, 
called Alabama Arise (Clark et al. 1998).  In Maryland, Welfare Advocates, a coalition of 
over 400 state and local advocacy and service organizations, was active in welfare reform 
hearings and other legislative lobbying (Winston 2002).   
Media reports and case studies suggest that while formal and ad-hoc coalitions did 
not necessarily change legislative outcomes, they were often consulted for informational 
purposes.  For example, Alabama Arise was one of several advocacy groups invited to 
participate in Governor Fob James Jr.‘s Commission on Welfare Reform, charged with 
developed a welfare reform plan for the state (Clark et al. 1998). Though at the local 
rather, the Seattle Ad Hoc Welfare Reform Committee brought together local businesses, 
community, and advocacy groups to address issues related to welfare reform in Seattle 
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(Long et al. 1998).  This provides support for the hypothesis that state-level advocacy 
groups gain influence by addressing the informational needs of like-minded legislators. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I examined two key implications of the theoretical model: that 
advocacy group strength is associated with policy outcomes (the Diverse Coalitions 
Hypothesis), and that diverse coalitions are more likely to form when advocates are 
strong, political conflict is high, and Republicans control the legislature.  I found little 
support for the first hypothesis, and limited support for the second hypothesis.    
 The analysis suggests that state-level advocates do sometimes turn to diverse 
coalitions as a mechanism of political influence. A necessary condition for coalition 
formation is the presence of an advocate with experience and centrality in a policy 
network; all states in which diverse coalitions formed had at least one advocacy group 
that had been a central player in the social welfare policy domain for several years.  In 
addition, while diverse coalition formation in response to welfare reform was relatively 
rare, many states had preexisting diverse coalition of advocates that seemed to function in 
primarily an informational role.   
 The qualitative analysis of 15 states shows that collaborative behavior across 
diverse organizational actors does occur at the state level.  Thus, it is unlikely that that the 
absence of a significant finding in the quantitative tests is due to the fact that diverse 
collaboration does not occur at the state level.  It is of course possible that the 
quantitative tests find no significant relationship because diverse interest group 
collaboration is not an important determinant of state policy choices.  However, further 
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tests are necessary to test whether the lack of a significant relationship between diverse 
interest group collaboration and policy adoption stems from the fact that the proposed 
mechanism of interest group influence is incorrect, or because the key dependent and 
independent variables do not accurately measure the underlying concepts.  The next 
chapter will outline my next steps in this regard.  
 
   
 148 
Table 6.1. Description of Policy Goals and Prevalence of Strict, Moderate, and Lenient 
Policies under TANF by 1999 
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Table 6.2. Correlations between Policy Measures across States 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) 
(A) Work requirements 1.000     
(B) Time limits 0.228 1.000    
(C) Sanctions  0.024 0.414 1.000   
(D) Earnings disregards  -0.047 0.056 0.273 1.000  
(E) Benefit generosity  -0.093 0.330 0.332 0.370 1.000 
(F) Family caps  0.122 0.210 0.274 0.199 0.205 
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Dev. 436 16.2 3.6 4.0 6.5 $106 
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Table 6.4. Dependent Variables for Tests of Diverse Coalitions Hypothesis 
Family Cap (0, 1) 
 21 states enacted a family cap 
Strength of Welfare-to-Work Policies (1, 2, 3) 
 9 states enacted strict sanctions, short time limits, low benefits, high disregards (3) 
 14 states enacted lenient sanctions, long time limits, high benefits, low disregards (1) 
 27 states enacted mixed set of strict and lenient policies (2) 
Strict Policy Adoption (0, 1, 2, 3) 
 7 states enacted strictest sanctions, time limits, and work requirements (3) 
 15 states enacted 2 of 3 strictest policies (2) 
 16 states enacted 1 of 3 strictest policies (1) 
 12 states enacted no strict policies (0) 
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 Table 6.5. Description and Mean Values, Independent Variables  
Strength of Anti-Poverty Advocates Mean 
 Presence of Anti-
Poverty Advocates 
Total number of interest groups registered to 
lobby on welfare issues in 1997  
25.5 
   
 Presence of Diverse 
Coalition Partners 
Family Cap Policy: 
Number of diverse partners in each state in 
1997, of the following 4 groups: (1) National 
Organization for Women, (2) American Civil 
Liberties Union, (3) Catholic Conference, (4) 
National Right to Life Committee 
2.0 
 Other Welfare Policies: 
Total number of organizations in each state 
registered to lobby on women‘s issues, civil 
rights issues, or public interest issues, in 1997 
20.4 
Government Pressure  
 Liberalism of State 
Government 
Ideological score for each state government on 
0 to 100 scale, with higher values indicating 
greater liberalism (1996) 
40.2 
   
 Lack of Generosity of 
State Government in 
Non-Welfare Areas 
Percent of uninsured children, 1996 9.1% 
   
 Budgetary Capacity Gross State Product, 1996 (millions of dollars) $160,215 
   
 Lack of Innovation in 
Welfare Policy 





 Percent of AFDC 
Caseload Minority 
Proportion of state‘s AFDC caseload that was 
African American or Hispanic in 1996 
43.0% 
 
Policy Problem Indicators 
 
 Unmarried Birth Rate Percentage of births born to unmarried women 
in 1996 
31.2% 
Other Control Variables  
 Size of State Interest 
Group Population 
Total number of interest groups registered to 
lobby in 1997 
690 
   
 Professionalism of 
State Legislature, 1996 
 18.2 
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Table 6.6. Logistic Regression Results, Adoption of Family Cap Policy by 1999  
  
Anti-Poverty Advocates, 1997 0.193* 
 (0.109) 
Diverse Coalition Partners, 1997 1.391* 
 (0.839) 
Interaction, Advocates*Partners -0.041 
 (0.034) 
Problem Indicator, 1996 -0.251* 
 (0.130) 
Percent Minority on AFDC Caseload, 1996 0.089*** 
 (0.032) 
Liberalism of State Government, 1996 -0.014 
 (0.020) 
Lack of Generosity in Social Policy, 1996 0.348** 
 (0.166) 
Lack of Innovation in Welfare Policy 0.042 
 (0.076) 
Budgetary Capacity, 1996 0.000 
 0.000 
Professionalism of State Legislature, 1996 -2.653 
 (5.400) 






Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.7. Logistic Regression Results, Adoption of Family Cap Policy by 1999, 
using Interest Group Measures from 1990  
  
Anti-Poverty Advocates, 1990 -0.047 
 (0.192) 
Diverse Coalition Partners, 1990 0.090 
 (0.747) 
Interaction, Advocates*Partners 0.027 
 (0.090) 
Problem Indicator, 1996 -0.148 
 (0.104) 
Percent Minority on AFDC Caseload, 1996 0.056*** 
 (0.021) 
Liberalism of State Government, 1996 0.000 
 (0.016) 
Lack of Generosity in Social Policy, 1996 0.194 
 (0.139) 
Lack of Innovation in Welfare Policy 0.011 
 (0.066) 
Budgetary Capacity, 1996 4.25e-06 
 (4.62e-06) 
Professionalism of State Legislature, 1996 -0.993 
 (4.807) 






Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Anti-Poverty Advocates, 1990 -0.193 0.152 
 (0.162) (0.128) 
Diverse Coalition Partners, 1990 -0.073 -0.135 
 (0.158) (0.143) 
Interaction, Advocates*Partners 0.018 0.0003 
 (0.014) (0.009) 
Liberalism of State Government, 1996 0.018 -0.025** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Lack of Generosity in Social Policy, 1996 -0.010 0.039 
 (0.102) (0.085) 
Lack of Innovation in Welfare Policy 0.022 -0.022 
 (0.048) (0.048) 
Percent Minority on AFDC Caseload, 1996 -0.028** 0.022* 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
Budgetary Capacity, 1996 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Size of State Interest Group Population, 1997 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Professionalism of State Legislature, 1996 2.543 0.421 
 (3.819) (3.435) 
   
Intercept 1 1.038 -3.922 
 (4.603) (4.433) 
Intercept 2 3.922 -2.176 
 (4.644) (4.415) 
Intercept 3  -0.471 
  (4.419) 
   
Observations 50 50 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6.9. Strength of Advocates, Partisan Control of the State Legislature, and 






















California 53 56 High No No No 
Michigan 37 25 NA
37
 Yes No Yes 
New York 56 36 High Yes Yes NA 
Wisconsin 22 18 High Yes Yes NA 
New Jersey 23 11 High Yes No No 
Mass. 49 24 High No No Yes 
Florida 30 16 High Yes No No 
Texas 36 36 Low Yes Yes NA 
Washington 42 30 High Yes No Yes 
Maryland 19 16 Low No No Yes 
Minnesota 67 57 Low No Yes NA 
Colorado 27 20 Low Yes No No 
Mississippi 13 25 Low No No No 








                                                 
37
 Unfortunately, I was unable to access state newspapers in Michigan for the specified period (January 1, 
1995 – January 1, 1999) because online library resources for the University of Michigan do not include 
access to state newspapers for this period (surprisingly).  Information regarding diverse coalition formation 
was gathered from national newspaper sources.  
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This dissertation has attempted to answer the following questions: (1) Do 
advocates for the poor build diverse coalitions as a strategy of legislative influence? (2) If 
so, under what conditions do they build diverse coalitions? (3) Are diverse coalitions 
associated with legislative influence?  Some of these questions have been answered, but 
future tests are necessary to provide a more rigorous test of the theory. In this chapter, I 
provide a review and discussion of the key findings from the empirical analysis, and 
outline my next steps on the project. 
Review and Discussion of Key Findings 
 
 
Diverse Coalition Building as a Strategy of Political Influence 
 
The empirical analysis provides support for the first question.  Advocates for the 
poor sought to build diverse coalitions as a strategy of legislative influence during 
welfare reform.  These coalitions were almost never about increasing the monetary 
resources of a coalition, and were only sometimes about increasing the electoral 
resources of a coalition.  Rather, partnerships were about diversifying the informational 
resources that a group of actors could offer a lawmaker.  Sometimes, coalitions 
diversified the type of resource being provided – for example, when a group with a large 
number of members collaborated with a group with substantive expertise.  Other times, 
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coalitions diversified the range of a single type of resource – for example, when a group 
with expertise in one policy area worked with a group with expertise in another policy 
area.  In both cases, the partnerships utilized the different capabilities and specialties of 
the each member organization.  Collaboration was not simply about increasing the size of 
support or opposition to a policy, but was rather about bringing different types of 
resources to bear on a policy debate.  
During welfare reform, diverse coalitions varied in their level of formality.  
Informal collaboration was far more pervasive than formal cooperation. At both national 
and state levels, organizations frequently worked together to share information and 
coordinate lobbying strategies.  Most of the time, these informal partnerships led to joint 
sponsorship of media ads or demonstrations, or coordination of strategies behind the 
scenes.  Less often, these partnerships resulted in the formation of formal, diverse 
coalitions. In addition, organizations sometimes attempted to build formal, diverse 
coalitions, but did not succeed.  
 While diverse collaboration was not the only strategy used to gain influence, the 
fact that groups on all sides of the policy debate engaged (or, at least, tried to engage) in 
diverse coalition building provides support for the hypothesis that such strategies are an 
important and underexplored strategy of political influence.  Future research on lobbying, 
coalition building, and legislative influence ought to more explicitly take into account 
organizational strategies for diversifying – rather than simply augmenting – lobbying 
resources through partnerships with other groups. 
In addition, the fact that a great deal of diverse collaboration was informal in 
nature suggests that the heterogeneity of support or opposition to a policy – rather than 
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simply the costliness of the lobbying effort – may be an important factor underlying 
political influence.  Informal collaboration surely costs less than formal coalition 
building.  When organizations work together informally, the diversity of their voices may 
help them gain influence even if collaboration is not very costly.  As mentioned in the 
third chapter, this insight builds on a body of research that views heterogeneous signals 
(rather than the costs of lobbying) as a mechanism of influence in legislative settings.  
Future iterations of my theory will more explicitly take into account these two distinct 
mechanisms of influence (costly lobbying versus heterogeneous signaling). 
 
Conditions for Diverse Coalition Building 
With respect to the second question, when coalitions did form during welfare 
reform, a necessary condition for diverse coalition building was the presence of an 
advocacy group with a history of central involvement in a policy domain. All advocates 
that built coalitions at national and state levels were key players in the social welfare 
policy domain, and had been for many years.  These advocates may have had a greater 
number of contacts at other organizations, which would likely aid in collaborative 
processes.  They also may have been respected by potential partners, which would also 
help them collaborate.   
 The empirical tests illustrate that other features of the political context were not 
necessary conditions for diverse coalition formation.  Among these were the level of 
political conflict and the partisan control of the legislature.  At the national level – where 
strong advocates existed and Republicans controlled the legislature – diverse coalitions 
formed on child exclusion issues, which were some of the most contentious issues within 
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welfare reform.  However, formal, diverse coalitions did not emerge on program structure 
(i.e. entitlement) issues, also an area of high conflict.  At the state level, there is evidence 
of diverse coalition formation in some states that witnessed high conflict and were under 
Republican control, but not others.  Thus each of these conditions, independent of the 
other, seems to provide a sufficient condition for diverse coalition formation in states in 
which there existed a group that was a central player in the advocacy group community. 
But none on the contextual factors appeared necessary.  
 Together with the findings discussed in the previous section, this suggests that a 
greater distinction be drawn between trying to build a diverse coalition (whether informal 
or formal) and actually succeeding.  The primacy of organizational factors (specifically, 
an organization‘s history of involvement in a policy community) over contextual factors 
(such as partisan control of government and level of conflict) may have to do with the 
fact that only organizations who had been central players in a policy community actually 
succeeded in building coalitions.  Or, alternatively, it may be the case that contextual 
factors are not systematically related to whether an interest group tries to partner and/or 
succeeds in partnering with diverse organizations.  In either case, the current project is 
unable to sort out these two hypotheses because it assumes that when organizations try to 
build coalitions, they succeed.  This suggests that the second question is better posed as a 
series of questions: Under what conditions do advocates for the poor attempt to build 





Diverse Coalitions and Legislative Influence 
With respect to the third question, there is limited evidence of interest group 
influence – in the sense of an organization persuading legislators to change their policy 
preferences – through diverse coalition building.  The fifth chapter finds that at the 
national level, participants attributed some policy successes to the work of anti-poverty 
advocates (Haskins 2006; Weaver 2000; Winston 2002).  Some of these policy successes 
were on child exclusion issues, the only issues on which formal coalitions formed.  
However, for these instances of success, it is difficult to isolate the influence of diverse 
coalitions because advocates for the poor engaged in such a wide array of lobbying 
strategies.  For example, on child exclusion issues, many respect social scientists – from 
both the left and the right – argued against policies like the family cap in hearings 
testimony (Haskins 2006).  It is difficult to say whether it was the expertise of a large 
number of scholars, or the efforts of a diverse coalition, that ultimately led to the removal 
of mandated child exclusion policies in the PRWORA.  At the state level, there is little 
support for the idea that advocacy groups, in building diverse coalition, influenced policy 
outcomes.   
While not inconsistent with a large body of literature that finds little to no 
influence of interest group lobbying on policy adoption (see Baumgartner and Leech 
1998, Baumgartner and colleagues 2009, and Smith 1995 for reviews), the current 
analysis does not allow me to wholly reject the hypothesis that diverse coalition building 
(or the potential for diverse coalition building) influences policy adoption, particularly at 
the state level.  This is because the variables used to measure state policy adoption, 
interest group strength, and diverse policy support may be inadequate proxies for the 
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underlying concepts.  Future research is necessary to provide a more rigorous test of the 
theoretical model. 
 
Next Steps and Future Research 
My next steps in this project are as follows.  As discussed above, several 
modifications to the theoretical model are necessary.  First, the next iteration of the 
theory will draw a greater distinction between costly lobbying as a mechanism of 
influence and heterogeneous signaling as a mechanism of influence.  While both 
mechanisms may be at play when diverse groups collaborate, it is necessary to separate 
these ideas at a theoretical level in order to develop better empirical tests of the theory. 
For example, a test of the costly lobbying hypothesis would focus on actual instances of 
formal diverse coalition formation, while a test of the heterogeneous signaling hypothesis 
would focus on the diversity of support or opposition to a policy, rather than actual 
coalition formation.  Second, the next version of the theory will separate attempts to build 
diverse coalitions from actual instances of diverse coalition formation in order to derive 
better predictions regarding the conditions of diverse coalition formation and influence.   
Revisions to the state-level empirical tests will focus on obtaining better measures 
for state policy adoption, the presence of organizational advocates for the poor, and the 
diversity of support or opposition to welfare policies.  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, I will utilize continuous as well as dichotomous measures of state policy 
adoption to determine whether continuous measures are better able to capture 
relationships between interest groups and policy choices. I also intend to use variables 
that measure legislative votes, in addition to final policy decisions. 
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I plan to revise the state-level interest group measures in the following ways.  
First, using the 15-state analysis, I will compare the lists of ‗welfare‘ organizations from 
Gray and Lowery‘s data to the groups mentioned in newspaper reports and existing case 
studies to better gauge the extent to which the Gray and Lowery data capture interest 
group involvement in welfare policy debates.  Second, I will gather additional data to 
determine whether any of the diverse partners were actually active during welfare reform 
(by taking a position, lobbying independently, or working collaboratively with anti-
poverty advocates).  This will allow me to determine (a) whether diverse collaboration 
across the hypothesized partners actually existed, and (b) whether diverse support or 
opposition behind particular policies actually existed. 
At the national level, I plan to draw out case comparisons of advocacy group 
activity across the issues within welfare reform (focusing on child exclusion policies, 
entitlement issues, and work policies), and explore in greater detail collaborative activity 
among intergovernmental and conservative organizations.  With respect to the case 
comparisons, the current analysis focused almost exclusively on issues in which diverse 
collaboration occurred.  However, paying greater attention to the issues on which diverse 
partnerships did not form may provide greater insight into the factors that shaped 
coalitional activity as well as the influence of such coalitions.  
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 5, I was surprised by the level of 
collaborative activity among intergovernmental and conservative groups – in part because 
existing research on interest group advocacy during welfare reform focuses almost 
exclusively on the activities of liberal advocacy groups. However, it is clear that both 
organizational actors from all sides of the policy debate engaged in diverse collaboration.  
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Furthermore, the diverse partnerships that formed within the National Governors‘ 
Association, for example, provide support for a central aspect of my theory: that interest 
groups, in diversifying the resources they can offer to legislators, can gain greater 
influence over the legislative process. 
 
Conclusion 
To return to the question that motivated this project: How do advocates for the 
poor achieve influence in legislative settings?  This analysis reveals that advocates 
employ many different types of strategies.  Sometimes, advocates moderate their 
positions so as to gain access to legislators normally opposed to their viewpoints.  Other 
times, they develop expertise in particular substantive areas and cultivate reputations for 
credibility.  Still other times, they turn to coalition building in order to diversify the 
resources they can bring to bear in the policy battle.  Whether an advocate chooses the 
last strategy depends somewhat on the context.  Advocates need partners with whom they 
can ally.  But the choice of strategy also depends somewhat on the organization itself: 
groups with a history of involvement in a policy network are much more likely to form 
diverse coalitions. 
This project shows that diverse collaboration, whether formal or informal, is an 
important strategy for many types of interest organizations.  I began this project with the 
assumption that because organizational advocates for the poor had few resources with 
which to influence legislators, they would be more likely to engage in diverse coalition 
building.  However, the case study of welfare reform at the national level revealed that 
organizational actors with ample political resources also engaged in diverse 
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collaboration. This suggests that formal and informal diverse collaboration is an 
important area for future study within the interest group literature. 
While revisions to the theory and empirical tests are necessary, future research is 
also warranted because existing state-level research on interest group influence on 
welfare policy adoption across states fails to consider any relationship between 
organizational advocates for the poor and state policy adoption (see Soss et al. 2001, 
Fellowes and Rowe 2004), despite the fact that qualitative work in this area attests to the 
importance of such organizational actors (Winston 2002).  While this dissertation 
represents only a first step in assessing the relationship between advocacy group 
influence and state social policy adoption, research that more explicitly considers the role 
of organizational advocates for the poor can make an important contribution to this 
literature.  Thinking through better ways to measure the presence and strength of 
organizational advocates for the poor, in addition to the diversity of support/opposition to 
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